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1. Abstract 
 
Proponents of positive psychology advocate that it is the absence of distress combined with 
the presence of positive functioning that is reflective of good mental health and well-being 
(Seligman & Csikszentmihalyi, 2014). There is consensus within the theoretical schools of 
well-being that the capacity to freely experience and express emotion is important to 
subjective well-being (Ryan & Deci, 2001; Ryff & Singer, 1998). Fear of Compassion (FoC; 
Gilbert et al., 2014) and Attitudes towards Emotional Expression (AEE; Joseph, 1994) are 
two transdiagnostic concepts related to distress and the ability to experience and express 
emotion in a healthy manner. The relationships between these concepts and subjective well-
being were explored for the first time in a community sample of 331 adults aged between 18 
and 89 who completed the AEE questionnaire (Joseph et al., 1994), FoC scales (Gilbert et al., 
2014), Positive and Negative Affect Scales (Watson, Lee, & Tellegen, 1988), and Positive 
Functioning Inventory (PFI; Joseph & Maltby, 2014). Correlations revealed that more 
negative AEE and greater fears of compassion were associated with lower levels of 
subjective well-being. Partial correlations and multiple regressions provided evidence that 
FoC and AEE explain unique variance in subjective well-being. Thus, whilst both concepts 
relate to the processing, and expression of, emotions, they appear to act through different 
mechanisms. It is suggested that FoC and AEE may map on to different aspects of the 
Cognitive-Experiential Self-Theory (CEST; Epstein, 2003), with FoC proposed to map onto 
the emotional-cognitive experiential system and AEE suggested to map onto the cognitive 
rational system. Theoretical and clinical implications are discussed; for example, the utility of 
AEE and FoC to both distress and subjective well-being, and the value in conceptualising 
mental health on a single continuum as done by the PFI (Joseph & Maltby, 2014). 
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2. Introduction 
2.1 Overview 
 
 An argument will be presented relating to the benefits of assimilating principles of 
positive psychology, specifically well-being, into clinical psychology practice, a discipline 
whose literature is skewed towards understanding distress. Definitions of subjective and 
psychological well-being will be outlined with a focus on the role of emotions in both. The 
importance of emotional expression will be considered within a cognitive model of emotional 
regulation that highlights potential processes that may block emotional expression. The 
literature regarding two concepts thought to be implicated in the blocking of emotional 
experience and expression, Attitudes towards Emotional Expression (AEE) and Fear of 
Compassion (FoC) originating from Cognitive Behavioural Therapy and Compassion 
Focused Therapy respectively, is then reviewed. The research questions of whether AEE and 
FoC are significantly associated with subjective well-being, and if so, whether the explained 
variance is shared or unique, are then posed. To begin with key definitions of terms used in 
the thesis referring to different aspects of well-being will be presented. 
 
2.2 Definitions of Terms used in this Thesis 
 
 Taken from the Oxford dictionary definitions, the term ‘mental health’ will be used to 
refer to an individual’s condition with regard to their psychological and emotional well-
being, meaning that mental health can range from high distress to high well-being. The term 
well-being refers to an individual’s state of overall happiness. The term ‘distress’ refers to an 
individual’s state of psychological distress, and could for example signal low mood and high 
anxiety. To add further clarity to the terms used, figure 1 presents how the terms relate to 
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each other with mental health seen as an overarching continuum with distress and well-being 
representing its poles. Figure 1 is influenced by the proposed hierarchically organised 
conceptualisation of mental health, advocated by Joseph and Wood (2010). In figure 1 the top 
level of the hierarchical structure is presented, other levels of the proposed structure of 
mental health will be considered in latter parts of the thesis. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1 Schematic of the terms used on mental health continuum taken from Joseph and 
Wood (2010) 
 
2.3 Rationale for Focusing on Well-Being 
 
During the course of the past decade well-being has received an increased research 
interest within the field of clinical psychology, perhaps exemplified best by the field of 
positive psychology (Seligman et al., 2005). This appears to have translated to the service 
level, as the past decade has seen significant change, guided largely by the health economics 
arguments presented most notably by Lord Layard (2006), in how mental health services are 
provided within communities. Lord Layard (2006) document led to the creation of Improving 
Access to Psychological Therapy (IAPT) services that amongst offering high intensity 
psychological intervention for specific conditions, also offer low-intensity well-being and 
psychoeducation interventions. In many counties across the UK the emergence of often 
separately commissioned well-being services has been observed. These services tend to allow 
Well-being Distress 
Overarching concept: 
Mental Health 
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clients to self-refer to the service and as the title of the service suggests, the aim is to improve 
positive well-being.  
 
At a governmental level, initiatives have emerged within the UK for the well-being of 
populations to be measured to supplement more traditional measures of Gross Domestic 
Product. Within the UK, since 2011 the annual population survey has included four questions 
aimed to measure well-being (Tinkler, 2015). The questions enquire about the amount of 
positive and negative affect experienced (‘Overall, how happy did you feel yesterday?’ and 
‘Overall, how anxious did you feel yesterday?’) as well as life satisfaction (‘Overall, how 
satisfied are you with life nowadays?’) and sense of worth/meaning (‘Overall, to what extent 
do you feel the things you do in your life are worthwhile?’). These are measure on a ten point 
Likert scale. The field of clinical psychology has a responsibility to take opportunities to 
engage with service level changes and government policy which encourages the reflection on 
well-being. One way the profession of clinical psychology can engage with the concept of 
well-being in a critical way is to draw insight from the positive psychology literature. 
Positive psychology can be defined as the study of human flourishing and optimal 
functioning and amongst other contributions has advocated for the single continuum 
approach to mental health as shown in figure 1 (Gable & Haidt, 2005; Joseph and Wood, 
2010). 
 
 2.3.1 The Assimilation of Positive Psychology into Clinical Practice 
 
 Clinical psychology strives to provide an alternative to the diagnostic-based medical 
conceptualisation of distress. Amongst other contributions the profession has at times 
advocated for a continuum approach of mental health ranging from functional to 
dysfunctional whereby evidence-based psychological formulations, models and theories may 
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supplement or replace diagnostic classifications in order to understand dysfunction and 
inform recommendations and interventions (BPS, 2011, 2013). It is argued that the 
continuum approach enables a less stigmatising way of understanding poor mental health 
without pathologising individuals. However, like the medical model, historically clinical 
psychology has a disproportionate focus on the alleviation of distress as opposed to the 
understanding of well-being. This has been highlighted within the field of positive 
psychology that posit that it is the absence of distress combined with the presence of well-
being that signifies good mental health (Seligman, Steen, Park, & Peterson, 2005). As such a 
positive psychology critique is that clinical psychology practice should attempt to both reduce 
distress and build well-being in therapy.  
 
 Whilst the critique of clinical psychology from positive psychology has high face 
validity, Joseph and Wood (2010) outlined the challenges to the assimilation and 
accommodation of positive psychology into current clinical psychology practice. They 
suggest that due to the influence of the categorical nature of the medical model, as seen in the 
Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders fifth edition (American Psychiatric 
Association, 2013) and International Classification of Diseases and Related Health 
Problems tenth edition (World Health Organisation, 1992), concepts of well-being are often 
perceived to be on separate continuums; for example, high positive affect ranges from low to 
high rather than being conceptualised as the positive poll on a depression-well-being 
continuum. As such some have suggested that much of the existing literature which clinical 
psychology bases its practice on is problematic as there are too many assumptions and too 
few inferences made (Joseph & Wood, 2010; Joseph & Maltby, 2014). Assumptions such as 
‘if trans-diagnostic concept A is associated with distress concept B, trans-diagnostic concept 
A is assumed to also be associated with well-being concept C’. To support the transition from 
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assumption to inference in the assimilating of principles from positive psychology into 
clinical psychology practice, Joseph and Maltby (2014) suggest that an awareness of the 
different theoretical positions taken in the design of standardised measures of mental health 
can help, as can the publication of research using standardised measures charting mental 
health on a high distress-high well-being continuum.  
 
2.3.2 Summary of why Positive Psychology can Help Research on Well-being  
 
 In summary, due to calls from the positive psychology literature, commissioning of 
well-being services and political interest in measuring well-being, it seems important that the 
practice of clinical psychology gains balance in its focus on both distress and well-being. As 
both a problem and potential solution have been identified in the literature there is good 
rationale to conduct research in this area to further clinical practice in the future. To better 
understand what positive psychology means by the building of well-being, definitions of 
well-being will be discussed. 
 
2.4 Well-being and how Emotion is Central to it 
 
 What constitutes well-being is both a philosophical and psychological question; a 
question which remains fiercely debated. Whilst a comprehensive overview of the debate is 
beyond the scope of this thesis, an outline of relevant concepts will be presented. The 
aforementioned definition of well-being, set out in a previous section, centred on an 
individual’s state of overall happiness. The Greek philosophies of hedonia and eudaimonia 
set out the starting points to describing what constitutes happiness. These opposing 
philosophies will be outlined, after which their influence and application within the research 
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and practice of clinical psychology is discussed, specifically in regard to their relationship 
with emotion. 
 
 2.4.1 The Opposing Philosophies in Well-being; Hedonic and Eudaimonic 
Perspectives 
 
Hedonic philosophy proposes that well-being is the experience of pleasurable 
moments. Philosophers such as Aristippus, Epicurus, Bentham, Locke, and Hobbes suggest in 
different ways that well-being is felt through the satisfaction of desire and the experience of 
pleasure, carefreeness, and enjoyment, otherwise termed the pleasant life (Diener & Ryan, 
2009). Desire is considered to relate to a yearning to maximise pleasure whilst minimising 
pain. Hedonic philosophy places the individual as the expert on what desires give pleasures to 
them, thus there are individual differences in how pleasure is derived from different 
activities, goals, needs and relationships. 
 
The philosophy of eudaimonic well-being originates with the reasoning of Aristotle. 
Aristotle argued that hedonic pleasure seeking was not reflective of well-being, but instead a 
life lived authentically and full of virtues such as, kindness, courage, and honesty, was the 
pathway to well-being. It is conceded that hedonic pleasure would often be a consequence of 
eudaimonic well-being (Waterman, 2008). Whilst originally eudaimonic well-being would 
have to be judged from the outside against the various ethical and moral preferences of 
institutions such as religion and state, recent philosophers have advocated for a person 
centred model whereby individuals are the experts in living in line with their own moral code 
and sense of authenticity (Tiberius & Hall, 2010; Waterman, 2008). Thus, eudaimonic well-
being, like hedonic well-being, can be investigated subjectively by the person themselves. 
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2.4.2 Defining Subjective Well-being and Psychological Well-being 
 
The translation of eudaimonic and hedonic well-being into psychological research and 
practice has led to the coining of the terms psychological well-being (Ryff, 1989) and 
subjective well-being (Diener, Emmons, Larsen, & Griffin, 1985). A brief outline of both will 
be given alongside a justification for the focus of subjective well-being in this thesis. 
 
2.4.2.1 Eudaimonic Well-being into Psychological Well-being 
 
Ryff’s (1989) model of psychological well-being has provided a means of 
conceptualising eudaimonic well-being. Ryff (1989) drew from Maslow’s hierarchy of needs 
(Maslow, 2013) and Rogers theory of the fully functioning person (Rogers, 1963) to identify 
six characteristics of psychological well-being; self-acceptance, personal growth, relatedness, 
autonomy, relationships, environmental mastery, and purpose. However, a plethora of other 
constructs thought to be related to psychological well-being have also found support such as 
self-acceptance, social connectedness, mindfulness, autonomy and authenticity (Huta & 
Ryan, 2010; Ryan & Deci, 2000). As such, there is a lack of consensus as to what factors 
contribute to psychological well-being and the generalisability of the literature suffers from 
the term psychological well-being being operationalised and measured differently. 
 
2.4.2.2 Hedonic Well-being into Subjective Well-being 
 
The translation of hedonic well-being has been less problematic. Diener, Emmons, 
Larsen, and Griffin (1985) coined the term subjective well-being and Kahneman (2003) used 
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it as a means of translating hedonia into clinical practice and research. Subjective well-being 
refers to the levels of negative and positive affect experienced, built on the premise that high 
levels of positive affect and low levels of negative affect reflect well-being. A person is able 
to quantify their levels of positive and negative emotions retrospectively via their memories 
regarding the experience and expression of emotions, thus it can be measured subjectively. 
One measure of subjective well-being is the Positive and Negative Affect Schedule 
(PANAS). The PANAS is a widely used self-report tool which measures the frequency of 
positive and negative affect experienced over a specified time frame (Watson, Clark, & 
Tellegen, 1988). Within the PANAS, positive affect (PA) reflects the extent to which a 
person feels enthusiastic, active, and alert. High PA is a state of high energy, full 
concentration, and pleasurable engagement. In contrast, Negative Affect (NA) is a general 
dimension of subjective distress and unpleasurable engagement that subsumes a variety of 
aversive mood states, including anger, contempt, disgust, guilt, fear, and nervousness. 
Watson, Wiese, Vaidya, and Tellegen (1999) point out that PA and NA are predominantly 
defined by the activation of positively and negatively valenced affects, respectively, so that 
the lower ends of each dimension are typified by the absence of positive affect or negative 
affect. However, the PANAS does not provide a single continuum of well-being as the PA 
and NA items are scored separately.  
 
The operational definition of subjective well-being also includes the sense of 
satisfaction with life  one feels (Deci & Ryan, 2008), thus when an individual experiences 
low negative affect, high positive affect, and has high levels of life satisfaction they are 
deemed to have better mental health. Interestingly, as general life satisfaction is a cognitive 
evaluation based on the fit between an ideal life and actual life, subjective well-being as a 
concept overlaps to some degree with the newer schools of eudaimonic philosophy. A 
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measure of subjective well-being that includes items relating to all aspects of subjective well-
being is the PFI. The PFI is a self-report measure which captures life satisfaction as well as 
positive and negative affect (Joseph & Maltby, 2014). It quantifies mental health on a single 
continuum from distress to well-being as it is an amalgamation of the short Depression-
Happiness Scale (Joseph, Linley, Harwood, Lewis, & McCollam, 2004) and the short 
Spielberger State—Trait Anxiety Inventory (Marteau & Bekker, 1992). 
 
2.4.2.3 The Inter-correlation of Subjective and Psychological Well-being 
 
 Whilst the translation of hedonic and eudaimonic well-being into subjective and 
psychological well-being has been presented in an attempt to demarcate their respective 
territories, academic debate has led to an appreciation of the shared variance and future 
integration (Huta & Ryan, 2010). A study reported a .84 correlation between psychological 
and subjective well-being in a sample of 3,032 American adult sample aged 25 to 74 years 
(Keyes et al., 2002). A British research group reported similar associations in multigroup 
confirmatory factor analysis of psychological and subjective well-being measures with 
samples ranging from 285 participants to 849 participants (Linley, Maltby, Wood, Osbourne, 
& Hurling, 2009). Linley et al. (2009) found that all subjective and well-being variables 
loaded on the same factor in a one factor solution and did not vary according to age, gender 
and ethnicity. There is cross-cultural evidence to suggest therefore that subjective and 
psychological well-being are highly associated and have areas of particular overlap with other 
concepts. Huta and Ryan (2010) proposed that the significant shared overlap between 
subjective and psychological well-being concepts is that of emotion. As such, emotion and 
subjective well-being will be discussed in the context of potential emotion-related barriers 
related to subjective well-being. 
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2.4.3 The Role of Emotion in Subjective and Psychological Well-being 
 
 Ryan and Deci (2001) outlined the relation of emotions and well-being. In terms of 
subjective well-being, it is proposed that people experience affect on an ongoing basis, and 
that this affect is valenced and easily judged as positive or negative. In terms of psychological 
well-being, it is not the experience of positive affect that is paramount, instead it is whether 
the people are able and can choose to approach emotions in a safe way. Therefore, the 
barriers one may feel or think regarding their emotional experience and expression may 
influence their subjective and psychological well-being. For example, approaching an inner 
sense of injustice may highlight that one’s autonomy has been challenged, therefore, 
approaching and responding to the subsequent emotion may lead to a future state of 
achievement and calm. From a social perspective the expression of emotions can be powerful 
in eliciting responses from other people, such as concern and care, thus has an important 
functional role in maintaining and strengthening interpersonal relationships and subsequent 
subjective well-being (Campos, Mumme, Kermoian, & Campos, 1994). 
 
 A positive psychology model of happiness contributes to the understanding of 
emotion and well-being. Seligman, Rashid, and Parks (2006) proposed the Positive affect, 
Engagement, Relationship, Meaning, and Accomplishment (PERMA) model of Happiness in 
an attempt to isolate the elements which contribute to the positive aspects of subjective well-
being. Two aspects that Seligman et al. (2006) highlights in the model are, experiencing 
positive emotions, and having strong authentic relationships with others. In other words, from 
a theoretical perspective, a prerequisite to well-being, be it subjective or psychological, is that 
an individual is freely able to choose to safely identify and express emotions whether alone or 
with other people (Ryff & Singer, 1998). Therefore, clinical psychologists interested in 
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assimilating well-being into their practice therefore also need to be interested in the barriers 
to emotional experience and expression. 
 
 2.4.4 Focusing on Subjective Well-Being 
 
 As subjective and psychological well-being are potentially highly associated and both 
related to emotions, a focus on subjective well-being will be taken. Focusing on subjective 
well-being is due to the lack of consensus within the definitions and measurements of 
psychological well-being limiting how far research findings can be generalised. Secondly, 
agreement across both philosophical and psychological schools that subjective well-being can 
either be perceived as a measure of well-being directly (i.e., hedonic well-being) or a 
consequence of high levels of psychological well-being (Compton et al., 1996). In other 
words, individuals reporting high psychological well-being would not generally be expected 
to be low in subjective well-being, particularly the aspect of life satisfaction. Focusing on 
subjective well-being also allows for alignment with current governmental well-being 
initiatives such as the annual population survey measuring well-being (Tinkler, 2015).   
 
 Now that subjective well-being has been introduced as a key concept, a more detailed 
introduction to emotion and its relationship to subjective well-being will be given.  
 
 2.5 Emotion and the Link to Subjective Well-Being 
  
As the thesis explores the relationships to subjective well-being of concepts 
associated with the processing of emotions, the broad concept of emotion will be introduced.  
After a general theory of emotion is presented, focus will turn to a cognitive model of 
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emotional expression that proposes disruptions and blocks to emotional expression at 
different stages of the emotional regulation process. Finally the relationship between AEE, a 
block highlighted in the cognitive model of emotional expression, will then be explored in 
relation to subjective well-being. The focus of the thesis on concepts that can disrupt or block 
emotional expression is due to a want to better understand the possible mechanisms involved 
when peoples patterns of emotional expression are in and of themselves the targets in 
psychological therapy.  
 
 2.5.1 A General Theory of Emotion and its Constitute Parts 
 
A general theory of emotion differentiates between arousal, experience, expression, 
and reflection (Leventhal, 1991). Before briefly defining each component, the central tenants 
of the model are that the components are partially independent and are prone to discrepancies 
(Izard, 1992). Arousal refers to physiological responses, experience refers to subjective felt 
responses, and expression, refers to observable emotional behaviours. Reflection was added 
later to the component model and refers to interpretation and evaluation of expression, 
experience, and arousal. Reflection involves the activation of general beliefs and attitudes 
held about emotional expression, for example, “crying is unmanly” or “it’s important to let 
one’s feelings out” (Kennedy-Moore & Watson, 1999). As such reflection about emotion can 
lead to emotion about emotion, for example, evaluating one’s crying as a sign of weakness 
can evoke feelings of shame. However, reflection about emotion can also alleviate emotional 
distress, for example, when crying is evaluated as being reasonable and understandable.  
 
Models of adjustment postulate that healthy emotional expression can facilitate life 
enhancing transitions between different emotional states following stressful life events 
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(Kubler-Ross, 2005; Worden, 2009) whilst non-expression of emotion can have negative 
health consequences (Pennebaker, 1985). Thus further discussion will follow regarding the 
expression component of the general theory of emotion in the context of a tendency to not 
express or to berate oneself in the reflection of the experience and expression of emotion.   
 
 2.5.2 The Functions of Emotional Expression and Non Expression 
 
Emotional expression refers to the communication of emotional experience through 
verbal and nonverbal behaviours (Gross, 1998, 1999). Kennedy-Moore and Watson (1999) 
describe emotional expression as the link between ones internal experience and the outside 
social world. From a social perspective the expression of emotions can be powerful in 
eliciting desired responses from other people, such as concern and care, thus has an important 
functional role in interpersonal relationships (Campos, 1994; Fischer, 2008), a factor 
identified in the well-being literature. As already stated, emotional expression is considered 
to be central to the process of psychological adjustment to stressful life experiences, such as 
the grief following a loss. Thus, emotional expression can be viewed as a means of turning 
emotional experience into a more tangible outward expression; the function of which can be 
to facilitate emotional processing following stressful life events and/or maintain or create 
authentic social connection.   
 
There is also a literature on the non-expression of the experience of emotion, most 
commonly termed emotional suppression. In a number of experimental studies, Pennebaker 
(1985) outlined the negative consequences of chronic emotional suppression, suggesting that 
as suppression is considered to be effortful and leads to a stress response in autonomic 
activity, it is associated with poorer physical and mental health outcomes. The general model 
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of emotion proposes that there can be discrepancies between the components; arousal, 
experience, expression, and reflection. In other words, an individual may have a strong 
emotional experience but not wish to express it based on reflections that it would be 
inappropriate to do so. Pennebaker (1985) outlined three ways that reflections made about 
emotional expression can impact emotional expression and secondary emotions; inhibited, 
regretted and reluctant. Inhibited expression’ refers to wanting to express but actively holding 
back from expressing, ‘reluctant expressing’ is expressing but not wanting to, whereas 
‘regretted expression’ is expressing and later regretting it. Reluctant and regretted expression 
may be enacted after the event and cause strong secondary emotions such as shame.   
 
It is important to note that the argument laid out so far does not subscribe to the 
simplistic notion that all emotional expression has a positive effect on mental health, whilst 
non-expression, or suppression, always has a negative effect on mental health. There are of 
course contexts when emotional expression is not indicative of maintaining or creating 
positive social outcomes. A cognitive model of emotional expression and non-expression as a 
means of regulating emotions is discussed to show the choice points that an individual may 
have when experiencing emotion and processing whether to express it or not.  
 
 2.5.3 A Cognitive Model of Emotional Expression and Non Expression 
 
The Kennedy-Moore and Watson (1999) five steps cognitive evaluation model of 
emotional expression and non-expression takes a cognitive behavioural perspective that 
highlights the active role individuals take in the regulation of emotional experience and 
expression. At each step of the model potential disruptions which can lead to non-expression 
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of emotion are outlined. The first two steps of the model operate at a preconscious level 
whilst the final three steps of the model are based on conscious processing. 
 
The first two steps consist of the preconscious processing of emotional information 
which can lead to the subsequent automatic physiological arousal resulting from a potentially 
emotion-provoking stimulus. Step two refers to one’s preconscious perception of one’s 
affective state. Disruption at this step can occur when a person is unconsciously motivated to 
block the experience of negative emotions from one’s consciousness. Disruption at this level 
has been thought of as repressive coping, a coping style in which negative aspects of the self, 
especially negative emotions, are denied without conscious recognition (Garssen, 2007; 
Lumley, 2002).  
 
The final three steps in the model are more closely linked to conscious processing. 
The third step involves the labelling and interpretation of affective response. A disruption at 
this step occurs when there is a lack of skill to label or interpret an emotional experience, thus 
leads to non-expression. Alexithymia can be thought of as a clinical form of this, whereby an 
individual is unable to identify and distinguish between different emotion states. The fourth 
step involves an evaluation of affective response in terms of beliefs and goals. Disruption can 
be due to negative attitudes concerning emotional expression. In the fifth step, one perceives 
whether one’s immediate social context permits the expression of emotions. Disruption at this 
level involves the perception that one lacks socially accepted opportunities to express 
emotions in an adaptive way. Lumley (2002) asserted that disruptions at steps four and five 
can be referred to as the volitional and conscious inhibition of emotion, thus are distinct from 
repression as outlined in step three. 
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2.5.4 Relationship between Emotion, Emotional Expression, and Subjective Well-
being 
 
The general theory of emotion and cognitive evaluation of emotional expression can 
be considered in relation to subjective well-being in the following ways. Firstly, linked to the 
arousal component of the general model of emotion it may be that individuals vary in their 
physiological responses to emotion provoking situations, for example are hypersensitive to 
negative emotion events and hyposensitive to positive emotion events. Secondly, linked to 
the experience aspect of the general model of emotion and repressive coping style outlined in 
step two of the cognitive evaluation model, people will vary in their experience of a primary 
emotion. Thirdly, at the more conscious processing levels of the cognitive evaluation model 
and reflection component of the general emotion model, individuals will vary in the 
acceptability of experiencing and expressing the primary emotion, and will subsequently 
experience different secondary emotions following the experience of a primary emotion such 
as elation or anger. By considering the general model of emotion and the cognitive evaluation 
model it would seem that the affective components of subjective well-being, positive and 
negative affect, could be impacted by an individual’s unique relationship to emotion and the 
expression of it. It would also appear to be that some of an individuals’ relationship is based 
on consciously held beliefs or attitudes about emotion with regulate emotional experience and 
expression, whilst other aspects of the relationship with emotion operate at a more 
preconscious emotional coping level.  
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2.5.5 The Focus on Emotional Processing in Therapies 
 
The cognitive evaluation model (Kennedy-Moore & Watson, 1999) presents potential 
disruptions to emotional expression, some operating in preconscious processing and others in 
conscious processing. A key point to take away from the discussion so far is that individuals 
are often faced with choices regarding their emotional expression; choices which are often 
heavily impacted by the personal beliefs, attitudes and perspectives held by the individual. 
Dysfunctional beliefs about emotion and the expression of it are sometimes the therapeutic 
target in a range of evidence-based psychological therapies as means of reducing distress. For 
example, in Compassion Focused Therapy patients are encouraged to cultivate awareness and 
kindness to able to approach all experience without self criticism (Gilbert, 2009). 
In Cognitive Behaviour Therapy unhelpful beliefs about emotions may be addressed and 
challenged as a specific form of dysfunctional assumption (Beck & Beck, 2011). 
In Mindfulness-Based Cognitive Therapy the repeated practice of bringing non-judgmental 
awareness and acceptance to feelings, thoughts and sensations may reduce more automatic 
unhelpful beliefs about emotions (Segal, Williams, & Teasdale, 2013). Similarly, in 
Acceptance and Commitment Therapy participants are encouraged to feel emotions fully and 
without defence, as an alternative to experiential avoidance (Harris, 2009). In Dialectical 
Behavioural Therapy components are included which likely modify beliefs about emotions, 
including mindfulness, distress tolerance, and emotional regulation methods (Lynch & 
Bronner, 2006).  
 
A range of therapies approach how individuals consciously relate to their experience 
and expression of emotion, with a number seeming to consider the importance of taking a 
non-critical stance to ones emotions which enables an increased freedom to feel and express 
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emotions in an assumed healthy way. In other words within the cognitive paradigm the 
importance of non-critical mindset in ones thinking about their experience can be a common 
therapeutic aim. To study how the regulation of emotional expression may impact on 
subjective well-being two trans-diagnostic concepts will be explored in more depth. The 
relationships that AEE taken from the Cognitive Behavioural Therapy approach and FoC 
taken from the Compassion Focused Therapy approach, have on subjective well-being will be 
introduced. 
 
2.6 The Relationships between AEE, FoC, and Mental Health 
 
 The key constructs to this thesis of AEE and FoC will be defined before relevant 
literature regarding the relationships with mental health are summarised. To aid the 
understanding of FoC being introduced to the current thesis, relevant theory will be outlined 
to explain the relationship to emotion and mental health. To begin with though, the literature 
on AEE and mental health will be reviewed. 
 
 2.6.1 The Relationship between AEE and Mental Health 
 
Cognitive behavioural theories of emotion suggest that far from individuals being 
passive in the experience of emotion, individuals are constantly interacting with their 
environment and inner experience in attempts to regulate emotion and their expression or 
non-expression of it (Gross. 1998; 1999). The choice of expression or non-expression is 
conceptualised by the aforementioned Kennedy-Moore and Watson’s (1999) cognitive 
evaluation five step model of emotional expression and non-expression.  
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In the conscious processing steps of the model, Lumley (2002) asserted that 
disruptions of expression can be referred to as the volitional and conscious inhibition of 
emotion. They suggested that broad cultural dicta such as ‘keep a stiff upper lip’ or ‘let it all 
hang out/wear your heart on your sleeve’ as well as more specific cultural situational norms, 
e.g., ‘cry at a funeral but never at work’ combine to create the ‘shoulds’, ‘oughts’, and 
‘musts’ of emotional expression and nonexpression. In other words, the cultural dicta 
regarding emotional expression are internalised as attitudes. An ‘attitude’ can be defined as a 
relatively enduring organisation of beliefs, feelings and behavioural tendencies towards 
socially significant objects, groups, events or symbols (Vaughan & Hogg, 2005).   
 
2.6.2 The Measurement of AEE 
 
Attitudes about emotional expression can therefore range from good to bad (Olson & 
Zanna, 1993). The AEE is a 20-item measure which specifically assesses the negativity of 
attitudes about emotional expression (Joseph, Williams, Irwing, & Cammock, 1994). 
Example items include ‘If a person asks for help it is a sign of weakness’, ‘I should always 
have complete control over my feelings’, ‘My bad feelings will harm other people if I express 
them’, and ‘I seldom show how I feel about things’. The authors of the AEE originally 
designed the measure to add specificity to the cognitive behavioural theory that individuals 
with dysfunctional assumptions are predisposed to mental ill health when such assumptions 
are activated in the here and now by critical incidents (Beck & Beck, 2011). The AEE 
focused on traumatic events, however, the scale has been used in other population groups. 
 
The Dysfunctional Attitudes Scale (Beck, Brown, Steer, & Weissman, 1991) has been 
used to measure dysfunctional attitudes, beliefs and assumptions; however, its construct 
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validity has been called into question due to inconsistent causal links between cognitions and 
mental health.  As such, in the interest of specificity, the AEE was intended to provide a 
means of measuring potentially dysfunctional attitudes towards the specific area of emotional 
expression. Whilst the AEE scale was initially validated with trauma populations (Joseph et 
al., 1994), it has been used with other populations including community samples (Spokas, 
Luterek, & Heimberg, 2009; Wong, Pituch, & Rochlen, 2006) as the measures conceptual 
underpinnings are not trauma specific and instead as aforementioned the AEE is based on the 
role of cognitions in all human behaviour and well-being. With this said, the AEE is 
predominately a measure of attitudes about emotional expression as opposed to a 
comprehensive measure of the behaviour of emotional expression or non-expression. This 
distinction is important as the theory of planned behaviour (Azjen, 1991) posits that whilst 
attitudes explain much variance in predicting behaviour, other important factors also explain 
variance such as peoples sense of control over their behaviours. As such, the use of the AEE 
enables this thesis comment on the attitudes people hold which are speculated to contribute to 
their emotional behaviours as suggested by Azjen’s (1991) theory of planned behaviour. 
 
 2.6.3 Systematic Review of the AEE and Mental Health Literature  
 
A systematic literature review was conducted in August 2016 to identify studies 
exploring the association between AEE and mental health. There are other measures 
concerning attitudes and beliefs about emotions such as the Beliefs about Emotions scale 
(BES; Rimes, 2010) and the Ambivalence about Emotional Expression (AEQ; King & 
Emmons, 1990). When considering which measure to use within the literature, two strengths 
of the AEE were noted that rendered it a good fit for the current study. Firstly, the BES and 
AEQ have been found to be unidimensional measures (Rimes, 2010; Mongrain & Vettese, 
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2003) compared to the AEE’s four factor solution (Laghai & Joseph, 2000; Spokas, Luterek 
& Heimberg, 2008). As the current study aimed to explore how attitudes about emotional 
expression were related to well-being, having greater specificity within different types of 
attitudes was preferred. A second area of difference is that AEQ was conceptually interested 
in the inner conflict people feel when expressing emotions and was developed out of the 
conflict over goals literature, otherwise termed personal strivings (Emmons, 1986). The BES 
(Rimes, 2010) was designed to measure the negativity of beliefs about both the experiencing 
and expression of emotions, however, as it has been shown to have a one factor solution the 
measure does not allow for attitudes about the experience and expression of emotion to be 
differentiated. Therefore, the AEE measure is the only one to be able to quantify different 
types of beliefs about the specific act of emotional expression.   
  
To limit results to those which used the AEE scale (Joseph et al., 1994) the search 
term ‘Attitudes towards emotional expression’ appearing in all text was used. As the 
literature is relatively small, no search terms were included regarding mental health to ensure 
that all studies using the AEE were found. Results were limited to English language and those 
which were published in peer-reviewed journals. Using the EBSCO host to search PsychInfo, 
PsychArticles, and Medline, 80 studies were identified. Of these studies 11 reported 
associations between AEE and measures of mental health. Review of the reference lists 
identified one further study. In total 12 studies were reviewed.  
 
2.6.3.1 AEE and Anxiety 
 
Associations with anxiety were reported in two studies using community samples 
Spokas, Luterek, & Heimberg, 2009; Wong, Pituch, & Rochlen, 2006). Wong et al. (2006) 
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used the Manifest Anxiety Scale (Bendig, 1956) which has good internal consistency, and 
reported in an all-male sample of 227 participants, a significant small correlation between 
more negative AEE and higher levels of trait anxiety. Having recruited a sample of 95 
undergraduate students who, based on self-report measures, were categorised into low, mild 
to moderate and high levels of social anxiety groups, Spokas et al. (2009)  analysed group 
differences in AEE. Spokas et al. (2009) reported that the high social anxiety group had a 
higher AEE mean, followed by the mild to moderate group and finally by the low group. 
Spokas et al. (2009) concluded that the more negative AEE is the greater distress in the form 
of social anxiety. Spokas et al. (2009) controlled for participants ability to attend to emotion 
and describe emotion and found the relationship between AEE and distress remained.  
 
2.6.3.2 AEE and Depression and Eating Disorder Psychopathology 
 
Relationships between AEE and other forms of distress and specific 
psychopathologies have also been reported. Joseph et al. (1994) reported a small significant 
association between AEE total score and depression as measured by the Beck Depression 
Inventory (Beck, Ward, Mendelson, Mock, & Erbaugh, 1961), in a mixed student sample. 
Small yet significant linear correlations were reported in community samples, showing that 
more negative AEE was associated with more distress. The measures used by the studies so 
far are direct measures of distress; anxiety and depression. Meyer, Leung, Barry, and De Feo 
(2009) and Haslam, Arcelus, Farrow and Meyer (2012) reported associations between AEE 
and psychopathology, in other words indirect distress. In all female community student 
samples small to medium effect sizes between negative AEE and eating disorder relating 
psychopathology were reported (Meyer, Leung, Barry, & De Feo, 2009; Haslam, Arcelus, 
Farrow, & Meyer, 2012). The studies reviewed provide support that more negative AEE is 
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associated with distress both when measured directly and indirectly in the form of 
psychopathology.  
 
2.6.3.3 Summary of Cross-sectional Literature on AEE and Distress 
 
All relationships between AEE and distress yielded small effect sizes, whilst studies 
exploring the association between AEE and psychopathology ranged from small to medium. 
Whilst small to medium in size, these correlations are noteworthy as all were from 
community samples assumed to represent groups of people not considered to be clinically 
distressed; therefore, AEE seems to be more than a clinical term in that it is relevant to the 
mental health of community samples. The relationship between AEE and distress remained 
when controlling for other emotion related abilities such as attending and describing emotion, 
suggesting that attitudes hold a clear role in the experience of emotion. However, all of the 
studies reviewed thus far are cross-sectional thus the relationship between AEE and distress 
cannot be considered to be causal. The studies also recruited community student samples with 
mean ages in the early 20’s so it is not known whether findings can be generalised to clinical 
groups or other age groups.  
 
2.6.3.4 AEE and Post Traumatic Stress 
 
In non-student samples of participants at higher risk of exposure to traumatic life 
events, more negative AEE was again found to be associated with greater distress. Lowery 
and Stokes (2005) recruited a sample of paramedics and using a cross sectional design, found 
that more negative AEE was associated with increased Post Traumatic Stress Disorder 
(PTSD) symptomology, as measured by the Posttraumatic Diagnostic Scale (Foa, Cashman, 
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Jaycox, & Perry, 1997). Lowery and Stokes (2005) controlled for number of traumatic events 
and levels of peer support but still found the relationship between AEE and distress remained. 
Quale (2009) measured PTSD using the Impact of Event Scale – revised (Weiss, 2007) in a 
clinical sample of 79 patients who had suffered spinal cord injuries. It was found that rather 
than injury type or severity, it was more negative AEE that was found to be a risk factor for 
developing post traumatic stress symptoms both full or sub-syndrome presentations, 
alongside symptoms of anxiety. In a clinical sample of 28 females with anorexia compared 
against age matched healthy controls, the clinical group reported significantly more negative 
AEE (Jansch, Harmer, & Cooper, 2009). The results from studies recruiting at risk or clinical 
groups supports the notion that more negative AEE is associated with greater distress as is the 
case in community samples. This was found to be the case when the number of traumatic 
events and amount of peer support was controlled for, suggesting that alongside social 
factors, the psychological factor of AEE remains associated with distress. However, as in the 
community studies all of the studies were again cross-sectional so causation cannot be 
assumed. 
 
Longitudinal research by Joseph et al. (1997) and Nightingale and Williams (2000) 
support a causal role of AEE on future distress. Joseph et al. (1997) recruited a clinical 
sample of 73 survivors of a ferry accident three years post accident. Joseph et al. (1997) 
employed a longitudinal design spanning two time points at three years and five years after a 
ferry accident. Statistically significant correlations were reported between more negative 
AEE at three years and higher levels of depression, anxiety and post traumatic avoidance 
symptoms at five years, as measured by the Beck Depression Inventory (Beck, Steer, & 
Carbin, 1988) and the Spielberger State-Trait Anxiety Inventory (Spielberger, Gorsuch, & 
Lushene, 1970) and the Impact of Event Scale (IES; Horowitz, Wilner, &Alvarez, 1979). 
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However, the study suffered from a 50 percent attrition rate and when interpreted alongside 
the fact that participants were recruited three years after the trauma, there is doubt regarding 
the causal relationship as it may have been that the trauma itself that led to the development 
of more negative AEE. 
 
Nightingale and Williams (2000) designed a prospective study to test whether AEE, 
measured much earlier on after a traumatic event, could predict post traumatic stress in the 
immediate weeks following a road traffic accident. Nightingale and Williams (2000) found a 
small but significant relationship at week one for AEE and the prediction of intrusive 
symptoms at week six. Nightingale and Williams (2000) also reported that AEE scores 
remained stable over a six week period following a traumatic event, even when mood and 
distress symptoms fluctuated, suggesting that AEE is not a reflection of mood or symptoms 
and perhaps are a relatively rigid and enduring collection of attitudes. Whilst Nightingale and 
Williams (2000) provide stronger evidence for a causal role of AEE and increased probability 
of PTSD following trauma, caution is advised as a third of their participants nominated prior 
traumas other than the most recent road traffic accident as being responsible for their ongoing 
post traumatic symptoms.  
 
2.6.3.5 The Mediating Role of AEE on Distress 
 
 To add to the support provided from longitudinal studies, cross-sectional studies have 
reported on the potential mediating role that AEE may play in the development of distress. In 
all female community student samples Haslam, Arcelus, Farrow, and Meyer (2012) found 
that people’s negative AEE fully mediated between invalidating environments in childhood 
and current eating concern in adulthood; however, a small effect size was reported. Whilst the 
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effect size was small, it is noteworthy as it was a community sample. Thus, it may be that for 
some people negative AEE develop due to invalidating reactions they have received when 
expressing emotion. Whilst this maps onto the cognitive model in that early life experience 
shape core beliefs and dysfunctional assumptions (Beck & Beck, 2011) it must be noted that 
the study was cross-sectional thus causation cannot be inferred. 
 
 Similarly, in a cross-sectional community sample of 194 participants Surgenor and 
Joseph (2000) reported that an association between life events and distress, as measured by 
the Hospital Anxiety and Depression Scale (HADS; Zigmond & Snaith, 1983), was mediated 
by AEE, but only for those reporting low levels of social support. Whilst peer support had 
been controlled for in previous cross sectional studies, Castle, Slade, Barranco‐Wadlow, and 
Rogers (2008) compared AEE and perceived social support over approximately a three month 
testing period, time point one during the third trimester of pregnancy and time point two six 
weeks postpartum. Castle et al. (2008) used a longitudinal design and found that, within a 
sample of new first time parents, negative AEE was associated with parents feeling less able 
to signal their needs for social support. Whilst Castle et al. (2008) failed to report specific 
correlations, it is reported that for mothers, who represented 57% of the sample, more 
positive AEE measured antenatally were associated with higher levels of perceived social 
support measured postnatally six weeks post the birth. The relationship for men was different 
in that AEE measured at time point one was associated with perceived social support at time 
point one, but was not associated with perceived social support at time point two. 
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2.6.3.6 The Role of Social Support in AEE 
 
 Two interpretations have been made regarding the role of social support in the 
relationship between negative AEE and well-being. The first is that individuals with negative 
AEE are more likely to receive less support from their social networks, possibly due to 
negative beliefs about emotional expression leading to a compromised ability to signal for 
help and mobilise support. The other interpretation is that those with more negative AEE 
individuals tend to hold a negativity bias regarding emotional expression of themselves and 
others which blocks the experience of supportive and affiliative emotional experience which 
often comes from social support. In other words, rather than negative AEE being linked to a 
fear of negative consequences or beliefs, perhaps a resistance or difficulty experiencing and 
expressing positive social emotional experiences may be implicated.  
 
 2.6.3.7 AEE and Well-being 
 
 All of the studies reviewed focused on the relationship between AEE and distress. 
Only one paper explored the association between AEE and well-being. Castle et al. (2008) 
reported no association between AEE and well-being, however, well-being was measured 
using the General Well-being Questionnaire (Bradley & Lewis, 1990) which does not include 
items of life satisfaction thus is not a complete measure of subjective well-being. The General 
Well-being Questionnaire was also designed for clients with type-II diabetes, thus has a 
leaning towards physical well-being in a health psychology setting.  
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2.6.3.8 The Relationship between Gender and AEE 
 
Within the AEE literature two studies analysed the effect of gender (Castle et al., 
2008; Surgenor, 2000).  In a community sample of 194 participants Surgenor and Joseph 
(2000) report no gender differences. However, in Castle et al.’s (2008) sample of perinatal 
parents, a small effect size was reported in that newly expectant fathers reported more 
negative AEE than mothers (Castle et al., 2008). Whilst empirical results on gender are 
inconsistent when interpreted within the wider sociocultural context regarding the construct 
of gender, possible gender differences will be included in the hypothesis to add to the debate.  
 
 
 2.6.3.9 Summary of Literature on the AEE and Mental Health 
 
 In summary AEE appears to be a trans-diagnostic concept linked to different 
measures of distress and psychopathology in both community samples (Haslam et al., 2012; 
Meyer et al., 2009; Spokas et al., 2009; Wong et al., 2006) and clinical samples (Jansch et al., 
2009; Joseph et al., 1997; Nightingale & Williams, 2000), even when other emotion related 
abilities such as attending to and describing emotion are controlled for. In other words more 
negative AEE is consistently associated with higher levels of distress. The literature is 
unclear as to whether this relationship may differ by gender, however, one study has reported 
that men may report more negative AEE (Castle et al., 2008) thus further investigation is 
warranted. 
 
 Within stress responses to traumatic events, more negative AEE was associated with 
greater levels of post event symptomatology, as measured by different questionnaires in cross 
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sectional studies (Lowery & Stokes, 2005; Quale et al., 2009), longitudinal studies (Joseph et 
al., 1997) and negative AEE was evidenced to hold predictive value in a prospective study 
(Nightingale & Williams, 2000) even when mood and degree of symptoms were controlled 
for. Longitudinal studies suggest a causal role for AEE on future distress and in line with the 
cognitive model, there is some evidence from a community sample that an invalidating 
environment in childhood may lead to the development of self critical and negative AEE 
(Haslam et al., 2012). 
 
 There is also suggestion that perceived social support (Castle et al., 2008; Surgenor & 
Joseph, 2000) may mediate the relationship between AEE and well-being, perhaps due to 
inability to use emotion to receive positive emotions and care from others, or that an overly 
harsh and critical negativity bias regarding emotional expression may block the experience of 
supportive and affiliative emotional experience from support networks. 
 
 There is a lack of research which included direct measures of well-being. Castle et al. 
(2008) reported no significant relationship between AEE and well-being, however, the 
sample was specific in that it was new first time parents and the well-being measure used was 
not a measuring subjective well-being in its entirety. Thus generalisations from this study are 
limited. When reviewing associations between AEE and distress, it was noted that some of 
the measures used, whilst designed and used within the distress paradigm, include both 
negative and positively worded items. For example, the Spielberger State-Trait Anxiety 
Inventory (STAI; Spielberger, Gorsuch, & Lushene, 1970) consists of an equal balance of 
positive and negative items such as ‘I am content’, ‘I feel calm’, ‘I am tense’ and ‘I am 
worried’. The HADS (Zigmond & Snaith, 1983) also includes a combination of positive and 
negative worded items such as ‘I feel cheerful’ and ‘I feel tense’. Therefore, reported results 
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on the associations between AEE and distress in studies using the aforementioned measures 
(Joseph et al., 1997; Surgenor & Joseph, 2000) may also be commenting on a potential 
relationship between AEE and well-being, a notion supported by Joseph and Wood (2010). 
However, as the HADS and STAI were not designed as a measure of well-being these 
conclusions remain tentative and speculative. 
 
 AEE appears to be a useful transdiagnostic concept linked to a range of distress, 
suggested to develop as a result of childhood experience, and perhaps operating through the 
social function of emotions. Joseph et al. (1994) designed the AEE scale to provide a means 
of assessing negative, critical and dysfunctional attitudes regarding emotional expression, on 
the premise that reduced ability to express emotions leads to poorer mental health. However, 
the association to well-being is not known as it has been explored very seldom in the 
literature.  
 
 Following on from the review of AEE literature, a second concept, Fears of 
Compassion, presumed to be associated with the blocking of emotional experience and 
expression will be discussed.  
 
 2.7 The Relationship between Compassion Focused Therapy, FoC, and Mental Health 
 
 The critical attitudes and beliefs held towards emotions targeted in therapeutic 
approaches consider how well-being can be enhanced by changing how one consciously 
relates in their cognitions to their experience and expression of emotion. Gilbert (2009) 
proposed that the conceptual opposite to critical judgements are compassionate ones. 
Compassion is not an emotional state such as anger, sadness or joy, instead it has been 
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described as ones capacity for sympathy, empathic understanding and non-judging or 
condemning across all human experience (Gilbert, 2009). Compassion across all human 
experience has been referred to as flows in three directions, for others, from others, and for 
self (Gilbert, 2010; Neff, 2003). Central to all flows of compassion is the deliberate attention 
to emotion (Neff, Kirkpatrick, & Rude, 2007).  
 
 Compassion has been embraced by western psychology, largely because of the robust 
findings from the self-compassion literature of the positive association with subjective well-
being. Self-compassionate individuals have been shown to also report more positive affect 
(Neff, 2009; Neff et al., 2007; Wei, Liao, Ku, & Shaffer, 2011), less negative affect (Birnie, 
Speca, & Carlson, 2010; Leary, Tate, Adams, Batts Allen, & Hancock, 2007; Neff et al., 
2007; Wei et al., 2011), and greater life satisfaction (Wei et al., 2011). It has also been shown 
that those high in compassion report fewer symptoms of depression and anxiety than less 
self-compassionate individuals (Neff & McGehee, 2010; Ying, 2009). The concept of 
compassion has been translated into compassion focused therapy, wherein two prominent 
theoretical models help to further understand compassion and its impact on emotion within a 
therapeutic context. The tripartite affect regulation model (also known as the three circles 
compassion model) and social mentality theory will be outlined before taking a focus on the 
fears and/or resistance that some individuals feel to compassion and the emotions that a 
compassionate stance may allow. 
 
2.7.1 The Role of Social Mentalities in Compassion 
 
 Social mentality theory considers the links between motives and emotions (Gilbert, 
2009). Gilbert (2015) defines a social motive as an evolutionary motivation to secure 
FoC, AEE and Subjective Well-Being 
 
38 
 
biosocial goals such as sexual, caring, competitive, and cooperative acts. In other words a 
social motive requires interaction with other people. Motives evolved because they help 
humans survive, whereas emotions guide us to our goals and provide a feedback system of 
whether goals are met or remain unmet. Motives can relate to two broad types of mentalities 
in compassion theory; caring and competition, termed social mentalities (Gilbert, 2009). A 
social mentality is the organisation of abilities, competencies and modules which is guided by 
motives, with the aim of achieving social outcomes and roles (status, friendship, care, and 
sexual). It is interpersonal in nature and helps think about different aspects of how our minds 
are activated in different patterns in different types of relationships. Gilbert (2009) 
distinguishes between competition and caring, suggesting that when caring for others, care-
focused emotions are needed whilst threat-based emotions are turned off. In contrast, when 
competing with others, care focused emotions are turned off and desires to subdue others are 
turned on. Compassion is thought to emerge when minds seek care focused interactions at 
inter and intra personal levels. For example, at the intra-person level, a person who 
empathises with their own circumstances when being made redundant and expresses sadness 
may have a more dominate care social mentality. At an interpersonal level, a person who is 
receptive to the concern that loved ones show them when they are made redundant and 
authentically expresses gratitude to them is operating from a more dominate care mentality. 
Whilst a competition mentality can lead to a range of personal and team successes, it also has 
a tendency for critical comparisons and a yearning to be better. 
 
 2.7.2 The Role of Affect Regulation in Compassion 
 
 As social mentality theory proposes that a caring and a competition mentality direct 
the motives of humans, it is the emotions or affects that provide the feedback to confirm 
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whether motives and goals have been met or not. Compassion Focused Therapy identifies 
three types of emotion regulation; those that focus on threat and self-protection (threat 
system), those that focus on achieving (drive system), and those focused on contentment and 
feeling safe (soothing system) (Gilbert, 2010; Liotti & Gilbert, 2010). The threat system aims 
to defend the self and is associated with the flight, fight and freeze responses. The drive 
system centres on goal directed behaviour and operates on a sense of reward or failure. The 
soothing system is associated with understanding, commitment, kindness, acceptance, 
compassion and a sense of interpersonal security and connection. In individuals without 
significant distress, the three affect regulation systems tend to be activated appropriately in 
the correct contexts, thus there is a congruency to external and internal experience.  
 
 However, individuals vary in their capacity for compassion and the varying 
components of the three circles model may vary in their dominance (Gilbert & Procter, 
2006). For example, the sense of competition with others strongly activates both the threat 
and drive systems. When the systems become too unbalanced, for example the threat system 
is chronically activated a person may feel more distressed. Central to compassion focused 
therapy is the finding that the experience of compassion or affiliative prosocial emotions can 
in some individuals activate the threat system rather than the soothing system (Gilbert, 2010). 
This means that an individual can experience positive emotions such as love, interest, and 
care as threatening as opposed to restorative. Thus, potentially positive experiences such as 
the kindness or support offered from others can be experienced in a critical way. In other 
words external and internal realities are incongruent.  
 
 An aim in compassion focused therapy is to ascertain whether there may be  over and 
under activated components of the affect regulation system, for example, an over activated 
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threat system and under active soothing system. In this example, practical exercises to 
facilitate experiences being felt within the soothing system may readdress any balance issues. 
An important aspect of CFT is that it is an evolutionary theory. CFT assumes that human 
brains and minds have evolved in such a way that the competition social mentality and threat 
and drive systems are prone to be quickly activated, largely due to the better safe than sorry 
principle. Therefore, CFT is based on an evolutionary understanding of the mind, allowing 
the therapist and client to work with how the mind naturally works rather than how one 
would like the mind to work.  
 
 2.7.3 The Relationship between FoC and Mental Health 
 
 Researchers interested in compassion focused therapy realised that some people 
experienced fears or resistances to compassion and the positive affiliative emotion it can 
foster. A number of hypotheses have been put forward to attempt to explain the different 
reasons for resisting or fearing compassion. A few which have found some empirical support 
are a belief or misunderstanding that compassion is a sign of weakness or is self-indulgent 
has been reported (Gilbert, McEwan, Catarino, Baiao, & Palmeira, 2014). It is suggested that 
abusive and neglectful childhood experiences from attachment figures can lead to confusion 
and/or trauma emotion memories being reactivated by cues of positive emotions in 
interpersonal or intrapersonal settings (Liotti & Gilbert, 2010), fear of one’s own rage or 
sense that one is internally bad, e.g., if you knew the real me you would not think I deserve 
compassion  (Davanloo, 1999), unprocessed or frozen grief leading to heighten sense of 
loneliness (Gilbert & Irons, 2005), and a major reason is that of owning a self-critical rather 
than self-validating system of monitoring and evaluating oneself (Kannan & Levitt, 2013; 
Neff, 2011; Gilbert & Irons, 2004; Whelton & Greenberg, 2005). Self-critical individuals can 
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respond to compassionate exercises with physiological responses reflective of the threat 
system as opposed to the soothing systems, thus may be more in the realm of competition 
mentality (Longe, Maratos, Gilbert, Evans, & Volker, 2010; Rockliff, Karl, McEwan, Gilbert, 
& Matos, 2011). 
 
2.7.4 The Three Flows of FoC 
 
 A means of measuring people’s resistance or fear of experiencing compassionately 
(Gilbert et al., 2014) is the FoC measure (FoC; Gilbert, 2011). Lower levels of FoC are 
predictive of higher levels of actual self compassion (Gilbert et al., 2014). Like compassion 
FoC can be separated into the three directions of compassion: compassionate feelings for 
others (FoC for others), compassion from others (FoC from others), and compassion for self 
(FoC self). FoC from others concerns a fear of the affiliative emotions such as affection and 
care which are proposed to be the building blocks of secure attachments and positive feelings 
about the self and others.  FoC for others largely relates to the attitudes regarding connecting 
and helping others. FoC self can consist of a sense that compassion is not deserved, or is a 
sign of weakness (Gilbert & Procter, 2006). FoC therefore can interrupt the deliberate action 
central to compassion of attending to emotional experience in a non-judgemental manner.  
 
 2.7.4.1 Systematic Review of FoC and Mental Health 
 
 A systematic review of the literature was undertaken in August 2016 to identify 
studies exploring the relationship between FoC and mental health. As the current study was 
focused on investigating possible blocks to emotional processing related to the experience of 
compassion as defined by Gilbert (2010), the study was not interested in peoples overall 
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levels of compassion or self-compassion, instead it was interested in peoples resistance to 
experiencing compassion as this was a phenomena observed within clinical practice. To limit 
results to those which used the FoC scales (Gilbert, McEwan, Matos, & Rivis, 2011) the 
search term ‘Fear of Compassion’ appearing in all text was used. To ensure that all studies 
using FoC scales were found no other search terms such as those relating to mental health 
were used. Results were limited to English language and those which were published in peer-
reviewed journals. Using the EBSCO host to search PsychInfo, PsychArticles, and Medline, 
443 results were returned. Perusal of the results, 11 studies that directly used the FoC scales 
were identified and reviewed further. Review of reference lists did not lead to the 
identification of other research papers. As FoC is measured in three flows by three measures, 
the literature relating to each scale will be taken in turn. 
 
 2.7.4.2 Review of the Relationship between FoC Self and Mental Health 
 
 FoC self has been shown in community samples to be positively associated with 
distress such as depression (Gilbert et al., 2011, Gilbert et al., 2012, Joeng & Turner, 2015; 
Miron, Seligowski, Boykin, & Orcutt, H, 2016). In student samples using the DASS-21 
(Lovibond & Lovibond, 1995) correlation strengths ranged between .40 to .52 (Gilbert et al., 
2011; Miron et al., 2016). When using the Self-report Depression Scale (SDS; Zung, 1965) 
with a sample with an 82% female majority Joeng and Turner (2015) reported a similar 
relationship of .552 between FoC self and depression. Within a clinical sample of adults 
accessing community mental health services for depression, Gilbert et al. (2014) again used 
the DASS-21 and found large correlations between FoC self and depression. Medium sized 
positive relationships between negative affect, as measured by the PANAS negative (Watson, 
Clark, & Tellegen, 1988), were reported in an all-female community sample (Kelly & 
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Dupasquier, 2016) and mixed gender community sample (Miron, Sherrill, & Orcutt, 2015). 
Gilbert et al. (2011, 2012, 2014) also reported medium sized positive correlations between 
FoC self and stress and anxiety. In two samples of students who had experienced a DSM-IV 
defined type A traumatic event at some point in their life Miron et al., (2015; 2016) reported 
medium sized positive correlations between FoC self and post-traumatic stress 
symptomatology, whilst Kelly, Carter, Zuroff, and Borairi (2013) found a large sized positive 
correlation between FoC self and eating disorder symptomatology in an all-female clinical 
group at admission into inpatient eating disorder services. In a different sample Kelly, Carter, 
and Borairi (2014) found that an all-female clinical group of patients meeting DSM-IV eating 
disorder diagnoses had a statistically higher group mean FoC self score compared to an all-
female student sample. 
 
2.7.4.2.1 FoC Self and Well-being 
 
 Two studies explored the relationship between FoC self and positive affect. In an all-
female student sample Kelly and Dupasquier (2016) used zero-order correlations and found a 
non-significant relationship to positive affect as measured by the PANAS positive scale 
(Watson, Clark, & Tellegen, 1988). Contrary to this, Gilbert et al. (2012) used the Types of 
Positive Affect Scale (Gilbert et al, 2008) with a mixed community student sample and found 
negative associations between FoC self and feeling safe and relaxed. In other words, those 
with higher FoC self-reported lower levels of feeling characteristically safe, secure, warm, 
calm, peaceful and relaxed. The Types of Positive Affect Scale measures how characteristic it 
is for a person to experience various positive emotional states and three factors have been 
extracted from the measure leading to separate subscale scores for active, safe and relaxed 
emotion states. Active refers to feeling energetic and lively, safe refers to feeling 
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characteristically secure and warm, whilst relaxed emotion states refers to calm and peaceful 
emotional feeling. Gilbert et al. (2012) reported that effects are small, but as it was a 
community sample that was recruited the findings do suggest that higher FoC for self may be 
associated with lower positive affect. The Types of Positive Affect Scale (Gilbert et al., 2008) 
aligns with an aspect of subjective well-being as it quantifies the degree of positive emotion 
experienced by type. However, it cannot be used as a measure of subjective well-being in 
isolation as it does not enquire about negative affect or life satisfaction.  
 
2.7.4.2.2 Mediating Role of FoC Self in Distress 
 
 Path analysis and regression models provide data to suggest that FoC self may have a 
mediating role in the development of PTSD from childhood sexual and physical abuse 
(Miron et al.,2016) as well as a mediating role between the long established relationship 
between self-criticism and depression (Joeng & Turner, 2015). However, both studies were 
cross sectional in design and recruited student samples. Kelly et al. (2013) recruited a clinical 
sample and employed a longitudinal design to test whether FoC self as measured in patients 
with eating disorders at the start of their inpatient treatment, could predict changes in eating 
disorder symptomatology and self-reported shame. Kelly et al. (2013) found that baseline 
FoC self and self compassion interacted to predict changes in shame over 12 weeks of 
treatment, even when initial symptom severity was controlled for.  
 
2.7.4.2.3 Summary of FoC Self Literature 
 
 Review of the literature shows that higher FoC self is consistently associated with 
higher levels of distress with a medium to large effect size. FoC self has also been suggested 
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to hold a mediating role between self-criticism and depression, and mediate adverse early life 
events and PTSD in later life. Associations have been found across distress types and in 
studies using measures focused on mental health diagnosis such as depression, anxiety, PTSD 
and eating disorders, but also in studies using the trans-diagnostic concept of negative affect. 
The literature also shows that higher FoC self are reported in all female samples compared to 
student samples. All of the correlations reported so far are from cross-sectional designs and 
relied on self-report methodologies, as such causation cannot be assumed and report bias may 
be a problem in that participants completed all of the measures at the same point in time. 
However, a longitudinal study showed FoC self to be a predictor of reduction of shame in 
psychotherapy, thus highlighting the clinical usefulness of FoC to clinicians. 
 
 2.7.4.3 Review of Relationship between FoC from Others and Mental Health 
 
 Similar relationships were found for FoC from others and depression as reported for 
FoC self. In student samples recruited from the UK or USA, medium sized positive 
correlations were reported by Gilbert et al. (2011, 2012) in female majority samples when 
using the DAS-21 (Lovibond & Lovibond, 1995) as a depression measure. A different 
measure of depression, the Self-report Depression Scale (SDS; Zung, 1965), but again with a 
female majority sample, a large sized correlation was reported between FoC from others and 
depression. Hermanto et al. (2016) recruited separate samples from Canada, England and 
Portugal and found medium to large positive correlations between FoC from others and 
depression as measured by the Beck Depression Inventory-II (Beck, Steer, & Brown, 1996). 
The Portuguese sample of 302 adults also had a male majority and controlled for gender and 
ethnicity affects which were found to be non-significant. In a clinical sample Gilbert et al., 
(2013) found a medium to large strength correlations between FoC from others and 
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depression, anxiety and stress. Medium strength correlations were also reported in 
community samples between FoC from others and anxiety and stress. In an all-female student 
sample, Kelly and Dupasquier (2016) reported a large positive correlation between FoC from 
others and negative affect, and a small yet significant negative correlation with positive 
affect. Gilbert et al. (2012) measured positive affect using the Types of Positive Affect Scale 
(Gilbert et al., 2008) and reported that only the safe type of affect scale was significantly 
associated to a small degree with FoC from others. 
 
 2.7.4.3.1 Mediators of FoC From Others and Mediating Role of FoC From Others 
 
 Cross sectional correlational studies revealed medium to large associations between 
attachment patterns and FoC, such as anxious attachment style and higher FoC from others 
(Gilbert et al., 2011), and medium correlations between FoC from others and alexithymia 
(Gilbert et al., 2012). Whereas, FoC self was found to mediate the relationship between self-
criticism and depression, FoC from others was not found to mediate this relationship (Joeng 
& Turner, 2015), however, Hermanto et al. (2016) found through simple slope analysis that 
the association of self criticism and depression was found to be strongest in those with high 
FoC from others. Kelly and Dupasquier (2016) suggested that the relationship between 
parental warmth in childhood and FoC from others is partially mediated by social safeness; 
however, this was a cross-sectional study so causation is based on theoretical argument. The 
theoretical argument suggests that individuals’ ability to receive and trust displays of care and 
compassion from others may be most tied to soothing system of the tripartite model of 
emotional regulation. Perhaps through the experience of warmth and support in early life one 
is then able to be vulnerable and trusting enough of others to receive in a compassionate tone 
as opposed to feel unsafe or threatened by such encounters. 
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2.7.4.3.2 Summary of FoC From Others Literature  
 
The literature shows that FoC from others is consistently associated to distress and studies 
have used a range of questionnaires. All studies are cross sectional and rely on a self-report 
design therefore suffer from the same limitations as the FoC self literature of not proving 
causation and suffering from report bias. The literature on FoC from others includes research 
from different countries and whilst often samples are unbalanced in gender, Hermanto et al. 
(2016) provide support that gender is not a confounding variable. There is little evidence 
available to comment on the potential relationship between FoC from others and subjective 
well-being, but two studies do report that higher FoC from others is associated with lower 
positive affect being experienced, particularly in the experience of safe positive affect such as 
feeling characteristically secure and warm. Data from path analyses have suggested that early 
life experiences of parental warmth and healthy attachment patterns may lead to the 
development of less FoC from others. The role of FoC from others in the relationship of self-
criticism and depression seems different from that mooted in FoC self, in that those low in 
FoC from others do not report the self-criticism-depression relationship. 
 
 2.7.4.4 Review of Relationship between FoC to Others and Mental Health 
 
 When compared to FoC self and FoC to others, FoC for others has been investigated 
the least in the literature. However, three studies by Gilbert et al. (2011, 2012, 2013) explored 
the links of FoC to others and stress, depression, anxiety, and positive affect. Two studies 
explored stress using the DASS-42 on community samples and found that FoC for others 
showed small yet statistically significant associations (Gilbert et al., 2011, 2012). The 
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relationship with anxiety was reported by three studies, two community samples (Gilbert et 
al., 2011, 2012) and one a clinical sample (Gilbert et al., 2013). All used the DASS-42 to 
assess anxiety and yielded small yet statistically significant association. FoC to others was 
not found to be statistically associated to positive affect in the areas of safe, relaxed or active 
positive affective states. 
 
 
2.7.4.5 The Relationship between Gender and FoC 
 
 
 
Within the FoC literature gender differences were reported in five studies (Joeng & 
Turner, 2015; Gilbert, 2011, 2012, 2013; Miron, Sherrill, & Orcutt, 2015). Two found no 
gender differences on FoC scores (Joeng & Turner, 2015; Miron, Sherrill, & Orcutt, 2015), 
though the proportion of men in Joeng and Turner’s (2015) sample was just 18.4% and 
36.1% in Miron, Sherrill, and Orcutt’s (2015) raising the possibility of a gender sample bias. 
Two community sample studies reported that men reported more fears than women on the 
FoC self and FoC from other subscales (Gilbert, 2011, 2012), with small to medium sized 
correlations reported. In a separate clinical study a small correlation was reported showing 
that women reported more fears than men on the FoC from others scale (Gilbert, 2013), 
however, Gilbert (2013) used a small sample of 52 participants with a gender bias as 69% of 
the sample being female. Findings from the literature are inconsistent, thus the possibility that 
FoC may be shaped by gender constructions will be considered in thesis to add to the existing 
evidence base. 
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 2.7.4.6 Summary of the Literature on FoC and Mental Health 
 
 Associations were consistently reported between more FoC self, more FoC from 
others and greater levels of a variety of distress, with some studies reporting medium to large 
effect sizes in community and clinical samples. Greater FoC from others was also found to be 
associated with lower levels of positive affect. FoC to others was found to hold smaller 
relationships with distress than reported in FoC self and FoC from others. There were no 
studies found exploring the possible association between FoC and subjective well-being. As 
such, research is needed in order to consider whether findings regarding distress could then 
be extended to well-being. 
 
 FoC self was found to be a mediator in the relationship between self-criticism and 
depression, and adverse life events in childhood and PTSD, and a predictor of reduction in 
eating disorder symptomatology and shame. FoC from others was found to mediate the 
relationship between self-criticism and depression in those with high FoC from others but not 
those with low FoC from others. Positive associations were found for both FoC self and FoC 
from others between unhealthy attachment styles based on childhood memories and higher 
levels of FoC.  The relationship between parental warmth in childhood and FoC from others 
was also found to be mediated by social safeness, suggesting that an individual’s ability to be 
compassionate to the self and receive compassion from others is learnt from childhood 
experiences of feeling safe, secure and the recipient of warmth. 
 
 The presented evidence regarding FoC comes predominately from the founder of 
compassion focused therapy, Paul Gilbert (Gilbert et al., 2011, 2012, 2013). This reality 
highlights the possible inherent bias present as measures used relate to theoretical 
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underpinnings of compassion focused therapy, specifically the affect regulation model and 
social mentalities theory. Other authors have begun to use measures designed by Gilbert 
(Joeng & Turner, 2015; Miron et al., 2015; Kelly et al., 2013, 2014; Kelly & Dupasquier, 
2016), but it is clear that further work by other authors is needed, specifically, those using 
measures of subjective well-being. The studies reviewed have often recruited psychology 
graduates thus further studies recruiting a more varied sample are required. The literature 
presents an inconclusive view on how gender and FoC relate to each other, as such possible 
gender differences will be included as a hypothesis to attempt to add to the debate. The 
literature on FoC will also benefit from other authors exploring the relationship with other 
transdiagnostic concepts developed outside of the compassion focused therapy approach as 
this will help ascertain the overlap and uniqueness of the contributions of such concepts on 
mental health.  
 
2.8 Do AEE and FoC explain Unique or Shared Variance in Subjective Well-Being 
 
 The literature has shown consistently that more negative AEE and higher FoC are 
associated with more distress. However, there is very little literature showing that less 
negative AEE and lower FoC are associated to greater subjective well-being. Thus, it is not 
possible to comment on the relationship between FoC, AEE and mental health when using a 
definition of mental health which ranges from high distress to high well-being. Two questions 
emerge from the existing literature, firstly, are FoC and AEE associated with subjective well-
being alongside distress and therefore able to be considered in relation to mental health, and 
secondly, do AEE and FoC explain unique or shared variance. A search of the literature 
yielded no studies examining the relationship between AEE and FoC. As such to help 
consider whether AEE and FoC may explain unique or shared variance, one can draw from 
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the empirical literature for FoC and AEE, as well as from the underlying theoretical 
perspectives of CBT and CFT. Following a brief discussion of the literature and relevant 
theoretical perspectives, dualist theories are presented as a means of speculating on the 
uniqueness of the AEE and FoC. 
 
2.8.1 Overlapping Findings from AEE and FoC Literatures 
 
 As already discussed, the literature shows both AEE and FoC to be associated to 
distress and to be perhaps a mediating factor between adverse childhood experiences and 
distress in adulthood (Gilbert et al., 2011; Haslam et al., 2012; Miron et al., 2016). Within the 
AEE and distress literature it is posited that a learnt overly harsh and critical negativity bias 
regarding emotional expression may block the experience of supportive and affiliative 
emotional experience from support networks (Surgenor and Joseph, 2000). Within the FoC 
literature, self reported dysfunctional attachment relationships and lack of parental warmth in 
childhood was associated with greater FoC, and a lower sense of social safety was found to 
mediate this path. Therefore the research suggests that both negative AEE and greater FoC 
may develop through similar processes rooted in attachment relationships with care-givers. 
Perhaps therefore it is not just the absence of an invalidating childhood experience, but also 
the presence of attachments perceived as warm and safe, which enable emotions to be 
experienced in a non-critical manner, that is conducive to high subjective well-being in future 
life. 
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2.8.2 Theoretical Perspectives of AEE and FoC 
 
From a theoretical perspective it is also useful to reflect on how FoC and CFT 
originated. Therapy goals in CBT are often achieved through a position, typically, of 
disputation (i.e. faulty thinking). Over the course of therapy, the therapist and client work 
collaboratively to collate evidence which challenges unhelpful or distorted thinking in the 
here and now so that the client can move towards a more rational way and helpful way of 
thinking. Joseph et al. (1994) designed the AEE scales to represent cognitive components of a 
behavioural tendency of emotional suppression. However, clients can sometimes continue to 
feel the same negative affect even though distorted negative automatic thoughts and 
dysfunctional assumptions have been challenged rationally. Gilbert (2009) observed that 
these clients in CBT understand intellectually, but do not feel emotionally, for reasons such as 
their dysfunctional relationship to emotion, for example tendency to suppress or avoid 
emotion. This predicament can leave clients feeling less hopeful that their mental health will 
improve. Beck and Beck (2011) acknowledged the importance of emotion in the process of 
successfully restricting dysfunctional cognitions. Beck and Beck (2011) described that 
cognitive change occurs in the fires of affect, meaning that the cognitions which are 
emotionally salient are identified in the presence of emotion and the contrary evidence to 
challenge dysfunctional cognitions need to be emotionally salient in order to have the desired 
impact. 
 
 CFT has taken Beck and Beck’s (2011) description of the fires of affect one step 
further by identifying that for some clients, the fires of affect evoke a threatening experience, 
even when the emotion is affiliative, thus the lack of compassion can act as a block to 
emotional and cognitive change in therapy. Clinical evidence of a combined approach using 
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CBT and CFT comes from a case study wherein the effectiveness of therapy homework was 
shown to increase with the addition of emotionally held beliefs as proposed in CFT (Harris & 
Hiskey, 2015). In the case study it was found that the benefits of the facilitation of 
challenging intellectually based beliefs through thought challenging and behavioural 
activation was limited to the clinic with little evidence of carryover to the client’s daily life. 
However, the addition of an intervention based on emotionally based beliefs, in the form of 
facilitating learning within imagined safe interpersonal relationships, led to the client’s 
processing beliefs and emotions which led to behavioural and emotional change. The authors 
emphasised the importance of considering both the cognitive and emotional experience of a 
client as they learn about themselves in clinical practice and propose in the title that ‘it ain’t 
what you say it’s how it’s said that counts’ (Harris & Hiskey, 2015).  
 
2.8.3 Dualist Perspective of AEE and FoC 
 
 Therefore, it may be that the dualist description of the processing of cognitions and 
emotions as described by Beck and Beck (2011) and Gilbert (2009), and presented in a 
clinical case example by Harris and Hiskey (2015), may be a way of understanding the 
unique contribution held by AEE and FoC in mental health. If this were the case, two models 
may help to better conceptualise AEE and FoC; Sappington’s (1990) dualist cognitive 
processing theory and Epstein’s (2003) cognitive-experiential self-theory (CEST). These 
models have been selected as they explicitly describe the dynamic relationship between 
cognitions and emotions. Sappington (1990) had earlier referred to this dualist viewpoint of 
cognitive and emotion processing when commenting on how emotional expression can 
facilitate increased self understanding via cognitive and emotional processing pathways. 
Sappington (1990) defined cognitive processing as intellectually based beliefs or attitudes 
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which are perceived as rational and factual, whereas emotionally based beliefs are 
subjectively perceived as nonrational and supported only by feelings or intuitions. Sappington 
reported that emotionally based beliefs were not affected by objective information. Thus, 
psychotherapy targeting dysfunctional emotional expression may benefit from focussing on 
both cognitive and emotional processing as evidenced by Harris and Hiskey’s (2015) case 
example due to emotionally held beliefs not responding to objective rational contrary 
evidence.  
 
 Epstein’s cognitive-experiential self-theory (CEST; 2003) is an integrative theory of 
personality and offers a similar perspective regarding the processing of information. Epstein 
(2003) proposes a conscious rational system and preconscious experiential system. The 
experiential system is said to be an evolved emotionally driven and is an organised and 
adaptive system developed through experiential learning, much like that seen in the many 
higher order animals. Epstein (2003) described how the experiential system encodes 
information from both individual events that were highly emotionally arousing, and from 
more general experiences in the form of narratives and metaphors. The rational system 
encompasses the culturally specific rules of reasoning that are internalised by people. The 
rational system is based on concrete and abstract reasoning and is unique to humans and is 
capable of reflection on the experiential system. Whilst both the experiential and rationale 
systems are cognitive, the experiential system is strongly related to affect as such can be 
considered an emotional-cognitive system.  
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2.8.3.1 Summary of FoC, AEE, and Dualist Theories 
 
 It is argued that perhaps a unique contribution from AEE and FoC to well-being may 
be understood by mapping AEE on to Sappington’s (1990) cognitive/intellectual based 
processing pathway and Epstein’s (2003) conscious rational system which are both largely 
based on cognitive learning about expression of emotion, whilst FoC may map onto 
Sappington’s emotional processing pathway and Epstein’s experiential system which are 
more associated with felt intuitions and sense of feeling. In support of this view negative 
AEE has been proposed to develop due to individuals learning that emotional expression is 
unacceptable or will have negative consequences (Haslam et al ., 2012). CFT proposed that it 
is a fear of experiencing or expressing positive affiliative emotions in a safe way that can be 
increased by abusive or neglectful interpersonal experiences, thus leads to an underactive 
soothing system and overacting drive and threat system. Therefore, whereas AEE focuses on 
a cognitive behavioural learning cycle based on behaviour outputs and negative 
reinforcement, FoC considers an individual’s emotional sense of safety and security driven 
by emotion drive and motivational systems, which are inherent to being human but can also 
be shaped by attachment patterns.  
 
2.9 Rationale for Thesis 
 
 In bringing together the ideas discussed so far, it is suggested that clinical psychology 
would benefit from assimilating the well-being principles of positive psychology into its 
practice where appropriate. Subjective well-being is the focus of this thesis due to the greater 
degree of consensus regarding the definition and measurement of it compared to 
psychological well-being, its relationship to psychological well-being as either a prerequisite 
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or outcome, and that subjective well-being is being used in governmental well-being 
initiatives. The therapeutic concepts AEE and FoC have been found to be associated with a 
range of distress in community and clinical samples. FoC and positive affect has been shown 
to be associated to a small degree, but subjective well-being was not measured in any study. 
AEE and well-being was reported not to be associated in a study of new parents, however, as 
the sample was such as specific group it is hard to generalise from these findings to regular 
community samples. As such, the current thesis wishes to explore the relationships that AEE 
and FoC have with subjective well-being and whether there are gender differences. Joseph 
and Wood (2010) suggest that the inclusion of tools to measure distress and well-being 
together will help clinicians in three ways: It will help them better understand the extent to 
which they are already working to increase well-being; it will help them to develop 
approaches which actively serve to promote well-being whilst alleviating distress; and finally 
it is hoped that a better understanding of such issues will help clinical psychologist make use 
of the empirical findings that well-being serves a preventative function against future 
psychopathology and relapse (Watson & Naragon-Gainey, 2010). 
 
 As already discussed, the theoretical perspective of mental health and subjective well-
being is that it relies on the ability of an individual to approach emotional experience, be it 
positive or negative (Campos, 1994; Fischer, 2008; Ryff and Singer, 1998), as chronic 
emotional suppression has been linked to a variety of poor physical and psychological 
outcomes (Pennebaker, 1985). AEE and FoC are proposed as possible blocks to emotional 
expression and processing in two popular therapies, CBT and CFT. An aim of this thesis is to 
extend the knowledge in the area of how the transdiagnostic therapeutic concepts of FoC and 
AEE relate to subjective well-being. More specifically, as AEE and FoC have not been 
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directly compared in a single study it is unknown whether the concepts explain unique or 
shared variance in subjective well-being.  
 
2.10 Hypothesis for the Thesis 
 
1) More negative AEE will be associated with lower levels of subjective well-being. This is 
based on findings that negative AEE are associated with distress and are deemed to block 
emotional processing which is important to healthy adjustments.  
 
2) More FoC will be associated with lower levels of subjective well-being. This is based on 
findings that FoC are associated with distress and are deemed to block interpersonal 
relationships which are important in well-being. 
 
2.11 Exploratory Research questions 
 
Gender differences in the relationships between AEE, FoC and well-being will also be 
investigated as the existing literature has not reached consensus on this. 
 
Secondly, as it is not known how AEE and FoC will explain unique or shared 
variance in subjective well-being, an exploration of the relationships will be undertaken. The 
following exploratory questions will be posed: 
1) Are FoC and AEE unique or overlapping in the variance explained in subjective well-
being?  
2) How much variance in subjective well-being do FoC and AEE separately account for?  
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3) How much do demographic variables explain the relationships between AEE, FoC, and 
well-being? 
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3. Methods 
3.1 Epistemology 
 
The present study was driven by a critical realist epistemology (Bhaskar, 1978). 
Critical realism can be thought of as occupying the middle ground between positivism and 
constructivism (Schmidt, 2001). In short, positivism proposes that there is a true reality out 
there that is tangible and directly measurable (Popper, 1959), whilst constructivism argues 
that no objective reality exists out there that can be measured, instead there are multiple 
subjective realities constructed by the belief systems of individuals (Berger & Luckmann, 
1991).  Critical realism can therefore be described as drawing on a realist ontology with a 
relativist epistemology. That is, an objective reality exists but knowledge of it can only be 
estimated rather than perfectly detected due to the limitations on measurement.  
 
Bhaskar (1978) proposed that three layers of reality exist, ‘the real’, ‘the actual’ and 
‘the empirical’. ‘The real’ are the underlying mechanisms that are responsible for what we 
observe, yet these are unseen so can only be speculated on. ‘The actual’ refers to the 
observable events which are caused by the mechanisms in the real. Finally, ‘the empirical’ 
refers to the experience of the observer and the speculations they make about the real. 
The current study utilises a quantitative methodology to measure the relationships between 
FoC and AEE and subjective well-being. The study assumes that the attitudes participants 
self report, regarding to AEE, FoC and subjective well-being, reflect ‘the empirical’ layer of 
reality as it acknowledges that individuals’ reporting of internal experience is highly 
influenced by their interpretations of measures, as well as their attitudes and values towards 
their experience. For this reason ‘the real’ layer can be speculated on but not directly 
measured. 
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3.2 Design 
 
The current research uses a cross-sectional correlational design. The dependent 
variable is subjective well-being, and the independent variables are FoC and AEE. 
 
3.3 Procedure 
 
3.3.1 Recruitment Procedure 
  
 The study recruited a community sample of adults aged 18 years and older. Inclusion 
and exclusion criteria’s were limited to an adult only sample as many of the measures were 
standardised on adult samples, thus only people aged 18 years or over could participate. The 
other inclusion criterion was that participants had to be English speaking as the 
questionnaires were only available in this language. In keeping with the theoretical 
underpinnings of the thesis having limited exclusion criteria meant that the community 
sample would likely represent a wide spectrum of mental health continuum.  
 
Using snowball sampling, participants were invited to distribute questionnaires to other 
people once they had completed it. Adults of working age were recruited via the social and 
work networks of the researchers. Thus recruitment invitations were made to adults working 
at the University. Recruitment also used purposive techniques to maximise the likelihood of 
reaching a wide age range as previous research had predominately recruited student samples, 
particularly within the FoC literature. Older adults are underrepresented in research 
publications within the field of mental health (Witham & McMurdo, 2007). As such, attempts 
were made in the methodology to overcome the potential barriers to recruiting older adults as 
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reported by Hiskey and Edwards (2013) and Mody et al. (2008) such as accessibility. As such 
in the present study organisations working with older people such as Age UK, University of 
the Third Age branches, and pensioners associations and social clubs were approached and 
contacted via letter, telephone call and e-mail in the hope that this would negate the need for 
travel to a specific location other than somewhere already visited by potential participants. 
For each of these the local branch secretary or managers were contacted with information 
about the research before participants were given either the link to the online questionnaire or 
a paper copy. To ensure that those over 75 years old were represented drop-in centres 
providing services for those in this age range were contacted. 
 
3.3.2 Study Procedure 
 
The survey was designed on Qualtrics and was distributed using the Qualtrics online 
link survey via email. If participants had no access to computers, paper copies of the 
questionnaires were posted with Freepost addressed envelope included for returning 
completed questionnaires (addressed to the lead researcher at the Health & Human Science 
School, University of Essex). 
 
Before the questionnaires were completed, participants were shown an information 
page (see appendix A) which outlined their rights as a participant, along with a brief 
discussion about the subject matter of the questionnaires, approximate time frame, and 
instructions on how to progress with the questionnaire.  
 
Cassidy et al. (2001) proposed that within clinical research, ongoing support and 
building a sense of trust was important to older participants. The researchers’ contact details 
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were given in case participants had any unanswered questions and the availability of the 
researchers was emphasised to increase a sense of support and trust. Participants gave consent 
by confirming that they had read a consent page (see appendix A). 
 
A debrief sheet outlining help-points appeared at the end of the questionnaire (see 
appendix B). Contact details of the researchers were again given and people who might have 
been distressed were instructed to contact the team first in order for them to refer them on to 
an appropriate source of support. When participants had completed the questionnaires they 
were again asked to confirm their consent by either submitting their responses for the study 
or withdrawing from the study by closing the internet browser. Participants were then invited 
to share the link to the questionnaire with other people.  
 
Jancey et al. (2006) reported that the decision making process to participate by older 
participants was influenced by whether written results would be provided and whether it 
seemed an opportunity for them to learn. Therefore, the benefit of learning about ones 
attitudes was clearly communicated on the information sheet. Also, for those who wished to 
receive written results, the opportunity to supply their email or postal address was given so as 
to facilitate the sharing of written results from the study. 
 
The completed questionnaires were then electronically collated by the lead researcher. 
The data collected on the Qualtrics system was downloaded into a format compatible for 
SPSS. Responses to the paper questionnaires were inputted into the same SPSS file. No 
identifying information was entered into SPSS. 
3.4 Measures 
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3.4.1 Dependent Variables of Subjective Well-being  
  
3.4.1.1 Positive and Negative Affect Scale (PANAS; Watson, Lee, & Tellegen, 1988).  
 
The PANAS consists of 20 adjectives, each of which is rated on a 5-point scale from 1 
(very slightly or not at all) to 5 (extremely). The mid-point is described as ‘moderately’. 10 
items contribute to the positive affect scale (e.g. enthusiastic, excited, and active) and 10 to 
the negative affect scale (e.g. upset and afraid). There are no questions regarding the 
participants’ mental health in terms of suicidality or general mental health problems. The 
measure has been standardised with multiple temporal conditions, in this study to link up 
with other the instructions of other measures, participants are asked to think about how they 
have been feeling over the past few weeks when completing the scales, e.g., in the past few 
weeks have you been feeling Interested? (See appendix C) 
 
From the original validation student sample the Cronbach’s alpha’s for the positive 
and negative scales are .89 and .85 respectively and show a clear two factor solution 
following factor analysis (Watson et al., 1988). Cronbach’s alpha’s were also found to be 
good, .85 for negative scale and .89 for positive scale in a larger community sample 
(n=1003) with a greater age range 18 to 91 years. 
 
Watson, Lee and Tellegen (1988) reported good convergent validity with distress 
measures in the form of medium to large correlations with the beck depression inventory 
(Beck, Ward, Mendelson, Mock, & Erbaugh, 1961), the Hopkins Symptom Checklist 
(Derogatis, Lipman, Rickels, Uhlenhuth, & Covi, 1974), and the State-trait Anxiety Inventory 
(Spielberger, Gorsuch, & Lushene, 1970).  
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The authors of the scale created the PANAS through factor analysis of an initial 60 
items of positive and negative affect as reported by Zevon and Tellegen (1982), before 
reducing it to 37 Items which loaded heavily on the positive or negative factor whilst also 
having a small secondary loading on the other factor were initially included (Watson, Clark, 
& Tellegen, 1988). This was reduced further to 10 items on each scale following reliability 
analysis. 
 
The authors suggest that positive and negative affect represent two separate 
dimensions of mood. When used with temporal instructions of how one feels today it can 
reflect day to day fluctuations in mood, whereas when used with temporal instructions 
spanning months to a year it represents a more dispositional stable entity. In a recent review 
of well-being measures, Linton, Dieppe, and Medina-Lara (2016) categorise the PANAS as a 
measure of subjective well-being in that it calculates the extents one has experienced 
cognitive and emotional states. The PANAS reflects an aspect of subjective well-being in that 
it focuses solely on experience of emotional and cognitive states. The PANAS places positive 
affect and negative affect on separate continuum ranging from low to high. As such a low 
positive affect score represents a very low/or non-existent experience of positive affect but 
does not reflect any distress. Whereas, a high negative affect score represents a high degree 
of distress, but not necessarily a low level of positive affect. Both scores have to be 
interpreted on their separate continuums to comment on the overarching concept of subjective 
well-being as in order to conclude high subjective well-being, one would report low negative 
affect alongside high positive affect. 
3.4.1.2 Positive Functioning Inventory (PFI; Joseph & Maltby, 2014).  
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The PFI is a 12-item self-report tool developed to assess a spectrum of functioning 
ranging from distress to well-being. Participants are instructed to report how frequently they 
have felt a certain way over the past week including today. Items are rated on a four point 
Likert scale (never, rarely, sometimes and often) ranging from zero to three. Example items 
include ‘I felt dissatisfied with my life’, ‘I felt happy’, and ‘I felt upset’. Higher scores 
indicate greater positive functioning. The highest possible score on the PFI-12 is 36 and 
indicates full endorsement of the six positively worded items (pleased, enjoyable, happy 
content, calm, relaxed) and a lack of endorsement of the six negatively worded items 
(dissatisfied, cheerless, meaningless, upset, tense, worried). Conversely, the lowest possible 
score of 0 would indicate a lack of endorsement of the positive items and full endorsement of 
the negative items (appendix D). 
 
The authors report that in two samples comprising 242 (sample one) and 301 (sample 
two) undergraduates with age ranges of 18 to 47, internal consistency reliability was found to 
be acceptable .87 and .86 respectively. Test-retest reliability on sample two was .62 after a 
six month gap, suggesting the measure is moderately stable over time. The authors also report 
good convergent and discriminant validity in relation to a number of other measures of 
personality, social, physical and psychological functioning. 
 
The PFI measures subjective well-being in that it has items on experience of positive 
and negative emotions, but also has items enquiring about the concept in subjective well-
being of life satisfaction. Another aspect of the measure to consider is the theoretical 
perspective it takes in relation to distress and well-being. The authors propose that unlike the 
traditional categorical taxonomy of anxiety and depression as separate from normal 
experience, anxiety and depression are viewed as one end of the same continuum whilst at the 
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other end is calmness and happiness. Thus the dimension the measure creates is one of 
anxiety/depression – calmness/happiness. Joseph and Wood (2010) describe this type of a 
continuum approach as a strong lower order continuum as the concept of distress and well-
being reside on a single continuum with no lower order aspects below it which are combined 
to create an overarching well-being score.  
 
3.4.2 Measures of Independent Variables 
 
3.4.2.1 Attitudes towards Emotional Expression Scale (AEE; Joseph, Williams, Irving, 
& Cammock, 1994)  
 
The AEE is a 20-item self-report measure assessing negative AEE. Response options 
are on a 5-point Likert scale ranging between one-to-five that represents degree of agreement 
‘disagree very much’ to ‘agree very much’. There is a ‘neither agree nor disagree’ middle 
response option. The responses can be summed to produce an overall score or analysed using 
the four subscales, with higher scores reflecting more negative AEE. All items are negatively 
worded so that a maximum score of 100 represents the most negative attitudes held about 
expressing emotions, whilst a score of zero represents the least negatively attitudes, however 
as all items are negatively worded it cannot be assumed that a score of zero represents 
positive AEE. Example items include ‘it is shameful for a person to display his or her 
weaknesses’ and ‘you should always hide your feelings’.  
 
Factor analysis has shown that underneath an overarching total score, four factors 
exist which have been broken into four subscales. These refer to:  beliefs about emotional 
expression being a weakness (weakness); that expressing emotion will lead to social rejection 
FoC, AEE and Subjective Well-Being 
 
67 
 
(social rejection); views about having to always be in control of emotions (control); and using 
emotional suppression as a way to cope with strong feelings (bottling up) (Laghai & Joseph, 
2000; Spokas et al., 2008). Joseph et al. (1994) suggests that bottling up represents a 
behavioural tendency of emotional suppression whilst the other three subscales represent 
cognitive components. One item from the bottling up subscale is reversed scored. 
 
The internal consistency of the subscales has been reported as satisfactory (α=.77 – 
.90) within an undergraduate sample aged between 16-61 years old (Joseph et al., 1994; 
Laghai & Joseph, 2000). Good convergent validity was demonstrated by showing negative 
associations between the AEE and openness, agreeableness and extraversion scores from the 
NEO Five Factor Inventory in a sample of adults aged 16-81 years old (Costa & McCrae, 
1992). 
 
The measure built on a four item measure by Williams et al. (1993) which was 
designed for clinical work with patients who had experienced trauma. In line with the four 
item measure, the twenty item measure has added additional items in the aforementioned four 
subscales. The theoretical perspective underlying the design of the measure comes from the 
cognitive behavioural tradition and cognitive theory of post-traumatic stress. In line with 
cognitive behavioural theory, it is attitudes which shape interpretations of events which cause 
people to feel as they do, not the event per se (Beck, Emery, & Greenberg., 1985). Joseph et 
al. (1994) wanted to add specificity to the kind of dysfunctional assumptions often 
encountered in therapy. Within the cognitive theory of post-traumatic stress, dysfunctional 
attitudes regarding emotional expression can hinder the patients processing of traumatic 
events and keep them stuck in re-experiencing the trauma in a highly distressing way 
(Williams et al,. 1993). The measure was therefore built with a view that negative AEE can 
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prolong distress and stop the healing process. Whilst it was not built specifically on a theory 
of well-being, cognitive behavioural theory provides a continuum of dysfunctional to 
functional with the assumption being that functional cognitions are required to live without 
distress. 
 
3.4.2.2 Fear of Compassion Scales (FoC; Gilbert, McEwan, Matos, & Rivas, 2011)  
 
FoC consists of three scales assessing the nature of individuals’ attitudes towards 
different aspects of compassion: expressing compassion for others (10 items), responding to 
the expression of compassion from others (15 items) and expressing kindness and 
compassion towards oneself (17 items). Responses are on a 5-point Likert scale ranging from 
0-don’t agree at all to 4-completely agree. The midpoint response set is ‘somewhat agree’.   
The instructions ask the participant to rate the extent that they agree with the statements. 
Example items are ‘I fear that being too compassionate makes people an easy target’, 
‘wanting others to be kind to oneself is a weakness’, and ‘getting on in life is about being 
tough rather than compassionate’.  
 
The scales can only be used separately with higher scores reflecting greater fears 
towards compassion which represents a higher level of potential resistance towards the 
experience of receiving or giving compassion. Each of the subscales produces a score which 
falls on a single continuum ranging from low to high levels of fears. The wording of the 
response set used means that a low score represents a low level or no fear towards 
compassion. However, it cannot be assumed that a low score necessarily reflects a positive 
view and embracing of compassion.    
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The scale was originally developed on samples of students with an age range of 18 to 
59 years and therapists with an age range of 26 to 61 years. Internal consistency of the 
subscales was reported as good for students (α=.84-.92) and for therapists (α=.76-.86) 
(Gilbert et al., 2011). Within a clinical sample with an age range of 21 to 70 years of age, 
Gilbert et al., (2014) report Cronbach’s alphas for compassion to self and to others were .93 
and .91 respectively. 
 
The measure was created when clinicians noticed that some patients found 
compassion would lead to avoidance or fear responses (Gilbert, 2010). It is theorised that 
positive emotional states can be conditioned to negative states (Arieti & Bemporad, 1980; 
Gilbert, 2010). Based on attachment theory (Bowlby, 1980), Gilbert (2005, 2010) focused on 
how affiliative emotions usually associated with interpersonal closeness can be conditioned 
following neglect or abuse in attachment relationships to lead to avoidance of or aversion to 
compassion. Whilst FoC was conceptualised within the context of abusive or neglectful 
attachments, the concept has been thought of as representing a dimension, thus levels of fears 
of compassion vary in the general population who may not have experienced neglectful or 
abusive attachment relationships per se. Gilbert’s social mentality theory and three circles 
model (Gilbert, 2009, 2010) proposes that just by being human one has a tendency to fear 
compassion if unable to balance out the motivation for care versus competition and to 
regulate oneself to gain a healthy level of drive and soothing. In support of this the authors 
report small to medium correlations within a student sample between FoC and stress, anxiety 
and depression, thus suggesting a reasonable degree of convergent validity with distress. 
3.4.3 Demographics Questionnaire   
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Continuous data on age was collected and categorical data on gender, relationship 
status, living arrangements, ethnicity and nationality was collected. 
 
3.5 Participants 
 
3.5.1 Power Analysis  
 
The sample size for the regression analysis was estimated with the desired statistical 
power of 0.8 and a probability level of 0.05. Calculations were based on 11 predictors being 
entered into the model made up of the three FoC scales, the four AEE subscales, and the four 
demographic variables. The a-priori sample size calculator for multiple regression (enter 
procedure) was used (http://www.danielsoper.com/statcalc3/calc.aspx?id=1). Previous 
research exploring the relationship between AEE and psychological distress, such as anxiety, 
depression and PTSD, revealed small to medium effect sizes in correlations when using 
community samples (Haslam et al., 2012; Meyer et al., 2009; Spokas et al., 2009; Wong et 
al., 2006). Within community samples medium effect sizes have been reported previously 
between FoC and psychological distress including stress, depression and anxiety. Whilst it is 
not known whether the effect sizes between the two independent variables and distress will 
necessary correspond to well-being, the effect sizes provide the best estimate available based 
on the literature. Sample size calculations were conducted with both small and medium 
predicted effect sizes. 
 
A sample of 122 was deemed to be sufficient for the anticipated medium effect size of 
.15, whilst 847 would be adequate for a small effect size of .02. The current study aimed for a 
sample of over 122 to ensure the analysis has sufficient power to find a medium effect. Only 
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those demographic variables shown to be significantly correlated with subjective well-being 
would be included in the regression analysis. 
 
3.6 Ethical Considerations  
 
Ethical approval was sought through the Faculty Research Ethics Board at the University of 
Essex. The application for ethical approval can been found in appendix G. To ensure the 
principles of respect for the autonomy and dignity of persons, scientific value, social 
responsibility, and maximising benefit and minimising harm are were upheld, the ethical 
considerations outlined below are guided by the British Psychological Society Code of 
Human Research Ethics (BPS; 2014) and the Data Protection Act 1998. 
 
3.6.1 Informed Consent  
 
In accordance with the BPS (2014) valid consent was sought to ensure that participants 
were well informed and freely able to participate and withdraw as they saw fit. On the 
electronic questionnaire, consent was assumed when participants checked before and after 
completing the questionnaires under the statement ‘I have read the information about the 
study and consent to my responses being used in the ways stated’. Consent was deemed to be 
based on an informed decision as before completing the questionnaires the following 
information was outlined on an information sheet; withdrawal rights, outline of the subject 
matter, and the anonymity of data. On the paper copies of the questionnaires, informed 
consent was assumed when participates ticked a check box under the same statement stated 
on the electronic version as shown in appendix A the participant information sheet. A second 
level of informed consent was taken when the participant posted their completed 
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questionnaire back using the freepost address. Like on the electronic version the consent was 
deemed informed as a printed information and debrief sheet outlined their withdrawal rights, 
outline of the subject matter, and the anonymity of data. The specific aims of the research 
were not made explicit on either the electronic or paper version questionnaires. This was in 
order to limit the likelihood of social desirability in response patterns, however, the 
information sheet made it clear that the research was interested in helping therapists to better 
understand how people think about emotional expression and strong emotions. 
 
3.6.2 Confidentiality and Data Storage  
 
In accordance with the BPS (2014) and the Data Protection Act 1998, confidentiality 
was conserved to ensure that participants could trust that all of their information would be 
treated confidentially and not be identifiable. The main way of ensuring confidentiality was 
in the selection of measures that did not ask questions concerning high risk behaviours or 
intentions such as self-harm, harm to others,  or suicidal ideation and intent. This ensured that 
responses to the questions on the measures would not lead to the principle of confidentiality 
having to be broken due to a duty of care to the participant or others felt to be in immediate 
danger of harm. 
 
During data collection all electronic responses to questionnaires were securely stored 
on the password protected Qualtrics system. All paper copies of the questionnaires were kept 
in a locked cabinet within a locked university premises. During analysis the data was securely 
kept in a password protected SPSS document on a password protected computer. Paper 
questionnaires were checked for identifiable information and deletions were made as 
necessary. Responses from paper copies were inputted in to the same password protected 
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SPSS document. Once inputted as agreed in the ethics application the paper copies were 
shredded and put in confidential waste to minimise the chances of inaccurate data by storing 
data in one place. Some participates opted to give an email address so that they could receive 
a written copy of the results of the overall study. Email addresses were stored separately from 
the data on the password protected document and deleted once the results had been sent to 
them. The information sheet included details of how confidentiality, security and privacy of 
data would be ensured. 
 
3.6.3 Right to Withdraw  
 
The information sheet given to participants before beginning the questionnaire outlined 
their right to withdraw at any point during completion of the survey by either not giving 
consent or by closing the internet browser at any point during the study. The debrief 
information sheet again instructed participants of their rights to withdraw their data by 
closing the browser and not submitting their data. As the research was anonymous 
participants were also instructed that they could not request for their data to be withdrawn 
retrospectively, thus it was ensured that whether completing the electronic or paper copies 
their rights to withdraw were communicated at the start and end of the questionnaire battery. 
 
 
 
 
3.6.4 Debriefing  
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As the study explored themes related to mental health it was felt particularly important 
that participants were given debriefs that clearly signposted agencies and services that 
participants could seek help from if they were affected by the themes in the questionnaires. 
 
Participants were debriefed using a final information sheet (see appendix A). The 
information sheet thanked participants for their time and provided contact details of the 
research team and specifically stated that should they have felt affected or distressed as a 
result of completing the questionnaires they could contact the research team which consisted 
of the study supervisor and trainee clinical psychologist undertaking the project. In addition, 
links to relevant national services such as the NHS and MIND websites were given at the 
information sheet stage and debrief page so that participants knew their options prior to 
taking part in the study. Contact details including a postal address, email addresses, and 
telephone numbers were provided at both the information and debrief stage. The debrief also 
included sections on how confidentiality would be ensured, rights to withdraw from the 
study, a request to pass on the research study to friends and family, and how the results of the 
study would be disseminated.  
3.7 Planned Data Analysis 
 
 Statistical analysis was undertaken using SPSS 21 (IBM, 2012). Descriptive statistics 
were presented for demographic, independent variables AEE and FoC, and for the dependent 
variable subjective well-being as measured by the PANAS and PFI. 
 
 
3.7.1 Planned Tests of Normality 
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 Before conducting inferential statistics analysis testing for normality was conducted 
using a process set out by Field (2009). This involved Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests being 
performed which tests whether the observed distribution matches the hypothesised 
distribution. Field (2009) acknowledges that in large samples very small deviations from 
normality can result in significant K-S tests; therefore a review of histograms and p-p plots 
was also undertaken to check for normal distributions. If the parametric assumptions were not 
met, then non-parametric alternatives were applied. However, as multiple regression does not 
have a non-parametric alternative, transformation of the data would be considered where 
appropriate. Field (2009) outlines three transformations; log, square root, and reciprocal 
transformation. As advised all were conducted on a trial and error basis (Field, 2009).  
 
3.7.2 Planned Bonferroni Adjustments 
 
Bonferroni adjustments will be made is appropriate. Bland and Altman (1995) 
outlined the problem of running too many statistical tests on the same data that is not 
independent. They proposed that a statistically significant finding can be found in random 
data sets if enough testing is completed. When using the widely accepted five percent alpha 
level, it is suggested that numerous testing can reveal the statistically significant finding 
accounted by mere chance alone (Bland & Altman, 1995). When multiple independent tests 
are conducted on the same data with each data employing the .05 alpha value, the chance of 
one of the statistical results reaching the preset significance level is no longer .05, but instead 
is higher based on the formula alpha=1-(1-.05)n. In this study, each dependent variable would 
have fifteen correlations. Following the aforementioned formula, the chance of at least one 
test being significant is .537 as opposed to .05. If the formula is applied to the entire 
correlation analysis proposed of 45 tests being run, the type I error increases to .901. To 
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correct for this, Bland and Altman (1995) suggest that Bonferroni adjustments be made to 
reduce the alpha level applied to each individual statistical analysis, so that the summed study 
wide type I error rate remains at .05.  
 
3.7.3 Planned Correlations and Regression 
 
 Partial correlations were run to identify the shared and unique variance between the 
independent variables FoC and AEE, and the dependent variables PANAS and PFI. A partial 
correlation was calculated for each of the three FoC scales with PANAS and PFI scores, with 
the influence of AEE scales partitioned out. This lead to 45 separate correlations being run to 
systematically explore the effect of AEE scales and FoC scales on well-being. 
 
 Correlations were run to explore relationships between study variables. A forced entry 
hierarchical multiple regression analysis was then run with each subjective well-being 
variable separately as the dependent variable (PANAS positive, PANAS negative, and PFI). 
Independent variables were FoC self, FoC to others, and FoC from others, as well as the AEE 
variables (control, social rejection, weakness, and bottling up). Demographic variables which 
were significantly correlated with any of the dependent variables were included in the 
regression and controlled for by including them in block one. A forced entry hierarchical 
regression model enables the researcher to choose which variables to enter at each block of 
the regression, thus allows for the demographic variables to be controlled for and all AEE and 
FoC to be entered to explore their unique power to explain variance. The stepwise method of 
regression allows the statistical programme to pick the independent variables with the highest 
partial correlations with the dependent, and add them sequentially at each step. Whilst 
stepwise regression has a useful role in exploratory analysis, when being led by existing 
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theory, hierarchical regression allows the researcher to run analysis on variables which are 
predicted to be associated theoretically (Menard, 2000). 
 
3.8 Dissemination of Results 
 
 Following approval, this thesis will be available in the library at the University of 
Essex and an abstract available in the International Thesis Abstracts database. In September 
2017 a lay-persons summary of the findings will be presented on the website address given 
on the debrief page. The link of the website will be shared with all participating organisations 
and newspapers involved in recruitment. A paper copy of the summary will also be shared 
with the participating community groups and sent to participants who requested it. In 
addition, the research will be submitted to relevant journals (e.g. ‘British Journal of Clinical 
Psychology’; ‘Psychology and Psychotherapy Theory, Research and Practice’). Presentations 
will be aimed for at the Compassion Mind Foundation Conference, the British Psychological 
Society Division of Clinical Psychology Annual Conference, and the British Association for 
Behavioural and Cognitive Psychotherapies Conference. At a local level, a poster 
presentation will be given to the local special compassion focused therapy special interest 
group. 
 
 
 
 
 
4. Results 
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 This chapter will first present descriptive statistics for the sample. It will then check 
and outline the normality of the distribution of values within the variables tested. Following 
this, in line with the study hypothesis appropriate correlational and multiple regression 
analysis will be presented. 
 
4.1 Descriptive Statistics 
 
4.1.1 Descriptive Statistics for Demographic Variables 
 
 There were 331 participants in the sample, with 77 males (22.4% of sample) and 257 
females (77.6% of sample). Due to the possible gender bias inherent in the unbalanced 
sample, where appropriate results are given by gender in the following analysis. 
Overall attrition rates are not possible to calculate as no records were kept of non-responders 
who took paper copies of the study. However, on the electronic questionnaires, 327 began the 
questionnaire and 257 completed it, thus 70 people were non-responders representing 21%. 
 
 A wide age range was represented in the sample as shown in table 2. The kurtosis 
value is indicative of a platykurtic distribution suggesting that whilst the mean age of the 
sample was 50 years, there was a good spread across the lower and higher age ranges. A 
histogram of the distribution of the ages of participants can be found in the appendix D. 
Despite the overrepresentation of females in the sample, there is very little difference in the 
average age of males and females as shown in table 1.  
 
 
Table 1 
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 Descriptive Statistics for Age for Total Sample and by Gender 
Variables N M (years) SD Min. Max. Skewness Kurtosis 
Total 331 50.07 16.19 18 89 .01 -.94 
Male 74 51.14 18.11 18 87 -.119 -1.30 
Female 257 49.68 15.59 18 89 .049 -.79 
 
 
 The majority of the sample reported being in a relationship with a partner, with 50% 
being in a marriage/civil partnership and 18% having a partner. The minority of the sample 
reported being currently single, with 11.4% having never been in a legally binding 
relationship, 10.4% having been divorced, 5.4% having been widowed, and 2.4% reported 
being recently separated. Taken more generally, over two thirds of the sample was currently 
in a relationship. The missing data was 2.4%. 
 
 Over two thirds of the sample reported living in their own home with other people 
(68.4%). The next most common living arrangement was living in one’s own home alone 
(28.3%). Other living arrangements were represented in the sample, 2.7% reported ‘other’ 
living arrangements, whilst one participant was currently homeless (0.3%). Missing data was 
limited to one participant (0.3%). 
 
 The majority of the sample reported their ethnicity as White British (90.4%). White 
other was the next most frequently occurring ethnicity (5.1%). Participants reporting that they 
belonged to a mixed ethnic group were the next commonly occurring (1.5%). Asian British, 
Asian other, Black other, Other were reported by two participants each (0.6%), whilst Black 
British was reported by one participant (0.3%). There was one piece of missing data (0.3%). 
The sample was skewed to a white population; as such it is not representative of the general 
UK population. 
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 To aid the inclusion in correlational analysis, ethnicity, relationship status, living 
arrangements were dichotomised as the distribution between the nominal categories was 
unequal, with some having only one data point. Majority groups within each demographic 
category were created with all minority groups being summed together. Counts of the 
dichotomised variables of being in relationship or single, living with others or living alone, 
are presented in table 2. 
 
Table 2 
  
Percentages of Dichotomised Demographic Variables by Gender 
Demographic  Percentages  
 Total Male Female 
Relationship Status    
     In a relationship 68.7% 79.2% 67.5% 
     Single 29.2% 20.8% 32.5% 
Living Arrangements    
     With others 68.4% 79.2% 67.9% 
     On own 28.6% 20.8% 32.1% 
Ethnicity    
     White British 90.7% 97.3% 88.7% 
     Other Ethnicity 9.3% 2.7% 11.3% 
 
 
4.1.2 Descriptive Statistics for Subjective Well-Being 
 
 All of the subjective well-being measures were slightly bound in score ranges as 
shown in table 3. For example scores on the PFI represented the highest score indicating the 
greatest level of well-being, but the lowest score of zero was not represented. Skewness 
scores on the PANAS scales and PFI indicate that scores are weighted towards greater 
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subjective well-being, which is to be expected when using a non-clinical community sample. 
Kurtosis values reveal that the PFI had a slight platykurtic distribution, whilst PANAS scales 
had leptokurtic distributions.  
 
Table 3 
 
Descriptive Statistics of Subjective Well-being by Gender 
Variables N M SD Range Cronbach’s 
Alpha 
Skewness Kurtosis 
PANAS 
Positive 
       
     Total 331 3.41 .68 1.20 to 5.00* .859 -.49 .25 
     Male 74 3.41 .60 1.90 to 4.70 .817 -.33 -.07 
     
Female 
257 3.41 .70 1.20 to 5.00 .869 -.53 .15 
PANAS 
Negative 
       
     Total 331 1.97 .72 1.00 to 4.30* .876 .90 .32 
     Male 74 1.94 .75 1.00 to 3.80 .891 .74 -.39 
     
Female 
257 1.98 .71 1.00 to 4.30 .873 .96 .56 
PFI        
     Total 331 24.09 7.03 3.00 to 
36.00** 
.916 -.66 -.17 
     Male 73 24.30 7.15 7.00 to 36.00 .921 -.47 -.42 
     
Female 
257 24.03 7.02 3.00 to 36.00 .915 -.72 -.10 
*possible PANAS mean score range 1-5 
**possible PFI score range 0-36 
 
 To examine the current sample’s scores on well-being measures compared to other 
samples recruited in the literature, means were contrasted and t-tests were conducted. When 
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significant t-test results were found these are presented. The current sample had a higher 
mean average PFI score (M=24.09, SD=7.03) compared to the community sample (M=20.20, 
SD=3.7) recruited by Joseph and Maltby (2014). Further t-test analysis revealed this 
difference to be statistically significant; therefore the current sample reported a higher level 
of well-being on this measure than reported by the measures authors. It is worth noting that 
the mean age of the comparison sample (M=20 years) was much lower than the current 
sample (M= 50 years) and as found in this study age was positively associated with PFI thus 
the higher mean well-being score is likely to be due to the different age ranges recruited in 
the studies. The PANAS positive mean average for the current sample (M=3.41, SD=.68) was 
similar to that reported in community standardisation sample (M=3.20, SD=.70 using the 
same temporal instructions of a few weeks) by Watson, Lee, and Tellegen (1988). Mean 
average PANAS negative score in the current sample (M=1.97, SD=.72) was also similar to 
the community standardisation sample (M=1.95, SD=.70) reported by Watson, Lee, and 
Tellegen (1988). 
 
To ascertain whether there were statistical differences in subjective well-being means 
by gender, t-tests were conducted. None of the gender differences in the mental subjective-
being scores reached statistical significance, and as such, the sample was not separated by 
gender in the subsequent regression analysis. 
 
 
 
 
4.1.3 Descriptive Statistics for AEE and FoC 
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 Descriptive statistics for the independent variables are presented in table 4. The entire 
score range was observed in AEE control and AEE bottling. All other continuous variables 
with a score range were bounded to some degree. AEE social rejection and AEE weakness 
had scores reflecting the lower limits but not the upper limit of 25, instead 24 and 21 
respectively. Therefore the sample did not reflect those who may endorse the most negative 
attitudes in these domains. Within the FoC scales, all included scores at the lower extreme of 
zero, but none contained scores at the upper extremes. In other words, those reporting the 
least fears towards compassion were represented whilst the most fears towards compassion 
were not observed in the sample.  All AEE and FoC scales had positive skewness indicating 
that scores are weighted towards lower FoC and less negative AEE as would be expected in a 
community sample. Kurtosis values reveal that AEE control, AEE social rejection, and FoC 
to others have platykurtic distributions, whereas all other FoC and AEE scales have 
leptokurtic distributions. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 4 
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Descriptive Statistics of AEE and FoC for Total Sample 
Variables N M SD Range Cronbach’s 
Alpha 
Skewness Kurtosis 
AEE Total 312 48.52 12.52 21*-86* .918 0.50 .28 
     AEE control 312 11.72 3.72 5-25** .791 0.55 -.03 
     AEE 
Weakness 
312 9.01 3.08 5-21** .806 0.86 .73 
     AEE social 
rejection 
312 13.18 3.90 5-24** .783 0.14 -.26 
     AEE bottling 312 14.61 4.58 5-25** .866 0.22 .28 
FoC self 315 10.58 9.90 0-42*** .915 1.03 .30 
FoC from others 322 10.22 8.62 0-39**** .897 1.10 .68 
FoC to others 331 11.94 6.98 0-35***** .849 0.55 -.08 
*possible ATEE total score range 20-100 
**possible ATEE subscale score range 5-25 
***possible FoC self score range 0-68 
****possible FoC from others score range 0-60 
*****possible FoC to others score range 0-68 
 
Comparisons of the means for AEE were made with the community student sample 
reported by the measure’s author (Joseph et al., 1994). The current sample had a similar AEE 
mean average score (M=48.52, SD=12.52) to the community student sample (M=45.03, 
SD=12.75) recruited by Joseph et al. (1994). Comparisons of means per AEE subscale 
revealed that the current sample held slightly more negative attitudes in all of the subscales 
compared to the original standardisation sample (Joseph et al., 1994). T-test analysis was 
conducted to ascertain the statistical significance of differences between the current sample 
and Joseph et al.’s (1994) original sample. For control the current sample (M=11.72, 
SD=3.72) reported significantly more negative attitudes than the community student sample 
(M=8.94, SD=3.50) recruited by Joseph et al. (1994). For social rejection the current sample 
(M=13.18, SD=3.90) reported statistically more negative attitudes than Joseph et al.’s (1994) 
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community sample (M=10.62, SD=3.27). The same pattern of statistically significant 
difference was seen in the current samples mean average for weakness (M=9.01, SD=3.08) 
compared to Joseph et al.’s (1994) sample (M=6.39, SD=2.73) and for bottling up (M=14.61, 
SD=4.58) compared to the lower score from comparison sample (M=12.21, SD=4.60).  
 
Comparisons of mean FoC scale scores with other community samples were 
conducted and t-test analysis was conducted. The current sample had lower mean average 
scores on all of the FoC scales than compared to the community student sample recruited by 
Gilbert et al. (2011). The biggest difference was between the mean average for FoC for others 
in that the current sample had a lower mean (M=11.94, SD=6.98) compared to the student 
sample (M=21.18, SD=6.71), a difference that was deemed statistically significant in t-test 
analysis. However means did not differ statistically speaking for FoC for others when 
comparing to the smaller group of therapist in the community sample (M=10.51, SD=5.36) 
who had a wider age range and higher mean age than the student sample. FoC self mean 
average of the current sample (M=10.58, SD=9.90) was statistically lower than Gilbert’s 
(2011) student sample (M=16.12, SD=10.38) suggesting that again the current sample held 
less fear about self-compassion. Again though the current samples mean was not statistically 
different from the therapist sample in Gilbert et al.’s (2011) study (M=8.15, SD=6.51).  Mean 
average for FoC from others followed the similar pattern with the current sample (M=10.22, 
SD=8.62) having a statistically significant lower mean than Gilbert’s et al. (2011) student 
sample (M=.78, SD=7.81), however, did not differ significantly from the therapist sample 
(M=8.81, SD=7.41). The pattern across of all FoC scales of lower means than the original 
student sample but more similar to the original therapist sample could either be a sign of 
social desirability bias in the current sample or a reflection of the methodological limitation 
that research on FoC has often recruited student samples. It could also be that the current 
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sample recruited from NHS teams amongst other sources; therefore a proportion of 
participants may appear similar to the therapist sample recruited by Gilbert et al. (2011). 
However, this was not possible to explore further as occupation was not collected in the 
demographic questionnaire. 
 
Descriptive statistics for AEE and FoC are presented by gender in table 5. 
Independent samples t-tests were conducted on all independent measures by gender. 
Independent samples t-test found that men (51.578, SD=12.162) endorsed significantly more 
negative AEE than women (M=47.614, SD=12.505), t(310)=2.362, p=.019. Men were also 
found to hold significantly more negative attitudes about control of emotional expression 
(M=12.592, SD=3.736) than women (M=11.461, SD=3.685), t(310)=2.265, p=.024. It was 
also found that men reported a greater tendency to bottle up emotion (M=15.859, SD=4.731) 
than women (M=14.245, SD=4.481), t(310)=2.634, p=.009. All other independent measures 
were found not to significantly differ by gender. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 5 
 
Descriptive Statistics of AEE and FoC by Gender 
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 N Mean (SD) Range Cronbach’s 
Alpha 
 Male Female Male Female Male Female Male Female 
AEE 
Total 
71 241 51.58(12.16)* 47.61(12.51) 25-
86 
21-84 .920 .916 
AEE 
Control 
71 241 12.59(3.74) 11.46(3.69) 5-21 5-25 .808 .783 
AEE 
Weakness 
71 241 9.28(3.14)* 8.93(3.07) 5-21 5-18 .818 .803 
AEE 
Social 
rejection 
71 241 13.85(3.18) 12.98(4.03) 6-21 5-24 .701 .797 
AEE 
Bottling 
71 241 15.86(4.73)** 14.25(4.48) 7-25 5-25 .912 .848 
FoC self 72 243 10.53(9.29) 10.60(10.09) 0-32 0-42 .907 .917 
FoC to 
Other 
74 257 12.87(7.37) 11.67(6.86) 0-30 0-35 .867 .844 
FoC from 
Other 
72 251 10.57(8.17) 10.12(8.77) 0-35 0-39 .877 .902 
*t-test significant to p=.05 level 
**t-test significant to p=.01 level 
 
Within the FoC literature gender differences were reported in five studies (Joeng & 
Turner, 2015; Gilbert et al., 2011, 2012, 2013; Miron et al., 2015). Two found no gender 
differences on FoC scores (Joeng & Turner, 2015; Miron et al., 2015), two community 
sample studies reported that men scored higher on subscales of the FoC self and from others 
(Gilbert et al., 2011, 2012), and one study reported a small correlation in that females scored 
higher than men of fears of compassion from others (Gilbert, 2013). Of note is that all studies 
had suffered from a gender bias in that females made up the majority of the sample, more 
specifically between 69% to 82% (Miron et al., 2015; Gilbert, 2013). The current study also 
suffered from a gender bias in the same direction.  
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4.2 Testing Normality 
 
 4.2.1 Skewness of Variables 
 
 As skewness and kurtosis varied across variables and to ascertain the appropriateness 
of parametric or nonparametric tests Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests were performed. 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov compares the observed distribution to the hypothesised distribution 
(Field, 2009). A non-significant result means that the observed sample is deemed to be 
normally distributed, whereas a significant test shows that the observed sample is not 
normally distributed.  The results shown in table 6 reveal that none of the raw data variables 
had a normal distribution. Field (2009) does concede that in large samples very small 
deviations from the normality can result in significant K-S tests; therefore a review of 
histograms and p-p plots was undertaken. Review of these showed that the variables did 
indeed look not normally distributed. Example histogram and P-P plots are presented in the 
appendix E. Non parametric tests were used where they existed, for example the Spearman’s 
correlation was used instead of Pearson’s correlation coefficient. However, as multiple 
regression does not have a non-parametric alternative, transformation of the data was 
considered. 
 
 4.2.2 Transformation of Data 
 
 Field (2009) outlines three transformations; log, square root, and reciprocal 
transformation. It is advised that all are tried on a ‘trial and error’ basis and tests of normality 
are run again at each step. As PFI and PANAS positive were negatively skewed a reverse 
score transformation was first undertaken. Because some of the scales had minimum scores 
of zero, a constant of one was added prior to the log and reciprocal transformations. Table 6 
FoC, AEE and Subjective Well-Being 
 
89 
 
shows that all distributions remained non-normal, except the square root transformation for 
AEE total. However, as the AEE subscales remained non-normal after the square root 
transformation it was decided not to take this transformation any further. As such, partial 
correlations and multiple regressions would be run on the raw data and examination of the 
assumptions underlying the regression models will be conducted to see what impact these 
non-normal distributions had on the reliability of the models. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 6 
 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov (K-S) Tests for Independent and Dependent Variables for Raw Data 
and Transformations 
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 Raw data Log 
transformation 
Reciprocal 
transformation 
Square root 
transformation 
Variable K-S 
statistic 
K-S Sig K-S 
statistic 
K-S 
Sig 
K-S 
statistic 
K-S Sig K-S 
statistic 
K-S Sig 
PANAS 
positive 
.08 P<.001 .07 P=.001 .12 P<.001 .07 P=.001 
PANAS 
negative 
.11 P<.001 .08 P<.001 .07 P=.001 .09 P<.001 
PFI .12 P<.001 .10 P<.001 .25 P<.001 .06 P=.016 
FoC to 
others 
.08 P<.001 .12 P<.001 .26 P<.001 .06 P=.004 
FoC from 
others 
.14 P<.001 .08 P<.001 .26 P<.001 .05 p=.041 
FoC self .16 P<.001 .09 P<.001 .25 P<.001 .07 P=.002 
AEE total .07 P<.001 .05 P<.001 .11 P<.001 .05 P=.065* 
AEE 
weakness 
.14 P<.001 .08 P<.001 .14 P<.001 .10 P<.001 
AEE 
social 
rejection 
.06 P=.016 .10 P<.001 .16 P<.001 .08 P<.001 
AEE 
control 
.13 P<.001 .08 P<.001 .14 P<.001 .10 P<.001 
AEE 
bottling 
.10 P<.001 .09 P<.001 .12 P<.001 .08 P<.001 
*non significant K-S test showing normality in distribution 
 
 
 
 
4.3 Correlations between AEE, FoC and Subjective Well-Being 
 
 As the aforementioned distributions are deemed non-normal, non-parametric 
Spearman’s Rho correlations were used to explore the associations between the dependent 
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and independent variables. Cohen’s (1992) qualitative descriptions of correlation strength 
were used to aid interpretation. Coefficients between 0.1 to 0.29 were deemed small, those 
between .3 to .49 were considered medium, and those .5 and above were considered large.  
 
 Two way correlations for the total sample can be seen in table 7 and correlations by 
gender are presented in table 8. In the following sections, noteworthy correlations will be 
discussed, first those between negative AEE and well-being, before those between FoC and 
well-being.  
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Table 7 
 
Spearman’s Rho Correlations between Dependent and Independent Variables for Total Sample 
Variable PFI PANAS 
positive 
PANAS 
negative 
FoC self FoC to 
others 
FoC from 
others 
AEE total AEE 
social 
rejection 
AEE 
control 
AEE 
weakness 
AEE 
bottling 
PFI  .516** -.737** -.518** -.038 -.486** -.309** -.422** -.111* -.243** -.228** 
PANAS 
positive 
  -.282** -.277** -.106* -.256** -.330** -.341** -.221** -.272** -.238** 
PANAS 
negative 
   .494** .026 .466** .249** .374** .061 .218** .169** 
*Significant to .05 alpha level 
**Significant to .001 alpha level 
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Table 8  
 
Spearman’s Rho Correlations between Dependent and Independent Variables for Females bottom left (n=241) and Males top right (n=74) 
 PFI PANAS 
positive 
PANAS 
negative 
FoC 
self 
FoC to 
others 
FoC from 
others 
AEE 
total 
AEE 
social 
rejection 
AEE 
control 
AEE 
weakness 
AEE 
bottling 
PFI x .400** -.748** -.500** .047 -.547** -
.360** 
-.441** -.121 -.211* -.393** 
PANAS 
positive 
.400** x -.149 -.274* -.098 -.172 -
.374** 
-.269* -.231* -.305** -.374** 
PANAS 
negative 
-.749** -.373** x .392** -.155 .426** .201* .378** .008 .083 .224* 
FoC self -.528** -.354** .540** x        
FoC to 
others 
-.049 -.092 .101  x       
FoC from 
other 
-.500** -.329** .509**   x      
AEE total -.344** -.338** .341**    x     
AEE social 
rejection 
-.443** -.373** .438**     x    
AEE control -.178** -.221** .169**      x   
AEE 
weakness 
-.300** -.296** .356**       x  
AEE bottling -.209** -.224** .175**        x 
*Significant to .05 alpha level 
**Significant to .001 alpha level
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4.3.1 Correlations between AEE and Subjective Well-being  
 
 One-way Spearman’s Rho correlations presented in tables 7 and 8 revealed that more 
negative AEE were associated with lower levels of subjective well-being. However, some 
differences were observed between the measurements of well-being as well as between the AEE 
subscales and gender subsamples. 
 
 When focusing on the PFI, more negative AEE were associated with lower levels of PFI. 
Attitudes surrounding social rejection were negatively associated with a medium effect size. 
Attitudes concerning control showed a smaller effect size with PFI, which was in part due to the 
smaller effect size in males. 
 
 Correlations for positive affect, within the male and female samples, show that more negative 
AEE were associated with less positive affect being experienced. For females, negative attitudes 
concerning social rejection was the strongest associated AEE variable to positive affect with medium 
effect sizes. However, for men AEE bottling was the strongest correlations with positive affect. 
 
 Correlations for negative affect show that more negative AEE in all subscales apart from 
AEE Control were associated with more negative affect. The non-significant correlation between 
AEE control and negative affect may be due in part to the difference in gender, in that whilst it was a 
non-significant small effect size for males there was a small significant correlation for females. Other 
gender differences were also noted. Within the male sample, a small non significant effect size was 
found between AEE weakness and negative affect, whereas for women there was a medium sized 
relationship. Whilst the male sample was smaller so correlations are less likely to reach statistical 
significance, there seems to be a difference in effect sizes for males and females. For both genders, 
FoC, AEE and Subjective Well-Being 
 
 95 
AEE social rejection was most strongly correlated to negative affect with a medium effect size.  The 
results enable the hypothesis to be accepted, though some gender differences are important to note. 
 
 4.3.2 Correlations between FoC and Subjective Well-being  
 
 Correlations presented in tables 7 and 8 revealed that more FoC were associated with lower 
levels of subjective well-being. However, some differences were observed between the 
measurements of well-being as well as between the FoC scales and gender subsamples. 
 
 Within the PFI, whilst large correlations were observed in both genders with FoC self and 
FoC from others, FoC self was most related to PFI for women, whereas for men it was FoC from 
others that was most related to PFI. No significant relationship was found with FoC to others across 
both genders.  
 
 Correlations between positive affect and FoC within the whole sample revealed small 
significant associations with all of the FoC scales. However, correlations differed by gender. When 
FoC to others was analysed separately in the male and female samples, the relationship with positive 
affect was non-significant in both samples. Additionally, the relationship between FoC from others 
and positive affect was non-significant within the male sample but not the female sample. Within the 
female sample, the strongest relationship was a medium correlation between FoC self and positive 
affect, whilst for men it was a small correlation between the same variables. 
 Analysis of correlations within the whole sample between negative affect and FoC show 
medium relationships between FoC self and negative affect, and FoC from others and negative 
affect. FoC to others and negative affect was not found to have a significant relationship within both 
genders. Further analysis by gender revealed that for men FoC from others had the strongest 
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relationship with negative affect, whilst for women the relationship between FoC self and negative 
affect was the largest. However, of note was that correlations between FoC self and negative affect, 
and FoC from others and negative affect were within the large range for women. 
 
 In summary, the hypothesis can be partially accepted in that greater FoC in the flows of ‘to 
self’ and ‘from others’ were strongly associated with lower levels of subjective well-being. FoC to 
others was not found to be significantly associated with subjective well-being. Gender differences 
were observed, for example, for women FoC self was the strongest correlations with all subjective 
well-being measures, whereas, for men FoC from others was the strongest in two of the subjective 
well-being measures (PFI and negative affect). 
 
4.4 Unique Variance in Well-being explained by FoC and AEE 
 
 4.4.1 Correlations between FoC and AEE 
 
 Two-way Spearman’s Rho correlations presented in table 9 revealed that FoC from others 
and FoC self were positively correlated to all AEE scales with a medium or large size. The large 
effect size was observed between AEE social rejection and FoC self and from others. FoC to others 
was positively associated with a medium effect size to all AEE scales, except bottling wherein the 
significant association was of a small effect size. These relationships show that generally the greater 
the fears towards compassion in any flow, the more negative AEE are held. The size of correlations 
provides support that FoC and AEE are related but are distinct concepts as none of the correlations 
are strong enough to suggest multicollinearity. It is possible that associations between the AEE, FoC 
and subjective well-being measures are due to overlapping variance between AEE and FoC; 
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therefore, partial correlations were conducted to explore the unique contributions to subjective well-
being of AEE and FoC in a more robust manner. 
 
Table 9 
 
Spearman’s Rho Correlations between AEE and FoC for Total Sample 
Variable AEE total AEE control AEE social 
rejection 
AEE 
weakness 
AEE bottling 
FoC self .510* .347* .526* .403* .373* 
FoC to other .388* .354* .309* .366* .266* 
FoC from 
other 
.571* .390* .555* .426* .455* 
*Significance at level .01 level 
 
 
 4.4.2 Partial Correlations of FoC and AEE with Subjective Well-Being 
 
 Partial correlations were used to examine the individual unique variance explained in the 
relationships of FoC and specific AEE subscales and subjective well-being when controlling for the 
overlapping variance explained by the other AEE subscales. As 45 separate correlations were 
required to systematically analyse the unique and shared variance in the dependent variables 
accounted for by the independent variables FoC and AEE, Bonferroni correction was considered. In 
the current study, when the Bonferroni adjustment formula is applied, the adjusted statistical 
significance alpha is .003 or .001, for 15 and 45 statistically procedures respectively (Bland & 
Altman, 1995). However, following the critique of Bonferroni adjustments (Perneger, 1998; 
Rothman, 1990) it was decided not to use just the Bonferroni adjustment as it was deemed too much 
of a mechanistic adjustment to the alpha value. Instead a combination of integrating statistical 
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findings with prior held beliefs to explain unexpected findings and reduce type II errors (Perneger, 
1998) alongside using the type I error rate of .01 to reduce type I errors, was followed. 
 
 4.4.2.1 Partial Correlations of FoC and Well-being when Controlling AEE 
 
 Partial correlations presented in table 10 for FoC from others and well-being measures, 
controlling for AEE scales, did not reveal remarkably different results from bivariate correlations. 
This is to say that when the AEE scales were controlled for, FoC from others was still found to be 
associated with well-being measures. This suggests that FoC from others and AEE scales have direct 
relationships to well-being as opposed to spurious or overlapping relationships. The exception to this 
was the association between FoC from others and AEE social rejection and Positive Affect. Whilst 
the Bivariate correlation between FoC from others and Positive Affect was of a statistically 
significant negative small strength, when AEE social rejection was added in the partial correlation, 
the relationship between FoC from others and Positive Affect was no longer statistically significant 
to the .01 level. These results suggest that FoC from others and AEE social rejection explained 
shared variance in their relationship to Positive Affect. 
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Table 10 
 
Bivariate and Partial Correlations between FoC, AEE for Well-Being Variables. 
Variable Positive Affect Negative Affect PFI 
 Bivariate Partial Bivariate Partial Bivariate Partial 
FoC to other -.106*  .026  -.038  
     AEE total  .050  -.114*  .134* 
     AEE weakness  .020  -.099  .097 
     AEE social 
rejection 
 .018  -.118*  .129* 
     AEE control  -.008  -.032  .049 
     AEE bottling  -.026  -.029  .047 
FoC from others -.256**  .466**  -.486**  
     AEE total  -.129*  .399***  -.408*** 
     AEE weakness  -.186***  .406***  -.444*** 
     AEE social 
rejection 
 -.129*  .331***  -.354*** 
     AEE control  -.240***  .489***  -.503*** 
     AEE bottling  -.227***  .466***  -.473*** 
FoC self -.277**  .494**  -.518**  
     AEE total  -.178**  .421***  -.418*** 
     AEE weakness  -.218***  .427***  -.449*** 
     AEE social 
rejection 
 -.172**  .362***  -.369*** 
     AEE control  -.272***  .501***  -.503*** 
     AEE bottling  -.265***  .481***  -.479*** 
*Significance at level .05 
**Significance at level .01 
***Significance at level .001 
 
 As shown in table 10, partial correlations for FoC self and well-being when partitioning out 
AEE scales, did not differ from the Bivariate correlations. This suggests that FoC self and AEE 
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scales have direct and unique relationships with well-being variables as opposed to spurious or 
intervening relationships. 
 
 As shown in table 10, bivariate and partial correlations for FoC to others revealed that its 
association with all well-being measures were non-significant at the p<.01 level. In other words there 
is no statistically reliable association between FoC to others and well-being measures. 
 
 4.4.3 Regression Models of Well-being 
 
 Now that the independent variables FoC and AEE are deemed to be distinct concepts, 
regression models were run to determine which independent variable has the strongest relationship 
with the dependent variables PANAS and PFI. 
 
 Correlational relationships between well-being variables and Age and Gender alongside 
dichotomised demographic variables of relationship status (in a relation or single), living 
arrangements (live with other or live alone) and ethnicity (White British or Other ethnicity) are 
presented in table 11. Demographic variables that were statistically significantly related to the well-
being measures were included in the relevant regression models. 
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Table 11 
 
Two-Way Spearman’s Rho Correlations between Demographic Variables and Well-Being. 
 Age Gender Relationship 
Status 
Living 
Arrangement 
Ethnicity 
Positive 
Affect 
.124* .016 -.100 -.057 -.057 
Negative 
Affect 
-.338** .037 .105 .029 -.069 
PFI .254** -.010 -.201** -.083 .023 
*Significant at the .05 level 
** Significant at the .01 level 
 
 4.4.3.1 Regression Model of Positive Affect 
 
 As shown in table 11 Age had a small and significant positive correlations with Positive 
Affect, therefore it was controlled for in the multiple regression exploring the predictive value of 
AEE and FoC on PANAS positive as shown in table 12. 
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Table 12 
 
Multiple Regression Examining the Relationships between PANAS positive and FoC and AEE, when 
Controlling for Age. 
 Β SE B B P 
Model 1     
Age .005 .002 .118 P=.038* 
Model 2     
Age .002 .002 .057 P=.304 
FoC to others .005 .006 .049 P=.400 
FoC from other -.001 .007 -.008 P=.927 
FoC self -.011 .005 -.158  P=.046* 
AEE Weakness -.023 .017 -.108  P=.117 
AEE Social rejection -.035 .013 -.204  P=.008** 
AEE Control .012 .014 .065  P=.421 
AEE Bottling -.013 .010 -.089  P=.200 
R
2
adj=.011 for Model one; R
2
adj=.151 for Model two (ps < .001). 
*Significance at level .05 
**Significance at level .01 
 
 Hierarchical regression was used to analyse the effect of FoC and AEE on positive affect 
when controlling for Age. Using the forced entry blocking procedure, model two was able to explain 
15% of the variance (R2=.173, R2adj=.151) which was an improvement from the 1% explained by 
model one (R2=0.14, R2adj=.011). The F statistic showed that model two was statistically 
significantly better than using the mean as a model, F (8,302) =7.87, p<.001. The F statistic for 
model one was also statistically significant F (1,309)=4.36, p=.038. Of note is that Age became non-
significant in model two suggesting that the inclusion of FoC and AEE better explains the variance in 
positive affect than this demographic factor.  
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 Significant contributions from predictors are shown in table 12 and only came from AEE 
social rejection (B=-.204) and FoC self (B=-.158). As a number of variables were non-significant, 
combined with the finding that 85 percent of variance is explained by other variables not measured in 
this thesis, the model is not deemed to be highly efficient in predicting positive affect. 
 
 There were 11 outliers identified as having residuals over 2SD’s, however Cooks Distance, 
Mahalanobis distance and leverage showed their influence to be non-significant so they were kept in 
the analysis. Durbin-Watson statistic showed that the assumption of independent errors was met as 
the statistic was close to two (Field, 2009). A check of the residuals found them to be randomly 
distributed along the line of best fit. Review of correlations showed there to be no correlations 
exceeding .8, a cut off used to identify possible multicollinearity (Field, 2009). Variance Inflation 
Factors (VIF) were less than 10, a cut off posited by Lorch and Myers (1990) to raise concern of 
multicollinearity. A further test of multicollinearity reviewed tolerance levels, which were found to 
all be greater than the 0.2 threshold identified by Menard (2000). Normality of residuals was 
reviewed via histogram and p-p plots, and the assumption of random errors and homoscedasticity 
were reviewed via plots of *ZRESID against *ZPRED (see appendix E). Linearity was assessed 
using scatter plots (See appendix E). As all of the tests for the stability of the model met the 
necessary levels, it can be assumed that the regression model is robust enough and not biased by 
individual cases. 
 
 4.4.3.2 Regression Model of Negative Affect 
 
 As shown in table 11 Age had a medium sized and significant negative correlations with 
Negative Affect, it was controlled for in the multiple regression exploring the predictive value of 
AEE and FoC on PANAS Negative as shown in table 13. 
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Table 13 
 
Multiple Regression Examining the Relationships between FoC and AEE and Negative Affect when 
Controlling for Age. 
 B SE B Β P 
Model 1     
Age -.014 .002 -.322 P<.001*** 
Model 2     
Age -.008 .002 -.187 P=.001*** 
FoC to others -.014 .005 -.132 P=.008** 
FoC from 
other 
.016 .006 .192 P=.010** 
FoC self .021 .005 .298 P<.001*** 
AEE 
Weakness 
.025 .016 .111 P=.103 
AEE Social 
rejection 
.037 .012 .205 P=.002** 
AEE Control -.037 .013 -.199 P=.004** 
AEE Bottling -.004 .009 -.027 P=.655 
R
2
adj=.101 for Model one; R
2
adj=.375 for Model two (p< .001). 
*Significance at level .05 
**Significance at level .01 
***Significance at level .001 
 
 Hierarchical regression was used to analyse the effect of FoC and AEE on Negative affect 
when controlling for Age. Using the forced entry blocking procedure, model two was able to explain 
38% of the variance (R2=.391, R2adj=.375) which was an improvement from the 10% explained by 
model one (R2=.104, R2adj=.011). The F statistic showed that model two was statistically 
significantly better than using the mean as a model, F (8,302) =24.280, p<.001, thus showing it to be 
a useful model in understanding Negative affect. The F statistic for model one and two were both 
statistically significant. Age remained a significant predictor in both models. 
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Significant contributions from predictors are shown in table 13 and came from, in order of 
amount of variance explained from highest to lowest, FoC self (B=.298), AEE social rejection 
(B=.205), AEE control (B=-.199), FoC from others (B=.192), Age (B=-.187), and FoC to others (B=-
.132). Bottling and AEE weakness were not significant predictors in the model. 
 
 There were 16 outliers identified as having residuals over 2SD’s, however Cooks Distance, 
Mahalanobis distance and leverage showed their influence to be non-significant so they were kept in 
the analysis. Durbin-Watson statistic showed that the assumption of independent errors was met as 
the statistic was close to two (Field, 2009). A check of the residuals found them to be randomly 
distributed along the line of best fit. Review of correlations showed there to be no correlations 
exceeding .8, a cut off used to identify possible multicollinearity (Field, 2009). Variance Inflation 
Factors (VIF) were less than 10, a cut off posited by Lorch and Myers (1990) to raise concern of 
multicollinearity. A further test of multicollinearity reviewed tolerance levels, which were found to 
all be greater than the 0.2 threshold identified by Menard (2000). normality of residuals was 
reviewed via histogram and p-p plots, and the assumption of random errors and homoscedasticity 
were reviewed via plots of *ZRESID against *ZPRED (see appendix E) and there were some 
concerns of positive skew, thus the regression model can only be assumed to reflect this sample 
distribution only. 
 
 4.4.3.3 Regression Model for PFI 
 
 As shown in table 11 Age had a small and significant positive relationship with PFI, and 
Relationship status had a small and significant negative correlation with PFI, both were controlled 
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for in the multiple regression exploring the predictive value of AEE and FoC on PFI as shown in 
table 14. 
 
Table 14 
 
Multiple Regression Examining the Relationships between PFI and FoC and AEE, when Controlling 
for Age and Relationship Status 
 B SE B Β P 
Model 1     
Age .015 .024 .238 P<.001*** 
Relationship 
status 
-3.783 .838 -.246 P<.001*** 
Model 2     
Age .039 .021 .088 P=.063 
Relationship 
status 
-3.518 .686 -.229 P<.001*** 
FoC to others .147 .050 .142 P=.004** 
FoC from 
other 
-.170 .061 -.209 P=.006** 
FoC self -.212 .049 -.296 P<.001*** 
AEE 
Weakness 
-.123 .155 -.054 P=.427 
AEE Social 
rejection 
-.447 .117 -.247 P<.001*** 
AEE Control .392 .129 .207 P=.003** 
AEE Bottling -.061 .090 -.040 P=.494 
R
2
=.106 for Model one; R
2
adj=.417 for Model two (ps < .001). 
**Significance at level .01 
***Significance at level .001 
  
 Hierarchical regression was used to analyse the effect of FoC and AEE on PFI when 
controlling for Age and Relationship status. Using the forced entry blocking procedure, model two 
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was able to explain 42% of the variance (R2=.434, R2adj=.417) which was an improvement from the 
11% explained by model one (R2=.112, R2adj=.106). The F statistic showed that model two was 
statistically significantly better than using the mean as a model, F (8,302) =24.280, p<.001, thus 
showing it to be a useful model in predicting PFI. Model one’s F statistic was also significant, 
F(2,300)=18.192, p<.001. Relationship status remained a significant predictor in both models, whilst 
age was only significant in model one. 
 
 Significant contributions from predictors are shown in table 14 and came from, in order of 
amount of variance explained from highest to lowest, FoC self (B=-.296), AEE social rejection (B=-
.247), Relationship status (B=-.229), FoC from others (B=-.209), AEE control (B=.207), and FoC to 
others (B=.142). Age, AEE bottling and AEE weakness were not significant predictors in the model. 
Relationship status was coded in a way that the minus standardised beta coefficeint can be 
interpreted to mean that being in a relationship was predictive of higher PFI scores. 
 
 There were 17 outliers identified as having residuals over 2SD’s, however Cooks Distance, 
Mahalanobis distance and leverage showed their influence to be non-significant so they were kept in 
the analysis. Durbin-Watson statistic showed that the assumption of independent errors was met as 
the statistic was close to two (Field, 2009). A check of the residuals found them to be randomly 
distributed along the line of best fit. Review of correlations showed there to be no correlations 
exceeding .8, a cut off used to identify possible multicollinearity (Field, 2009). Variance Inflation 
Factors (VIF) were less than 10, a cut off posited by Lorch and Myers (1990) to raise concern of 
multicollinearity. A further test of multicollinearity reviewed tolerance levels, which were found to 
all be greater than the 0.2 threshold identified by Menard (2000). Normality of residuals was 
reviewed via histogram and p-p plots, and the assumption of random errors and homoscedasticity 
were reviewed via plots of *ZRESID against *ZPRED (see appendix E). Linearity was assessed 
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using scatter plots (See appendix E). As all of the tests for the stability of the model met the 
necessary levels, it can be assumed that the regression model is robust enough and not biased by 
individual cases. All checks of bias and assumptions were conducted and yielded no causes for 
concern. 
 
 4.4.3.4 Summary of Regression Models and Partial Correlations 
 
 The use of partial correlations aimed to ascertain whether and how much the relationships 
between FoC and AEE, and well-being was unique or overlapping. Partial correlations for FoC from 
others and well-being measures, controlling for AEE scales, showed that in all relationships except 
one, FoC from others and AEE scales have direct relationships to well-being as opposed to spurious 
or overlapping relationships. The exception was that FoC from others and AEE social rejection 
seemed to be intervening in their relationship with Positive Affect. Partial correlations for FoC self 
and well-being when partitioning out AEE scales, suggest that FoC self and AEE scales have direct 
and unique relationships with well-being. Bivariate correlations showed that the relationship between 
FoC to others and well-being was not strong enough to meet the p<.01 level.  
 
 Analysis of the data using multiple regressions aimed to ascertain the role of demographic 
data in the relationships between FoC, AEE and well-being. Multiple regressions also allowed for the 
identification of the FoC and AEE scales which explained the most variance in well-being. The 
regression model for Positive Affect explained 15% of variance with AEE social rejection and FoC 
self being the only significant predictors in the model. With this said, AEE social rejection and FoC 
self provided a better explanatory model than age alone. Age was a significant predictor in model 
one but became a non-significant predictor in model two.  
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 The regression model for Negative Affect explained 38% of variance. All of the FoC scales 
were significant predictors in the model, and AEE social rejection and AEE control were the 
significant predictors from the AEE scales. The greatest contributors to variance came from AEE 
social rejection and AEE control, followed by FoC self. Bottling and AEE weakness were not 
significant predictors in the model. Again, significant AEE and FoC subscales provided a better 
model of predicting negative affect than age alone. Age remained a significant predictor in both 
models. Checks of the impact of outliers and normality revealed that the regression model for 
negative affect should not be generalised outside of similar sampling groups. 
 
 The regression model for PFI explained 42% of variance, thus was the best fitting model out 
of those tested. FoC self was the predictor explaining the most variance. Again all of the FoC were 
significant predictors in the model, but AEE social rejection and control provided the greatest 
contributions to the variance explained. Age, AEE bottling and AEE weakness were non significant 
predictors. The significant AEE and FoC scales were able to explain more variance in PFI than age 
and relationship alone. Age was significant in model one but became a non significant predictor in 
model two, whilst relationship status remained a significant predictor in both models.  
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5. Discussion 
  
 The chapter will begin by revisiting the wider context that the research is positioned in. A 
summation of the hypotheses will then be given. Following this, results will be outlined in relation to 
the three research hypotheses and considered in the context of the relevant literature and clinical 
practice. After this the strengths and limitations of the study will be discussed in an attempt to guide 
future research. Implications of the study to clinical practice, theory and research will then be 
offered. Finally, personal reflections regarding the experience of conducting the research will then be 
shared. 
 
5.1 Revisiting the Context of the Study and Hypotheses 
 
 The value placed on fostering of well-being as well as the reduction of distress has been 
recognised within the positive psychology literature (Seligman et al., 2005), at a service level in the 
creation of IAPT and well-being services following the health economics arguments presented by 
Lord Layard (2006). Governmental initiatives have also emerged for the measurement of the well-
being of populations alongside more traditional measures of Gross Domestic Product (Tinkler, 
2015). The combination of these factors has presented opportunities for the profession of Clinical 
Psychology to continue to assimilate and accommodate the principles of positive psychology and 
well-being into practice in order to guide and provide the mental health services that are wanted by 
different stakeholders.  
 
Within the broad area of emotion and well-being, the first set of aims centred on two 
transdiagnostic concepts from popular therapeutic approaches, FoC from Compassion Focused 
Therapy, and AEE from Cognitive Behavioural Therapy. The aims were to explore the relationships 
FoC, AEE and Subjective Well-Being 
 
 111 
of FoC and AEE with subjective well-being. Both FoC and AEE were already known to be 
associated with distress, but neither concept had had their relationships with subjective well-being 
explored. Gender differences were also investigated in line with the discrepancies reported in the 
existing literature. 
 
 The third aim of the study was to ascertain whether FoC and AEE were in fact independent of 
each other in their relationships with subjective well-being. Exploratory research questions were 
explored. Both concepts relate to the ability or unwillingness of an individual to experience and 
express emotions. However, AEE focuses on a cognitive behavioural learning cycle based on the 
cognitive behavioural principles of negative reinforcement and punishment, whereas FoC considers 
an individual’s experience of safety and security driven by an emotion drive/motivation system 
which is inherent to being human but also can be shaped by attachment patterns. Therefore, it 
remained unclear as to how the constructs of FoC and AEE converged and diverged. The results 
relating to each of the three hypotheses will be discussed in turn. 
 
5.2 AEE and Subjective Well-being 
 
 The transdiagnostic concept of negative AEE was known to be associated with distress in 
community samples (Joseph et al., 1994; Lowery & Stokes, 2005; Spokas et al., 2009; Wong et al., 
2006) and clinical samples (Joseph et al., 1997; Quale et al., 2009). It has also been shown in 
prospective studies to predict PTSD (Nightingale & William, 2000) and has been found to mediate 
between life events and distress (Surgenor & Joseph, 2000) as well as between invalidating 
childhood experiences and eating disorder psychopathology (Haslam et al., 2012). Previous literature 
had not explored the relationship between AEE and subjective well-being, however, if distress and 
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well-being fall on the same mental health continuum, it was predicted that AEE and subjective well-
being would be negatively correlated (the opposite to the positive correlations reported with distress). 
 
 It was found in the current study that more negative total AEE was associated with more 
negative affect, and less positive affect and subjective well-being. In other words negative AEE and 
poorer subjective well-being were associated with each other. However, there were differences in 
associations between individual subscales and subjective well-being measures, which may be 
accounted for by gender.  Before discussing subscale and gender differences more fully, the major 
finding that AEE is associated with positive affect and PFI will be placed within the existing 
literature. 
 
 The finding that AEE is negatively associated with subjective well-being differs from the one 
study previously to report data on this matter. The previous study found no association between AEE 
and subjective well-being in a purposeful sample of first time parents during the perinatal stage 
(Castle et al., 2008). Possible reasons for the difference in findings could be the different participant 
groups sampled and/or the different measures used. The major difference in the studies is that the 
current study recruited a community sample whereas Castle et al. (2008) recruited a very specific 
perinatal stage sample, a life event that is known to be high in stress and often emotionally salient. 
Additionally the sample of new parents recruited by Castle et al. (2008), also had a lower mean age 
and smaller standard deviation (Females M=30.7, SD=3.8, Males M=32.9, SD=5.1) than the current 
sample (Females=49.68. SD=15.59, Males M=51.14, SD=18.11) and were all in relationships 
compared to 69% of the current sample. Both age and relationship were found to be significantly 
correlated to PFI in the current study thus differences in sample demographics may explain the 
different findings regarding AEE and well-being. The four item AEE measure was used, which is 
likely to have a higher floor and lower celling effect than the 20 item measure used in this thesis. The 
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well-being measure used by Castle et al. (2008) was the General Well-being Questionnaire (Bradley 
& Lewis, 1990). The General Well-being Questionnaire differs from the PFI as it does not include 
items on life satisfaction and meaning. The measure was also designed for use with type-II diabetes 
patients within a health psychology setting, therefore differing from the PFI which was created for a 
general community sample. As the current study recruited a broader community sample than Castle 
et al. (2008) and used more general measures of subjective well-being, the current study’s findings 
are worthy of note when considering the relationship between AEE and well-being in the general 
population. 
 
5.2.1 Discussion of AEE and Well-being 
 
 In terms of understanding why AEE is associated with positive affect and PFI as well as 
negative affect, one can utilise the theoretical origins of the AEE concept as well as the cognitive 
notion of emotional expression more generally. One way of understanding the relationship between 
AEE and subjective well-being is through the existing literature on cognitive emotional regulation, 
specifically the tendency for emotional suppression. The following discussion should be considered 
within the context that the current study was cross-sectional correlational research, thus causation 
cannot be inferred nor can specific models be empirically supported. However, insights drawn from 
the models and theories discussed can aid in understanding the study’s results. 
 
5.2.1.1 The Role of Cognitions and Emotional Suppression in Well-being 
 
 The role of cognitions in emotional regulation is outlined in Kennedy-Moore and Watson’s 
(1999) five step cognitive evaluation model of emotional expression and non-expression. This model 
suggests that at the latter steps an evaluation of emotional experience in terms of personal beliefs and 
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standards occurs. Negative attitudes concerning emotional expression or the perception that one 
lacks socially accepted opportunities to express emotions in an adaptive way is posited as a barrier to 
emotional autonomy and a forced choice of emotional non-expression, or in other words emotional 
suppression. Pennebaker (1985) outlined the negative consequences of chronic emotional 
suppression, suggesting that as suppression is considered to be effortful and leads to a stress response 
in autonomic activity, it is associated with poorer health outcomes. The AEE is underpinned by the 
assumption that emotional suppression, as measured by the behavioural subscale bottling, is 
associated with poorer mental health. Joseph et al. (1994) drew from the cognitive model of distress 
(Beck, Emery, & Greenberg, 1985) to focus on the cognitively held dysfunctional beliefs regarding 
the fears of what emotional expression might mean to individuals. The AEE is also based on the 
findings that a tendency to suppress emotion leads to poorer outcomes due to a reduced ability to 
seek social support (Barnett & Gotlib, 1988); Joseph et al., 1994)  
 
 Barnett and Gotlib (1988) proposed that regardless of its aetiology, a tendency to restrict 
social interaction/support is a vulnerability factor in the development of psychopathology and 
distress. Results from the current study could be understood within a similar relationship as 
suggested by Barnett and Gotlib (1988) whilst also drawing from Seligman’s PERMA model (2011) 
which highlights the role of social relationship and connectedness in well-being. The individual 
analysis of the relationships between AEE subscales and well-being shows that AEE social rejection 
showed the strongest negative relationship to PFI for the whole sample. This may be an example of a 
vicious cycle, as shown in figure 2, whereby in an attempt to maintain the need for social 
relationships, people suppress their emotions due to fears that emotional expression will lead to 
social rejection, but in doing so, people may experience subsequently experience lower levels of 
well-being, perhaps due to lack of authentic social support/relatedness as suggested in the PERMA 
model (Seligman, 2011). This is one interpretation of the results and AEE social rejection will be 
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discussed further in relation to a different cognitive behavioural technique to consider its significance 
in relation to other AEE scales. 
 
 
 
Figure 2 Vicious cycle of negative AEE and well-being based on Cognitive Behaviour Theory and 
PERMA model (Seligman et al., 2006). 
 
5.2.1.2 Cognitions about Social Rejection and Well-being 
 
 The findings of AEE social rejection being a strong correlate out of the subscales and control 
being a weaker and often non-significant correlate will be discussed in the context of the literature. 
Previous research comparing AEE subscales is restricted to those exploring the relationship between 
AEE subscales and measures of distress, namely, depression (Joseph et al., 1994) and eating disorder 
psychopathology (Meyer, Leung, Barry, & De Feo, 2009). Joseph et al. (1994) reported in a 
community student sample that social rejection and weakness were the strongest correlates out of the 
Negative attitudes about 
the consequences of 
emotional expression such 
as social rejection 
 
Lower levels of 
well-being 
 
Need for social 
relationship and 
connectedness 
 
Emotional 
suppression 
used to regulate 
emotions 
 
Fail to experience 
authentic social 
connectedness and 
relationship due to 
lack of emotional 
communication 
 
FoC, AEE and Subjective Well-Being 
 
 116 
subscales to self-reported depression scores. Meyer, Leung, Barry, and De Feo (2009) found that 
weakness had the strongest correlation amongst the subscales with eating disorder psychopathology. 
Therefore, there is some consensus that attitudes concerning social rejection may be a stronger 
correlate of well-being compared to other subscales; however, there may be differences depending 
on the measure of distress or well-being used, particularly when considering psychopathology as 
opposed to direct measures of distress or well-being. This is the first study to suggest that attitudes 
towards social rejection are the strongest subscale in terms of their strength of relationship with 
subjective well-being. As the study is cross-sectional and correlational research causation cannot be 
shown. 
 
 The finding that AEE social rejection is a strong correlate of subjective well-being as well as 
distress is somewhat consistent with previous community research. Seligman’s et al. (2006, 2011) 
PERMA model of happiness includes the need for strong authentic social relationships, whilst 
DeWall et al. (2012) support the evolutionary view of social membership and highlight the reliance 
on social groups for humans to flourish. Whilst it can be argued that in modern societies people can 
met their basic needs to survive physically, subjective well-being would be assumed to be poor in 
those living solitary lives not by choice. It can be useful to consider the different AEE scales and 
integrate it within the cognitive behaviour technique of the downward arrow. The downward arrow 
technique aims to ascertain the most distressing personal meaning accompanying a negative thought 
which causes the thought to be experienced as particularly distressing. In this case it is argued that 
the AEE social rejection is linked to poorer mental health than compared to the other AEE scales.  
 
In the downward arrow technique, as shown in figure 3 a person is thought to reflect on a 
distressing thought or reasoning and consider that if the thought were true what would that mean. 
The AEE has been described by Wong et al. (2006) as scales representing beliefs about meaning 
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(AEE weakness), beliefs about expression (AEE control), behavioural style (AEE bottling), and 
beliefs about consequences (AEE social rejection). It is suggested that the feared consequences of 
social rejection are the ultimate fear based on the evolutionary perspective of the role of emotions in 
facilitating relationship and cooperation (DeWall, 2012). Once again, the PERMA positive 
psychology model can be drawn upon to help understand this finding in that one’s need for social 
relationship is considered a core part of well-being. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3 Downward arrow technique considering AEE subscales 
 
 
5.2.1.2.1 Evolutionary Basis of Social Rejection 
 
 
 Findings from a neuropsychological study exploring the way social rejection is experienced 
adds further support to the notion that the feared consequence of social rejection may have 
evolutionary origins that explain why it may be the most associated AEE scale to well-being. 
Eisenberger, Lieberman, and Williams (2003) used fMRI techniques to show that when people 
experience social rejection they experience increased neuronal activity in regions of the brain 
involved in the experience of physical pain. The researchers assigned participants to a control and 
experimental group and whilst in an fMRI scanner both played a virtual game of catch with two 
virtual players. In the experimental group the players started to exclude the participant from the game 
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whilst in the control group they were included for the entirety of the game. At the point of exclusion 
from the virtual game, participants in the experimental group were shown to have increased activity 
in the dorsal anterior cingulated and the anterior insula, a finding which the researchers concluded 
that social rejection is experienced in a similar way to physical injury. DeWall (2012) suggested that 
from an evolutionary perspective, humans have seemed to co-opt the system of physical pain to also 
respond to socially painful events, reflecting the importance of social relationship. 
 
5.2.1.3 AEE Control and Well-being 
 
 Attitudes about control were consistently found to hold the smallest correlations with well-
being. Joseph et al. (1994) reported in the student sample that control was not statistically significant 
in its relationship with depression. The control subscale is a measure of how much one thinks that 
emotions should be kept under control. Compared to the other subscales which focus on perhaps the 
feared consequences of emotional expression, for example, the rejection by others or the sense of 
personal weakness, the control subscales focuses on attitudes concerning the self-imposed rules, or 
as Kennedy-Moore and Watson (1999) put it the ‘should, oughts and musts’ of emotional expression, 
as opposed to the feared consequences. The control subscale is the strongest correlate, out of the 
other cognitive subscales, to the behavioural tendency bottling subscale. This suggests that more 
attitudes endorsing a desire to control emotions are positively associated with a greater behavioural 
tendency to bottle up or suppression emotions. However, there were gender differences that will now 
be discussed. 
 
5.2.2 Gender Differences in AEE Subscales and Well-being 
 
 It was found that the male sample, unlike the female sample, negative attitudes about control 
were not associated with level of PFI. For both genders, AEE social rejection was the strongest 
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associated variable to PFI and negative affect. For women AEE social rejection was the strongest 
related to positive affect, whereas for men AEE weakness was the strongest related to positive affect. 
Negative AEE control was the least correlated with any of the well-being measures, particularly for 
men where its relationship was non-significant with PFI and negative affect. 
 
5.2.2.1 Theoretical Explanations of Gender Differences 
 
 Perhaps the most striking finding in relation to gender is that AEE control for women was 
consistently associated to a statistically significant degree with all well-being measures, whereas for 
men AEE control was only associated with positive affect. Analysis of interviews with men and 
women about emotions found that women spoke about the need to control emotions twice as much as 
men (Lutz, 1996). Lutz (1996) suggested that a narrative of emotional control for women may 
represent the internalised wider cultural narrative that women are more ‘emotional’ than men, that 
emotion is irrational and dangerous, thus in response women may feel a strong need to control 
emotion to prove they are not the irrational beings they are often stereotyped to be (Heesacker et al., 
1999; O’Neil, 1981). The finding that, especially for men negative AEE control is not associated 
with measures of subjective well-being other than positive affect, suggest that AEE control holds a 
unique relationship with the experience of positive affect. This raises the possibility that different 
AEE subscales could hold different uses depending on whether at different points of time the focus is 
to alleviate negative affect compared to fostering positive affect. The current data suggests that 
negative AEE social rejection may be a more common factor in subjective well-being when 
conceptualised as low negative affect, high positive affect, and high subjective well-being. Contrary 
to this, AEE control may be more useful when focusing on positive affect alone. However, there also 
appears to be important gender differences within the AEE subscales and relationships with well-
being which will now be discussed. 
FoC, AEE and Subjective Well-Being 
 
 120 
 
 In the current study, men were found to endorse more negative AEE total, AEE weakness and 
AEE bottling beliefs than females. Levels of AEE social rejection and control did not differ across 
the genders. A previous study reported a small effect size that newly expectant fathers, reported more 
negative AEE than newly expectant mothers when using the four item AEE (Castle et al., 2008). 
Unfortunately, subscale scores were not able to be reported by Castle et al. (2008) as the four item 
version of AEE was used, thus comparison at the subscale level is not possible. However, there is a 
literature on the expectations placed on men due to the social construction that suggests that it is not 
masculine and is a sign of weakness to express emotions (Cutrona, 1996; Wong et al., 2006).  
 
 5.2.3 Summary of Discussion of AEE and Well-being 
 
 In summary, this is the first study to present evidence that AEE are correlates of subjective 
well-being. It is also the first to suggest that attitudes concerning AEE social rejection are of 
particular importance in subjective well-being when comparing AEE scales. This finding was 
understood using the evolutionary perspective (DeWall, 2012) and PERMA model from positive 
psychology (Seligman, 2006), which both advocate the need for social relationship and 
connectedness. Gender differences were also revealed which suggests that consistent with previous 
findings men hold more negative AEE total, AEE control may be more important to women than 
men. Both differences could be due to cultural stereotypes of gender and emotion. 
 
5.3 FoC and Subjective Well-being 
 
 FoC, in the flows of to self and from other have been consistently found to be related to 
psychology distress in clinical and community samples (Gilbert et al., 2011, 2012; Joeng & Turner, 
2015; Miron et al., 2015) whilst FoC to others has been less studied but found to be less associated 
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with distress. However, there was no previous research explicitly exploring associations with 
subjective well-being, but a few studies providing inconsistent evidence of a relationship with 
positive affect. The results from the current study showed that greater FoC in the flows of ‘to self’ 
and ‘from others’ was strongly associated with lower levels of subjective well-being. However, FoC 
to others was not found to be significantly associated with subjective well-being. Gender differences 
were observed, for example, for women FoC self was the strongest correlation with all subjective 
well-being measures, whereas, for men FoC from others was the strongest in two of the subjective 
well-being measures (PFI and negative affect). For each flow of compassion a more detailed 
discussion will be laid out. 
 
5.3.1 FoC Self and Subjective Well-being 
 
 FoC self consists of a sense that compassion is not deserved, or is a sign of weakness (Gilbert 
& Procter, 2006). This study showed that the greater the FoC self the lower level of subjective well-
being reported, with effect sizes in the medium to large range. This association was particularly 
strong for the measure of subjective well-being measuring positive, negative affect and life 
satisfaction. Associations between FoC self and negative affect are consistent with the already 
established links with distress such as anxiety, stress and depression (Gilbert et al., 2011, 2012; 
Joeng & Turner, 2015; Miron et al., 2015), but associations with PFI and positive affect add to the 
literature.  
 
5.3.2 FoC From Others and Subjective Well-being 
 
 FoC from others concerns a fear of the affiliative emotions such as affection and care which 
are proposed to be the building blocks of secure attachments and positive feelings about the self and 
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others (Gilbert et al., 2011).  It was found that the greater the fears of compassion from others the 
lower levels of reported subjective well-being. This finding is consistent with the literature which 
reports associations between FoC from others and anxiety, stress and depression (Gilbert et al., 2011, 
2012; Joeng & Turner, 2015; Miron et al., 2015). The finding adds to the limited literature exploring 
positive emotion states (Gilbert et al., 2012) by evidencing that FoC from others is also associated 
with lower subjective well-being, more negative affect, and as well less positive affect.  
 
5.3.3 FoC For Others and Subjective Well-being 
 
 FoC to others did not yield any statistically significant relationships with subjective well-
being measures. This is consistent with Gilbert et al.’s (2011) findings within his therapist 
subsample, but differed from the student sample which revealed small yet significant correlations 
with stress, anxiety and depression scores. Similar in all of the samples was that FoC to others tended 
to have smaller correlations with distress or subjective well-being measures as compared to FoC self 
and FoC from others. Gilbert et al. (2011) found stronger correlations between FoC self and FoC 
from others and concluded that these concepts likely measure a more general difficulty in 
experiencing affiliative emotions, as opposed to FoC to others which may operate through a different 
process such as prosocial motivations or moral values. With this in mind it is likely that the literature 
on social desirability bias may be relevant (Fisher, 1993) as FoC to other is the only FoC scale to 
focus on the behaviour of self to other, thus may be more prone to  anxieties of being perceived as a 
‘bad’ person by the experimenter (Fisher, 1993).  
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5.3.4 Summary of FoC and Subjective Well-being 
 
In summary, the associations between FoC self and FoC from others suggests that individuals 
with greater fears may struggle to experience affiliative emotions generated by the self or from 
others, and that this negatively impacts on all aspects of subjective well-being; positive affect, 
negative affect, and PFI. However, gender differences were observed and will be discussed in more 
depth. 
 
5.3.5 Gender Differences in FoC and Well-being 
 
 There were gender differences that reveal that FoC from others for men was not associated 
with levels of positive affect, whereas for women it was. It could conclude from this that for men the 
amount of positive affect experienced is impacted solely by fear of self compassion, whereas for 
women it is a combination of fears of compassion to self and from others. Comparisons of mean 
averages showed that men and women did not vary in their levels of FoC across all flows. Other 
gender differences between FoC scales suggest that it is the FoC in the flow from others that is most 
associated with lower subjective well-being and more negative affect, whereas it is the FoC self that 
is the strongest correlate for all well-being measures. As correlations between FoC self and FoC from 
others are highly correlated in the current study and in previous research (Gilbert et al., 2011), it is 
not appropriate to over analyse this results as the two flows of compassion likely operate within the 
same process. 
 
 In summary, women’s FoC self is a stronger correlate to subjective well-being whilst FoC 
from others is strongest for men. However, caution is advised in this interpretation as the two 
concepts are highly inter-correlated as already said, but also that like in previous research there was a 
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strong female bias in the sample. When considering the separate aspects of the PERMA model from 
positive psychology (Seligman et al., 2006) it is not surprising that FoC was most associated to the 
PFI measure as opposed to a measure of positive affect alone, as unlike the PANAS, the PFI 
potentially taps into multiple facets of the PERMA model. FoC self and FoC from others are highly 
inter-correlated and thus as previous research has suggested likely share similar underlying processes 
in the facilitation or blocking of the individual experiencing affiliative emotions generated within or 
by others in a more positive well-being increase manner. 
 
Alongside gender differences, relationships between FoC and Well-being varied by measure 
used. As the PFI yielded the strongest associations with FoC it will now be discussed. 
  
5.3.5 Discussion of Relationship between FoC and PFI 
 
A consistent finding was that FoC self and FoC from other had stronger correlations, often 
within the large effect size range, with subjective well-being as measured by the PFI, compared to 
smaller correlations with the positive affect measure. To understand this one needs to revisit the 
measurement tools used for PFI and positive affect. The PFI is a tool assessing an individual on a 
continuum from high distress to high well-being based on frequency of different experiences over the 
past week. It also has items enquiring about the concept of life satisfaction. On top of this the 
measure includes items measuring ones sense of life meaning, enjoyment, and satisfaction. The 
measurement of Positive affect focuses solely on the frequency of the experience of different positive 
mood states over the past week. The PERMA model (Seligman et al., 2006) provides a possible 
explanation for the difference in correlation strengths in that the PFI may be tapping into more than 
one area of the model, for example positive emotions, sense of meaning, and sense of 
achievement/enjoyment, whereas the positive affect measure focuses on just positive emotions. As 
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such, it is suggested that the PFI may be more sensitive to the barriers that FoC may pose on 
subjective well-being such as those proposed in the PERMA model, than a measure of positive affect 
alone.  
 
5.4 Summary of Discussion about AEE, FoC and Subjective Well-being 
 
 In summary, more negative AEE was associated with more negative affect, less positive 
affect and lower subjective well-being. Within a social view of the role of emotions, the results are 
understood by drawing from the literature on emotional suppression and a tendency to restrict social 
interaction/support. It would seem that negative AEE, which were designed on the premise that a 
tendency to suppress emotion leads to distress due to a reduced ability to seek social support (Barnett 
& Gotlib, 1988; Joseph et al., 1994), may also be a vulnerability factor in subjective well-being. AEE 
social rejection was often the most strongly associated with subjective well-being. This was 
understood in the social context of emotion and the evolutionary importance of group membership. 
A vicious cycle was proposed whereby due to the need for social relationships, emotional 
suppression is used to alleviate concerns of social rejection, but in doing so, lower levels of 
subjective well-being are felt perhaps due to lack of authentic social support/relatedness as suggested 
in the PERMA model (Seligman et al., 2006; 2011). Data from an fMRI study was used to show how 
the pain of social rejection activates similar areas of the brain activated in physical pain whilst the 
CBT technique of identifying the most feared or distress provoking thought or belief which may lead 
ultimately to fear of rejection. Gender differences in negative AEE revealed that men endorsed more 
weakness and bottling beliefs, whilst women’s attitudes and not men’s regarding control of emotion 
were associated with subjective well-being. Gender differences were understood in terms of the 
social construction of the emotionality in gender. There is a narrative still that it is not masculine and 
is a sign of weakness to express emotions (Cutrona, 1996; Wong et al., 2006) whereas for women 
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lack of emotional control may represent the internalised wider cultural narrative that women are 
more ‘emotional’ than men, that emotion is irrational and dangerous. 
 
 More FoC in the flows of ‘to self’ and ‘from others’ was strongly associated with lower 
levels of subjective well-being. FoC to others was not found to be significantly associated with 
subjective well-being. FoC to others did not yield any statistically significant relationships with 
subjective well-being measures. This was supportive of Gilbert’s (2009) perception that FoC self and 
from others likely measure a more general affective difficulty in experiencing affiliative emotions, as 
opposed to FoC to others which may operate through a different more cognitive process such as ideal 
prosocial motivations or moral values.  
 
 A consistent finding was that FoC self and FoC from other were more associated with 
subjective well-being as measured by the PFI, compared to smaller correlations with the positive 
affect measure. The measurement of PFI assesses subjective well-being on a single high distress to 
high well-being continuum which assesses subjective well-being as defined by low negative affect, 
high positive affect and high life satisfaction. The PERMA model (Seligman et al., 2006, 2011) was 
drawn on to provide a possible explanation for the difference in correlation strengths, suggesting that 
the PFI may tap into more than one area of the model, for example positive emotions, sense of 
meaning, and sense of achievement/enjoyment, whereas the positive affect measure focuses on just 
positive emotions. As such, it is suggested that the PFI may be more sensitive to the barriers that FoC 
may pose on subjective well-being such as those proposed in the PERMA model, than a measure of 
positive affect or negative affect alone. Finally, high intercorrelations between FoC self and FoC 
from others were understood in terms of their shared underlying processes originating in viscerally 
learnt childhood attachment patterns in the facilitation or blocking of the experiencing of affiliative 
emotions generated within or by others.  
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5.5 The Unique Variance explained by AEE and FoC in Well-being 
 
 As already discussed AEE subscales and FoC scales were generally associated with well-
being. However, FoC and AEE scales were also found to be correlated with each other, in some 
cases to a large degree. Partial correlations and regressions were therefore undertaken in order to 
better understand whether FoC and AEE explain unique or shared variance in subjective well-being.  
The following questions were considered 1) are FoC and AEE unique or overlapping in the variance 
explained in subjective well-being? 2)  How much variance in subjective well-being do FoC and 
AEE separately account for? 3) How much do demographic variables explain the relationships 
between AEE, FoC, and well-being? A brief overview of the results will be given and discussed in 
relation to the dualist theories introduced early in the thesis. Following this, the influence of 
demographic variables, namely age and being in a relationship will be discussed using relevant 
theory. 
 
5.5.1 Overview of Results 
 
 The study set out to explore whether the transdiagnostic concepts of AEE and FoC were able 
to explain unique variance in well-being. Partial correlations revealed that for FoC self all of the 
relationships with well-being measures were unique and not shared with AEE subscales. An example 
of this relationship is presented in figure 4 for FoC self, AEE subscales and positive affect (unique 
variance represented by non-overlapping circles and shared variance represented by overlapping 
circles).  Partial correlations also revealed that for FoC from others, all relationships with negative 
affect and the PFI were found to be unique from AEE subscales. The exception, as shown in figure 4, 
was in the relationship between FoC from others and positive affect, as FoC from others and AEE 
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social rejection seemed to be intervening in their relationship with Positive Affect. FoC for others 
was not analysed due to non significant bivariate correlations. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4 Example schematics of shared and unique variance explained by FoC and AEE by well-
being measure 
 
 These findings suggest that whilst FoC and AEE are seen as potential process that may block 
emotional processing and be causes of poorer subjective well-being in two popular therapies CFT 
and CBT, they do so in unique ways for negative affect and PFI, with the exception of FoC from 
others and AEE social rejection which seem to overlap in the variance of positive affect explained. 
The findings that FoC and AEE explain unique variance in negative affect and PFI will be discussed 
in relation to theoretical origins of the AEE and FoC, dualist theories of emotion and cognitive 
processing. The finding that FoC from other and AEE social rejection overlap in the variance 
explained in positive affect will be discussed in relation to the measures of well-being used.  
 
 
 
FoC from 
others 
AEE 
social 
rejection 
FoC self AEE 
social 
rejection 
AEE 
weakness 
AEE 
control 
Positive Affect 
PFI 
FoC, AEE and Subjective Well-Being 
 
 129 
5.5.2 Theoretical Underpinnings of AEE and FoC 
 
 The AEE outcome measure was created for use within cognitive behavioural therapy as a 
means of assessing for specific unhelpful attitudes about emotional expression (Joseph et al., 1994). 
Joseph et al. (1994) suggested that three of the AEE subscales represent cognitive components whilst 
bottling up represented a behavioural tendency of emotional suppression. AEE subscales focus on 
the negative attitudes about a need to control emotion, negative attitudes concerning emotional 
expression being a sign of weakness, and negative attitudes surrounding the feared consequence of 
social rejection due to emotional expression. AEE subscales were designed to reflect a type of 
dysfunctional assumption which is one type of negative cognition in CBT that can be developed due 
to past experiences but triggered by incidents in the here and now. 
 
 Different to the AEE scale, Gilbert et al. (2012) created the FoC scales having noticed that 
whilst some patients were able to challenge negative cognitions such as those measured by the AEE, 
they were unable to experience a change in emotion from negative to more positive affect.   Gilbert 
et al. (2012) concluded that it was the experience of compassion that would lead to avoidance or fear 
responses. Again likely due to adverse experiences in childhood care-giver relationships, but the 
focus was less on the cognitive learning of emotional expression per se as in negative AEE, but 
instead was of a lack of interpersonal closeness and felt sense of safety, otherwise conceptualised as 
the soothing system of the tripartite affect regulation model. Gilbert proposed that due to the 
evolutionary emotional regulation systems sensitivity to threat and competition easily leads to 
affiliative emotions being experienced as threatening (Gilbert, 2010). Therefore, whereas AEE 
assumes negative attitudes are the product of a cognitive behavioural learning cycle, FoC considers 
an individual’s emotional sense of safety driven by emotion drive/motivation systems which are a 
product of an innate sensitivity to threatening interactions due to being an evolved human.  
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5.5.3 Using CEST (Epstein, 2003) to Discuss the Unique Variance of FoC and AEE 
 
 As results from the current study suggest that FoC and AEE may be unique in their 
associations with subjective well-being, a broader theoretical perspective will be offered using 
Epstein’s CEST (2003) in an attempt to tentatively provide a plausible explanation for these findings. 
It will be argued that the findings of unique variance in subjective well-being explained by FoC and 
AEE map onto Epstein’s (2003) CEST experiential and rationale systems respectively and to 
different stages of the cognitive evaluation model of expression and nonexpression. Due to the limits 
of the current study’s data due to the correlational cross-sectional design, the following discussion is 
largely hypothetical and sets out how future research could lead to firmer conclusions to be drawn. 
 
 A brief description of Epstein’s CEST model (2003) will be given before discussing what 
system FoC and AEE might map onto. Epstein (2003) proposes that people have a conscious rational 
system and a preconscious experiential system of processing information from internal and external 
worlds. The experiential system is an evolved emotionally driven system developed through 
experiential emotional learning. The rational system is built on internalised culturally specific rules 
of reasoning. The rational system can engage in abstract reasoning and is unique to humans in its 
capacity of reflection. Whilst both the experiential and rationale systems are cognitive, the 
experiential system is strongly related to affect and is considered an emotional-cognitive system. It is 
proposed that the unique variance explained in subjective well-being by FoC and AEE may be due to 
AEE mapping onto the cognitive rational system and FoC on to the emotional-cognitive experiential 
system. 
 
 Epstein (2003) describes the experiential system, which the FoC is proposed to map onto, as 
a deeply emotional system and leads to felt “vibes”, which refer to vague feelings that may be made 
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up of a mix of more easily accessible feelings that can be reflected on in consciousness. Epstein 
proposes that when an individual is faced with an event of high emotional salience, the experiential 
processing system searches for past related events which had a similar emotional vibe. Epstein goes 
on to suggest that the recalled feelings then have upstream effects in the processing of further aspects 
of the emotional salient event. It follows therefore that if the recalled vibes are positive, the 
individual may think and behave in ways anticipated to lead to more positive experiences. However, 
if the recalled vibes are negative, than thoughts and actions are likely to attempt to achieve avoidance 
of the predicted negative feelings in the current situation. In terms of the rational system, which AEE 
is proposed to map onto, is the slower processer as it involves the conscious reflection on emotion 
and subsequent control of actions so as to not be acting on impulse all of the time. The rational 
system is also able to counter the experiential system, a process often utilised in psychological 
therapy such as CBT, wherein clients are encouraged to examine their initial thoughts and action 
which may be the product of the experiential system. These ideas will now be discussed in relation to 
the cognitive evaluation model of emotional expression and non-expression that was introduced 
earlier in the thesis. 
 
 5.5.3.1 CEST and the Cognitive Evaluation Model of Emotional Expression 
 
 The cognitive evaluation model of emotional expression and non expression (Kennedy-
Moore & Watson, 1999) outlines five steps regarding the process of emotional experience that can 
lead either to expression or non-expression. The first steps consist of preconscious processing of 
emotional information based on automatic physiological arousal and one’s preconscious sense or 
perception of their affective state or as Epstein terms it the emotional vibe. Disruption that would 
lead to non-expression at these steps occurs when a person is unconsciously motivated to block the 
experience of emotions from one’s consciousness (Garssen, 2007; Lumley, 2002). Epstein (2003) 
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reports that the experiential system operates in the preconscious awareness, thus within the realm of 
emotional processing, may be active in the first two preconscious steps of Kennedy-Moore and 
Watson’s (1999) cognitive evaluation model of emotional expression and non-expression. It is 
hypothesised that a felt FoC may lead to a fight/flight automatic physiological response when 
compassion is experienced and thus lead to an interruption to the experience of emotion in a 
congruent manner.  
 
 The latter stages of the cognitive evaluation model of emotional expression and non-
expression involve the conscious evaluation of and reasoning about affective response in terms of the 
internalised beliefs and goals regarding emotion and application to these within an immediate social 
context. Lumley (2002) asserted that disruptions at steps four and five can be referred to as the 
volitional and conscious inhibition of emotion, often termed suppression. The rational system which 
is based on logical reasoning learnt from cause and effect contingencies seems to map onto the latter 
steps of the cognitive evaluation model of emotional expression and non-expression. It is 
hypothesised that AEE may map onto the latter conscious reflection of emotion and decision to 
behaviourally suppress emotion or not.   
 
 The hypothesised way in which AEE and FoC may map onto CEST and the cognitive 
evaluation model is supported by Gilbert’s (2010) observation that clients in psychotherapy can 
intellectually change their thoughts whilst emotionally feel no different. The clinical case study by 
Harris and Hiskey (2015) wherein a client was supported using CBT and CFT to both think and feel 
differently provides an example of how a dualist understanding of transdiagnostic concepts may 
prove beneficially in better understanding mental health. 
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 5.5.4 Regression Models of Well-Being 
 
 In terms of how much variance in subjective well-being accounted for by FoC, AEE and 
correlated demographic variables, the model for positive affect explained 15% variance with AEE 
social rejection and FoC self being the strongest predictors. The negative affect model explained 
38% variance with AEE social rejection, AEE control and FoC self being the biggest contributors. 
The PFI model explained 42% variance with relationship status, AEE social rejection and 
AEE control contributing the most variance.   
 
 5.5.4.1 Differences in Variance explained by Measure of Well-being 
 
 To help explain the finding that FoC from others and AEE social rejection explained unique 
variance in PFI but seemed to share variance in positive affect, the measures used, the PANAS 
positive and PFI will be discussed. Whilst the PANAS positive affect scale places participants scores 
on a single continuum ranging from low positive affect to high positive affect, the PFI places a 
person’s scores on a continuum of depression/anxiety to happiness/relaxation. Figure 5 presents a 
visual representation of the theoretical debate regarding what can be termed hierarchically organised 
conceptions of well-being (Joseph & Wood, 2010). Diener, Suh, Lucas and Smith (1999) report that 
there is agreement within the subjective well-being literature that well-being can be conceptualised 
on a single continuum from low to high based on the summation of negative affect, positive affect, 
and life satisfaction. The development of hierarchically organised conceptions of well-being has 
been central to the presentation of an alternative framework of understanding mental health to that of 
the medical model (Maddux, Snyder & Lopez, 2004). Shown in Figure 5 is the notion posited by 
Joseph and Maltby (2014) and Joseph and Wood (2010) that describes how subjective well-being can 
be thought of as a selection of lower level continuums as represented in the middle portion of the 
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triangle in Figure 5, such as high positive affect, low negative affect, and high life satisfaction which 
when considered as a whole are deemed to reflect aspects of well-being. Alternatively, subjective 
well-being can be viewed at the higher order level and quantified on a single continuum from low to 
high subjective well-being. It can be argued that PANAS positive positions itself in the low order 
dimensional approach to well-being as it provides a score representing frequency of positive affect, 
whereas the PFI sits in the higher order continuum as it provides one score from items which 
measure negative mood states, positive mood states, and life satisfaction.  
 
 
Figure 5 Schematic of levels of continuum of subjective well-being (Joseph & Maltby, 2014; Joseph 
& Wood, 2010) 
 
 
 The authors of the PFI suggest that subjective well-being can be measured on a single 
continuum (Joseph & Maltby, 2014) based on the assumption that depression and anxiety are not 
discrete entities separate from normal states of being as suggested in the DSM-5 (APA, 2013), but 
instead are forms of distress differing in severity which fall on a single continuum alongside life 
Subjectiv
e Well-
being. 
Positive Affect 
 
Negative Affect 
 
Life Satisfaction 
Positive Affect – happy, inspired etc 
Negative Affect – anger, sadness etc 
Life satisfaction – meaning, enjoyable,  
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satisfaction (Joseph & Wood, 2010).  The results from the current study suggest that in situations 
where clinicians and clients wished to focus on FoC and/or AEE as a treatment target, the PFI would 
allow for the unique contributions to subjective well-being of FoC and AEE to be measured, whereas 
the measure of positive affect alone would miss the role FoC and AEE on life satisfaction for 
example.  
 
 5.5.4.2 The impact of Age and Relationship Status on FoC, AEE and Well-being 
 
 For the positive affect and PFI regression models, age was a non significant predictor in the 
final models; however, increasing age remained significant in the negative affect model. Relationship 
status, i.e., being in a relationship was a strong predictor in PFI. The role of age and relationship 
status will now be discussed. 
 
 5.5.4.2.1 Age and Well-being 
 
 Analysis showed that age was a significant predictor in all subjective well-being models. 
However, whilst age was a significant predictor for negative affect with and without the addition of 
FoC and AEE, the contribution of age to positive affect and subjective well-being did not remain 
with the addition of FoC and AEE. In other words it would seem that AEE and FoC account for the 
variance explained by age for subjective well-being and positive affect. However, age was found to 
explain variance in negative affect.  
 
 The correlations between age and subjective well-being are consistent with previous cross 
sectional research has reported older adults to report less negative affect than their younger 
counterparts (Carstensen, Pasupathi, Mayr, & Nesselroade, 2000; Charles & Carstensen, 2010; 
FoC, AEE and Subjective Well-Being 
 
 136 
Mroczek & Kolarz, 1998; Riediger, Schmiedek, Wagner, & Lindenberger, 2009) and with 
longitudinal research which found self-reported increases in sense of well-being with aging 
(Carstensen et al., 2011; Cacioppo, Hawley, Kalil, Hughes, Waite, & Thisted, 2008; Rocke, Li, & 
Smith, 2009). The pattern of greater subjective well-being in aging has often been understood in 
terms of psychosocial age related changes to how one relates to emotions, described in Gross’s 
(1998; 1999) cognitive emotion process model and Carstensen et al.’s (1999, 2006) Socioemotional 
selectivity theory (SST).  
 
 Gross (1998) proposed that older age brings with it an increased use of antecedent-focused 
regulatory strategies to influence the experience of adaptive emotional experience. In other words 
Gross (1998) suggests that in older age in an attempt to experience more positive emotion and less 
negative, proactive emotion regulation strategies are preferred as opposed to a response focused 
emotion regulation as the former intervenes or regulates emotion prior to the physiological, 
behavioural and psychological response to an emotion cue, thus negative emotion can be avoided 
and positive emotion can be sought out. Carstensen et al.’s SST (1999, 2006) explains this shift in 
emotion regulation strategy through ones changing motivations and goals. SST posits that at 
conscious and subconscious levels, individuals monitor time, specifically how much time they have 
left. Considering time influences the relative importance of two types of goals that dominate human 
thought and behaviour; knowledge and emotional. Knowledge goals centre on self-development and 
are prioritised when time is perceived as expansive thus one can work towards longer term self-
development goals. Contrary to this, the emotional goal type includes a focus on one’s immediate 
emotional life, thus behaviours are directed into activities and relationships for their emotional 
significance in the here and now. SST theory posits that people become increasingly selective in their 
goals as they age, so that experiences are more emotionally meaningful and satisfying. In essence, 
according to SST, older adults’ awareness that lifetime is shrinking motivates them to adopt 
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emotion-focused goals, emphasizing emotional satisfaction and meaning, which leads to a greater 
sense of well-being in that they experience less negative affect, more positive affect and report 
greater life satisfaction.  
 
 The current study found that age only explained one percent of variance in positive affect, 
10% of variance in negative affect, yet the addition of FoC and AEE into the regression models 
enabled 14% more variance in positive affect and 28% of variance in negative affect to be explained 
with the individual contribution of age reducing in both models, thus showing AEE and FoC to be 
better predictors of well-being than age. Similar conclusions can be made from PFI regression model 
wherein age and relationship status explained 10% of variance, whilst the addition of FoC and AEE 
alongside relationship status and age explained 42% of variance in PFI. Evidence from the current 
study suggests that increasing age is associated with lower levels of FoC self, which in turn is 
associated with and a strong predictor of subjective well-being. Future research could explore the 
effect that FoC self has on the transition from knowledge focused goals to emotion-focused goals 
and subsequent increase in antecedent emotion regulation strategies. For example, it could be that the 
aforementioned changes psychosocial relating to emotions is more true for those with low FoC self 
than those with high FoC. Future research could further therapeutic work interested in how to 
support successful aging. 
 
 5.5.4.2.2 Relationship Status and Well-being 
 
 Relationship status was found to be associated with PFI but not negative or positive affect 
when taken in isolation. The PFI regression model wherein age and relationship status explained 
10% of variance was increased to 42% with the addition of FoC and AEE alongside relationship 
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status and age. However, as relationship remained the strongest predictor in the model it warrants 
further discussion. 
 
 Bringing together psychological well-being models and cultural norms of romantic 
relationships may help explain the finding that being in a relationship was found to be the strongest 
predictor of PFI over and above AEE and FoC scales. As the sample was overwhelming white 
British this finding is considered within the cultural norms about relationships in the UK and other 
western societies. Numerous models of well-being include relationship with others, Maslow’s 
Hierarchy of Needs includes the need of belonging and love, Seligman et al.’s (2006, 2011) PERMA 
model terms it positive relationships, Ryff’s (1995) psychological well-being model also includes 
positive relations with others as a key factor for well-being. Goodwin, Cook, and Yung (1999) 
remarked that being in a relationship is often associated with greater life satisfaction, particularly in 
western cultures which are more individualistic such as the UK and America. Stone (1989) argued 
that western cultures suffer from an idealisation of loving intimate relationships so much so that it is 
widely perceived as a necessity for well-being. Drawing from the literature on psychological well-
being, it could be argued that being in a relationship in general gives a sense of satisfaction, 
meaningfulness and purpose due to the dominate cultural norm that proposed that being in 
relationship is the most pleasurable and satisfactory way to live. 
 
 5.5.2.3 Summary of Discussion of the Unique Variance accounted for by AEE, FoC, and 
Demographics 
 
 This is the first study to provide data which suggests that FoC and AEE may explain unique 
variance in subjective well-being, suggesting that the respective associations with subjective well-
being may operate through different processes.  Gilbert’s (2009) observation that there are clients in 
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psychotherapy who understand their distorted beliefs about emotions intellectually, but do not feel 
differently emotionally about them were tentatively mapped onto Epstein’s CEST (2003), with FoC 
predicted to relate to the emotional-cognitive experiential system whereas AEE predicted to relate 
more to the cognitive rational system. AEE and FoC were also hypothesised to align with different 
steps of the cognitive evaluation model of emotional expression and non-expression, in that FoC was 
predicted to link more with the early preconscious stages of emotion processing where blocks are 
based on autonomic physiological responses and vague emotional vibes. AEE was speculated to 
relate to the latter steps of conscious processing of emotion.  
 
 The differences in the variance able to be explained in well-being measures, particularly the 
PFI and positive affect, by AEE and FoC was understood in the context of the continuums employed 
by each measure. Using Joseph and Maltby’s (2014) critique of the continuums used by different 
measures, the PFI was felt to measure all of the aspects of subjective well-being on a single 
continuum, whereas the PANAS positive affect measured one aspect of subjective well-being on a 
continuum that would have to be interpreted alongside others to get an overall measure of subjective 
well-being. The results from the current study suggest that in situations where clinicians and clients 
wished to focus on FoC and/or AEE as a treatment target, the PFI may allow for the unique 
contributions to subjective well-being of FoC and AEE to be monitored, whereas the measure of 
positive affect alone may miss the role FoC and AEE on life satisfaction for example.  
 
 The associations between age and relationship status (i.e., being in a relationship) on 
subjective well-being were understood using psychosocial theories of emotion processing and 
positive psychology theories of happiness and well-being. Whilst further research may explore in 
more depth whether AEE and FoC actually reflect different parts of Epstein’s (2003) CEST model 
and Kennedy-Moore and Watson’s (1999) cognitive evaluation model of emotional expression, it is 
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tentatively proposed that psychotherapy targeting dysfunctional emotional expression may benefit 
from focussing on the emotionally based beliefs perhaps measured in FoC as well as the cognitive 
held beliefs measured in AEE, as reported by Harris and Hiskey (2015) in a clinical case study. 
 
5.6 Critique of methodology and design  
 
 5.6.1 Strengths of the Study 
 
 A strength of the study was the deliberate attempts made to recruit working age adults and 
older age adults as opposed to accepting older age participants as a hard to reach group. This is 
important in the context of a population who live longer and the provision of mental health services 
for the older adult age group on parity with services for adults of working age which are often based 
on the extrapolation of findings from younger adult samples (Witham & McMurdo, 2007). This 
study provides psychometric data for the AEE and FoC that reveals the measures to be internally 
reliable for an adult population with an age range of 18-89 years. This is particularly useful for the 
FoC as the literature base is heavily skewed towards the recruitment of student samples.  To ensure 
recruitment of older adults methodological decisions based on research exploring barriers and 
motivators to research participation were considered (Hiskey & Edwards, 2013). Accessibility was 
considered in that the researcher travelled to locations where older adults were present, such as, 
university of the third age and Age UK meetings to minimise the need for travel by older adults 
(Mody et al., 2008). Recruitment posters and information sheets included reasons as to why 
participation is useful to other people and clinicians in an attempt to account for the key motivating 
factor of altruism (Mody et al., 2008). When giving recruitment speeches an emphasis was placed on 
the ongoing support from the researchers available to all participants in the form of contact details to 
meet the need of support and a sense of trust as reported by Cassidy et al. (2001). Finally, in response 
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to Jancey et al.’s (2006) findings that seeing the study as an opportunity to learn and having written 
results of the study were motivators in participation, both were facilitated. 
 
 Another strength of the study was its application of the literature on subjective well-being and 
awareness that focusing solely on subjective or psychological well-being can be restrictive. As such 
measures were selected and described using traditional definitions and categorisations of well-being 
alongside recent developments which include the term subjective well-being. The use of a new 
measure, the PFI, with a larger more diverse sample than the standardisation student sample is useful 
in highlighting the potential role of the PFI to clinicians committed to working with a 
conceptualisation of well-being which encompasses distress and PFI. This will be discussed further 
in the following section on implications. 
 
5.6.2 Limitations of the Study 
 
5.6.2.1 Defining Compassion 
  
 Unsolicited feedback via email from two separate participants suggested that the study had 
assumed that people would know what the term compassion meant. This ambiguity of its definition 
may reflect the relative newness of the term as understood within well-being and mental health 
services. It is an important point to consider as one can only answer questions about their fears of 
compassion when one has a working understanding of the term compassion. Without an agreed 
definition, there is likely to be a method bias caused by item ambiguity which refers to when 
ambiguous items allow respondents to respond to items systematically using their own heuristic or 
respond randomly (Peterson, 2000). 
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The Dalai Lama (1995) defines compassion as ‘an openness to the suffering of others with a 
commitment to relieve it’. The Oxford dictionary definition (2005) also centres on sympathetic pity 
and concern for the sufferings of others. Other attributes of compassion which have been mooted by 
Gilbert (2005, 2009, 2010) include motivation to care, an ability to tolerate unpleasant emotions, 
understanding others empathically, non-judging or condemning attitudes, and a capacity for 
sympathy. Research has also suggested that rather than compassion only applying to something you 
can be to others, as is suggested in the oxford dictionary and definition from the Dalai Lama, 
compassion feelings flow in the directions of to self, to others and receiving from others (Gilbert, 
2009, 2010; Neff, 2003). Neff (2003) and Gilbert (2009) differ in how they conceptualise 
compassion. Gilbert considers compassion within an evolutionary perspective that focuses on the 
evolved abilities to form attachment bonds within close others to enable cooperative behaviours to 
ensure survival of the group (Gilbert, 2010). Neff (2003) differs from Gilbert (2010) in that the 
conceptualisation of compassion is directed to the self as opposed to outwards to others as Gilbert 
(2010) proposed. The conceptual differences that have been outlined are important as it has been 
found that compassion directed outwardly to others and self-compassion may not be part of the same 
overarching concept of compassion, as shown in multiple correlational studies with undergraduates 
reporting no association between self compassion and compassion for others (Neff & Pommier, 
2013). 
 
 As can be seen, the definition of compassion as it has been in the research context is not 
perhaps easily accessible to research participants. Another aspect related to the ambiguous definition 
is that central to FoC from others is the understanding of affiliative emotions. Affiliative emotions 
are thought to be positive emotions which are experienced as soothing, calming and warmth. In 
essence it is these feelings which underpin the three circles model and enable the soothing system to 
operate (Rockliff, Gilbert, McEwan, Lightman, & Glover, 2008; Depue & Morrone-Strupinsky, 
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2005). The definition of FoC for others perhaps aligns most closely with traditional definitions of 
compassion in that it refers to noticing the suffering of others and being committed to helping that 
person. Providing or not providing help to others has been explored in relation to FoC for others 
(Graziano, Habashi, Sheese, & Tobin, 2007), thus perhaps the addition of helping could be added to 
the definition to help participants understand the concept. FoC self uses the traditional definitions of 
compassion but involves one directing it towards oneself rather than others. Findings which add 
depth to the definition are that those with mental health problems may feel that self compassion is 
not deserved or would represent a weakness (Gilbert & Procter, 2006). Perhaps a definition of 
compassion in research exploring FoC could benefit from providing a more detailed definition of the 
concept so as to help participants formulate their attitudes towards the three directions of flows. 
Strauss et al., (2016) consolidated existing definitions of compassion and proposed that compassion 
could be defined by five elements; recognising suffering, understanding the universality of human 
suffering, feeling for the person suffering, tolerating uncomfortable feelings, and motivation to 
alleviate suffering. Whilst no measure has been published that specifically measures all five 
components it is recommended that researchers specify the components of focus to improve the 
generalisability of findings emerging from the compassion literature. 
 
5.6.2.2 Sample Bias 
 
 The majority of the sample was female (77.7%) and as multiple regressions were run on the 
entire sample to ensure adequate power of analysis, it may be that gender differences were missed. It 
may also represent a potential difference in acceptability of the study to men and woman. The 
experimenter noted that when recruiting older adults, the take-up rate of men seemed lower than 
compared to women. There were examples of heterosexual couples approaching the recruitment 
stand and the woman taking a questionnaire pack but the man refusing, with one man stating whilst 
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pointing to himself that “this [I] is an emotion free zone.” Although there is no objective data 
available to compare take-up rates of males and females, subjective observations of this trend should 
be considered when interpreting the findings of this study. It may be that the male subset of the 
sample reflected men who considered emotions more acceptable, as such the sample may not reflect 
the wider male population. It is recommended that a qualitative study exploring the acceptability of 
participating in research concerning the trans-diagnostic concepts of AEE and FoC be undertaken. 
This is advised as opposed to quantitative research exploring the acceptability of research on emotion 
and well-being more generally as the stance taken in this thesis is one of advocating for a better 
understanding of mental health with regard to the possible and specific mechanisms that may be 
targets within psychological therapy. 
 
 The lack of diversity in ethnicity also limits the generalizability of the study. The sample was 
overwhelmingly white British and as such conclusions drawn should be applied to this client group. 
Different cultures have different norms for emotional expression and the attitudes which people 
internalise (Eid & Diener, 2001). Tsai, Knutson, and Fung (2006) affect valuation theory which 
proposes that people hold different perspectives on what emotions they would ideally like to 
experience. As such, study replication with more diverse samples in terms of ethnicity, as well as 
equal gender distributions are called for. 
 
5.6.2.3 Planned Analysis and Bonferroni Adjustments 
 
A possible limitation of the study was the relatively large number of statistical tests 
conducted on the same data points. Bonferroni adjustments were considered as per recommendations 
by Bland and Altman (1995).  However, many opponents of Bonferroni adjustments have questioned 
its utility and highlight that it is overly mechanical and solves the wrong problem. Perneger (1998) 
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provides a critique of Bonferroni adjustments, suggesting that its use can create problems for the 
researcher. Perneger (1998) that while applying Bonferroni adjustments may reduce the risk of type I 
errors, it simultaneously increases the chance of type II errors. Thus, results not brought about by 
chance are overlooked and thus the statistical analysis has in fact been overly cautious and 
conservative.  Other arguments against the Bonferroni method are that it solves the wrong problem 
(Rothman, 1990; Perneger, 1998). It is suggested that the Bonferroni method overlooks the 
researcher who is in fact interested in the individual analysis run rather than the study wide analysis 
per se. For example, a researcher using ten different questionnaires may wish to know whether any 
(even one) of the ten are related to their dependent variable, as opposed to hypothesising in a general 
manner that all or none will be related. In such cases a focus on the study wide type I rate is over 
simplistic and ignores the dilemmas faced when analysis reveals unexpected results which could be 
novel and true or simply down to measurement error. Instead Bayesian methods, wherein it is the 
integration of evidence based beliefs with new data analysis, are therefore a better approach than 
Bonferroni adjustment for the researcher interested in each of their variables individually as well as 
study wide. The approach advised by Penerger (1998) when testing hypothesis is to be sensitive to 
both the use of statistical analysis as well as the existing evidence base by describing what statistical 
analysis is conducted, what the results suggest alongside what the researcher believes to be true or 
chance findings. Whilst it is advised that Bonferroni corrections are considered in future research, 
Bayesian methods of analysis and interpretation is recommended in future research. 
 
5.6.2.4 Method Bias  
 
 Another weakness of the study was that it relied on self-report measures alone and may 
therefore suffer from systematic method bias (Bagozzi, Yi, & Phillips., 1991). This is also the case 
for previous studies exploring AEE and FoC so future studies would be encouraged to make use of 
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additional methodologies such as questionnaires from multiple respondents, or qualitative interview 
studies. Cote and Buckley (1987) reported on estimates of error due to method bias within different 
constructs such as attitudes, personality and aptitude. They concluded that for attitude variables 
perfectly correlating the degree of measurement error can account for half of the correlation, whilst 
for attitude variables with no correlation between them, measurement error can suggest a small 
correlation exists. Therefore, measurement error in this study could have led to both type I and type 
II errors. This is concerning as all measurement questionnaires were completed by the same person 
in this study. This is problematic as previous research speculates that participants attempt to remain 
consistent in their response set to appear rational to the researcher (McGuire, 1966). This has been 
called the consistency motif (Johns, 1994) or the consistency effect (Salancik & Pfeffer, 1977). 
Future studies should attempt to reduce the consistency effect by using methods such as the 
completion of self-report measures being staggered at different times to avoid them being completed 
all at once. Whilst informant completed versions of the AEE, FoC and PFI would also help in this 
limitation, it is not recommended as the theoretical perspectives of all of the concepts are that the 
individual is the most knowledgeable about their own cognitive and emotional experience. 
 
5.7 Study Implications to Practice, Theory 
 
 As FoC and AEE have been shown to be associated to subjective well-being, it is suggested 
that the therapies that FoC and AEE originate from, CFT and CBT respectively, in which FoC and 
AEE may be an effective target for treatment, may also be useful targets for intervention when the 
aim is to increase subjective well-being. Positive psychology therapies have tended to focus on 
increasing happiness and well-being under the theoretical assumption that positive functioning is 
fundamentally different from negative functioning. Therefore there is a divide in therapies seen to 
reduce distress and those aimed at increasing well-being. Whilst many issues would present in doing 
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so, it would be beneficial for the general public and commissioning bodies to have access to research 
which compares positive psychotherapy and distress based psychotherapy and those which explicitly 
and deliberately focus on both distress and subjective well-being. If done so it could help clinical 
psychologists who see the value in integrating therapeutic models in formulations and intervention 
plans. For example, when working on barriers to emotion processing it may be that adding aspects of 
CFT that target FoC and aspects of CBT that target AEE may have added benefits than either used in 
isolation. In a clinical context in which well-being services, who are tasked with increasing well-
being, are being set up independent of more traditional community mental health services who 
perhaps have more of a focus on alleviating distress, the current study suggests that it may be more 
reflective of the empirical evidence not to separate out distress and well-being, but instead to 
consider how transdiagnostic concepts relate to subjective well-being. 
 
 Regarding the dilemma for clinical psychologists to assimilate positive psychology principles 
of subjective well-being into practice, the current study suggests that the PFI could be useful to 
clinicians in three ways, firstly, it could be used by clinicians that subscribe to humanistic principles 
who aim to increase well-being in therapy not just alleviate distress. Secondly, the PFI can be helpful 
when evidencing the outcomes of a therapeutic model in terms of increasing well-being and thirdly, 
it can help identify determinants of well-being and the factors which promote positive outcomes in 
therapy. The associations found between AEE and the PFI are supportive of the use of the PFI in 
clinical psychology as the statistically significant relationships found in this community sample 
provide promising evidence that the PFI may have a place within therapies using a cognitive 
approach, particularly when AEE is an identified target in therapy. The findings have built upon 
positive results using predominately student samples, suggesting that there remains validity of the 
PFI within a greater age range encompassing adults and older adults. 
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 The relationships of AEE and FoC to subjective well-being had not been explored before. As 
such this study provides the start point of a literature which considers the value of identifying and 
focusing on blocks of emotion processing not only in therapy aimed to alleviate distress but also in 
general approaches to facilitate subjective well-being. As such implications to the theoretical 
approaches of CBT and CFT are that there may be other transdiagnostic concepts already supported 
in their links with distress which may also relate to subjective well-being. The current study also 
provides more support to the idea that all of the concepts measured in this study are based on theories 
not specific to abnormal psychology. For example, compassion focused therapy considers how 
evolutionary psychology affects all humans, whilst AEE is built on the notion that all humans 
perceive the world through a lens of core beliefs and assumptions. The subjective well-being 
measures used infer that all humans experience positive and negative mood states and have the 
ability to provide subjective ratings as to their satisfaction with life and experience.  
 
 5.7.1 Future Research 
 
 Future research on compassion should aim to provide better definitions of what is meant by 
the term compassion. In order to increase the appeal of research on compassion it may be that a 
definition taken from Gilbert’s (2005, 2009, 2010) work on CFT which includes motivation to be 
caring, ability to tolerate unpleasant emotions, feel empathy and sympathy, and be non-judgemental. 
The definition would need to be applied to all three flows of compassion. As FoC is deemed to be a 
measure of resistance to a felt experience or emotional state, definition of what affiliative emotions 
are would also be useful to future participants. The definition could also be supported by making 
explicit the social mentalities and three circles model to highlight that compassion is not necessarily 
an emotion as happiness or sadness is, but instead is a way of relating to one’s entire cognitive and 
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emotional life in a way that is caring and understanding, as opposed to self-critical and/or 
threatening. 
 
 Future research to replicate this study with a more ethnically diverse sample would be of 
benefit, particularly as relationship status was found to be a key predictor to PFI. Research should 
explore whether results are different from the current study with samples reflecting a broader range 
of cultural norms of emotional expression, acceptability of compassion, and components deemed 
important to well-being. 
 
 Research using the FoC has suffered from systematic method bias (Bagozzi, Yi, & Phillips., 
1991). Therefore, other methodologies such as clinical case studies, qualitative interview studies and 
quantitative questionnaire studies that collect data from a range of sources such as the participant and 
an informant might be helpful. 
 
 Replication of the study with samples who represent the more severe ends of the scoring 
range of the measures would be encouraged, as some scores were slightly bound on the FoC and 
AEE. This is particularly needed for the FoC measures which failed to have the top third of the 
scoring range represented. Whilst current longitudinal studies using the AEE suggest that it remains 
a relatively stable concept over time, even when mood fluctuates somewhat, it is less clear how 
stable FoC are over time, or how both FoC and AEE respond to treatment, in other words are the 
measures sensitive to change from interventions. 
 
 Finally, future research could explore in a more systematic manner how AEE and FoC may 
relate to different aspects of the cognitive evaluation model of emotional expression. Wong et al., 
(2006) outlines how each step of the cognitive evaluation can be measured; step one using 
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physiological instruments, step two using measures of repression such as the Weinberger Adjustment 
Inventory (Weinberger, 1990) and Index of Self-Regulation of Emotion (Mendolia, 2002), step three 
using measures of Alexithymia such as the TAS-20, and steps four and five using the AEE (Joseph et 
al., 1994). 
 
5.8 Overall Conclusions 
 
 This is the first study to provide evidence that the transdiagnostic concepts of FoC and AEE 
are associated to subjective well-being as well as distress as previously reported in the literature. 
AEE and FoC are most associated with subjective well-being when measured by the higher order 
factor which places life satisfaction, low negative affect and high positive affect on one single 
continuum such as the PFI. Clinicians are encouraged to use the PFI as an outcome measure when 
working with FoC and AEE as it may capture all of the areas of subjective well-being. The PFI may 
also be sensitive to increased life satisfaction due to demographic factors such as increasing age and 
being in a relationship as presented in psychosocial theories of age and emotional regulation, and the 
PERMA model (Seligman et al., 2006; 2011). 
 
 This is also the first study to provide evidence that AEE and FoC explain unique aspects of 
subjective well-being, that is, that the underlying mechanisms that connect AEE and FoC with 
subjective well-being are likely to be different. It is suggested that this reflects the differences in 
AEE and FoC of representing the cognitive rational system and emotional-cognitive experiential 
system, respectively, of Epstein’s (2003) CEST model. It is also proposed that AEE and FoC may 
represent different aspects of the blocking of emotion processing and expression as set out in the 
cognitive evaluation theory of emotional expression and non-expression. Further research would be 
needed to confirm the prediction that greater FoC may cause disruptions at the preconscious early 
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stages of emotion processing whilst AEE cause disruptions at the latter conscious stages of 
processing.  
 
 It is suggested that clinicians can make use of the finding that AEE and FoC represent unique 
associations to subjective well-being by integrating them both into practice when clients are troubled 
by blocks to emotional processing and using the PFI to monitor change over treatment to subjective 
well-being.      
 
6. Personal reflections 
 
The thesis undertaken was born from my clinical work with working age and older adult 
mental health services and observation that the process of engaging with emotions appeared more 
frequently problematic for those adults who were older and accessing services. It began as a project 
interested in potential age differences in AEE and FoC and evolved into the current project which 
focused also on the current dilemma of how Clinical Psychology can adapt to the increased interest 
in well-being. The process of conducting the research has included the dilemma of having to avoid 
questionnaires which may have highlighted potential risk issues such as suicidality. This has been 
difficult as I feel a sense of avoiding people’s distress, however, I took solace from the model of 
mental health I utilised as conclusions are felt to be generalisable to the full range of mental health 
and can be considered helpful for clinicians working with people accessing mental health services. 
  
Working on a project concerning blocks to emotional processing has provided many 
opportunities to confront my own shoulds, oughts, and musts about emotional expression and sense 
of safety and trust when receiving support from others. Reading about the power of a compassionate 
mindset when relating to one’s personal experience has been the greatest antidote to the sometimes 
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competitive experience of academia. The topic of this thesis has helped me learn to get to a place 
where I can persevere whilst allowing myself to struggle and seek help. However, it was not until 
late on in the process that I was able to learn to accept help and support in a way that felt calming 
and soothing. I owe a great deal to the gentleness of my academic supervisors who so skilfully 
supported me in different ways at different times. 
 
 The research has impacted on my own clinical practice in that I try to be aware of the 
potential for greater subjective well-being as opposed to focusing solely on the need to reduce 
distress. I have also considered the importance of being sensitive to everyone’s rules of emotion and 
how the processing of emotional content is different for everyone and often takes time to co-create 
the conditions that allows personal reflection in a safe way.  I particularly enjoyed the findings 
related to aging, and feel that it has invigorated my interest in approaches that foster successful aging 
as opposed to the efforts so often presented in modern day society to fight the aging process. I feel 
fortunate to have been able to read about positive psychology at this early stage of my career and 
hope that I am able to hold on to its principles in clinical practice over the coming years. Finally, I 
wanted the project to be relevant to Clinical Psychology and feel that the bold use of a single mental 
health continuum will encourage others to feel more confident in their assimilation of well-being into 
their practice and research. 
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7. Appendices 
Appendix A - Information sheet for Participants 
 
A Research Project Investigating Attitudes towards Expressing Emotions 
  
My name is Duncan Harris and I am a Trainee Clinical Psychologist at the University of Essex. As part of my 
doctorate research I would like to invite you to participate in this project concerned with the attitudes people 
hold towards expressing emotion. My research is being supervised by Dr Leanne Andrews and Dr Syd 
Hiskey, who together with me make up the research team. 
 
Before you decide whether you want to take part, it is important to understand why the research is being done 
and what your participation will involve. Please take time to read the following information carefully. Anyone 
who is 18 years of age or older can participate in the research. You can give your consent to participate in the 
research at the bottom of the page.  
 
What is the research and why is it important? 
 
The research is interested in what people think about expressing emotions. The project could help health-care 
professionals better understand the ways that people cope with strong emotions caused by different life events 
and stressful experiences. This can help health-care providers when working with people in therapy to support 
them in the best way possible. 
 
Are there any benefits involved in participating? 
 
You may find the project interesting and enjoy answering questions about your attitudes. At the conclusion of 
the project in September 2016, we will publish the findings which may be of interest to you on a website 
(website address is given at end of questionnaire).  
 
What would you be invited to do if you participate? 
 
You will be asked to answer questions about your attitudes towards expressing emotions and related themes 
such as compassion. You will also be asked some questions about your mood, your age, living arrangements, 
ethnicity and relationship status. 
 
How long will the questionnaires take to complete? 
 
The questionnaires can take approximately 15 to 20 minutes to complete. 
 
Are there any risks? 
 
There should be no risks in this research. However, as the research is interested in your attitudes towards 
emotional expression and compassion, it may be that you reflect on your mental well-being. If you are or 
become distressed please contact the research team in order for us to signpost you on to an appropriate source 
of support.  
 
You may also be interested in the NHS website page on mental well-being  
www.nhs.uk/Livewell/mentalhealth/Pages/Mentalhealthhome.aspx  
or the MIND website  
www.mind.org.uk/information-support/local-minds/. 
 
How will we maintain your privacy and confidentiality? 
 
Everything you answer on the questionnaires will be kept completely confidential. Paper copies of the 
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questionnaire will be locked in secure cabinets and will be made available only to members of the Project 
team. When the information is transferred onto the secure computer, the paper questionnaire will be shredded. 
 
Your rights as a participant 
 
It is up to you to decide whether to take part or not. If you decide to take part you are still free to withdraw at 
any time and without giving a reason. Once you submit your fully completed questionnaire it will not be 
possible to withdraw your data as responses are anonymous. 
 
What If I have questions about the project? 
 
Please contact Duncan Harris by email at dlharr@essex.ac.uk, by phone at 07586353561, or by post at School 
of Health and Human Sciences, University of Essex, Wivenhoe Park, Colchester, CO4 3SQ. Alternatively, 
you can contact the study supervisors: Leanne Andrews: landre@essex.ac.uk Dr Syd 
Hiskey: syd.hiskey@nhs.net 
 
Thank you for your time and interest. Please answer the consent question and click the arrow button at the 
bottom right of the page to continue. 
 
I have read the information about the study and consent to my responses being used in the 
ways stated 
[  ] Yes (please tick if you consent to participating in this study) 
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Appendix B – Debrief page for Participants 
 
Thank you for supporting our research study. We are very grateful for the time and effort you have 
spent completing the questionnaires. 
  
If you have been distressed by any of the topics raised in the questionnaires please contact the 
research team in order for us to signpost you on to an appropriate source of support. You can 
contact us using any of the details below; 
  
Duncan Harris: dlharr@essex.ac.uk or by phone at 07586353561, or by post at School of Health 
and Human Sciences, University of Essex, Wivenhoe Park, Colchester, CO4 3SQ.  
  
Alternatively, you can contact the study supervisors: 
Leanne Andrews: landre@essex.ac.uk                                    
Dr Syd Hiskey: syd.hiskey@nhs.net 
 
How will we maintain your privacy and confidentiality? 
Everything you answered on the questionnaires will be kept completely confidential. The 
questionnaires will be locked in secure cabinets and will be made available only to members of the 
research team. When the information is transferred onto the secure computer, the paper 
questionnaires will be shredded. 
  
Your rights as a participant 
You may withdraw your data by not sending back to the research team. 
 
What next? 
Pass it on! We would appreciate it if you could pass the research study onto your friends and family. 
Contact us to get paper copies of the questionnaires. Passing it on will help us with our aim to help 
healthcare professionals provide better support for people coping with strong emotions caused by 
different life events and stressful experiences. 
  
Want to know what the research found?  
The findings of the research will be shared in September 2016 on the following 
website https://attitudestowardsemotionalexpressionresearch.wordpress.com. A paper copy of the 
summary can be posted out on request using the contact details given. 
   
Thank you for your time and help. 
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Appendix C - Positive and Negative Affect Scale (PANAS; Watson, Lee, & Tellegen, 1988) 
 
This scale consists of a number of words and phrases that describe different feelings and emotions. Read each 
item and then mark the appropriate answer in the space next to that word. Indicate to what extent you have felt 
this way during the past few weeks. Use the following scale to record your answers: 
   
Very Slightly 
or Not at All A Little Moderately Quite a Bit Extremely 
1. Interested 
       
2. Distressed 
       
3. Excited 
       
4. Upset 
       
5. Strong 
       
6. Guilty 
       
7. Scared 
       
   
Very Slightly 
or Not at All A Little Moderately Quite a Bit Extremely 
8. Hostile 
       
9. Enthusiastic 
       
10. Proud 
       
11. Irritable 
       
12. Alert 
       
13. Ashamed 
       
14. Inspired 
       
   
Very Slightly 
or Not at All A Little Moderately Quite a Bit Extremely 
15. Nervous 
       
16. Determined 
       
17. Attentive 
       
18. Jittery 
       
19. Active 
       
20. Afraid 
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Appendix D - Positive Functioning Inventory (PFI; Joseph & Maltby, 2014). 
 
A number of statements that people have made to describe how they feel are given below.  Please read each one 
and tick the box which best describes how frequently you felt that way in the past seven days, including today.  
Some statements describe positive feelings and some describe negative feelings.  You may have experienced both 
positive and negative feelings at different times during the past seven days. 
   
Never Rarely Sometimes Often 
1. I felt dissatisfied with my 
life       
2. I felt happy 
      
3. I felt cheerless 
      
4. I felt pleased with the way I 
am       
   
Never Rarely Sometimes Often 
5. I felt that life was enjoyable 
      
6. I felt that life was 
meaningless       
7. I felt content 
      
8. I felt tense 
      
   
Never Rarely Sometimes Often 
9. I felt calm 
      
10. I felt relaxed 
      
11. I felt upset 
      
12. I felt worried 
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Appendix E - Attitudes towards Emotional Expression Scale (Joseph, Williams, Irving, & Cammock, 
1994). 
 
The following statements relate to thoughts and behaviours concerning the expression of emotions. Please read 
each one and indicate how much you agree or disagree with it:  
  
Strongly 
Disagree Disagree 
Neither 
Agree nor 
Disagree Agree 
Strongly 
Agree 
1. I think you should always keep your 
feelings under control       
2. I think you ought not to burden other 
people with your problems       
3. I think getting emotional is a sign of 
weakness       
4. I think other people don't understand 
your feelings       
5. When I'm upset I bottle up my feelings 
      
6. You should always keep your feelings 
to yourself       
7. Other people will reject you if you upset 
them       
8. My bad feelings will harm other people 
if I express them       
9. If I express my feelings I'm vulnerable 
to attack       
10. You should always hide your feelings 
      
11. When I'm upset I usually try to hide 
how I feel       
12. I seldom show how I feel about things 
      
13. Turning to someone else for advice or 
help is an admission of weakness       
14. It is shameful for a person to display 
his or her weaknesses       
15. I should always have complete control 
over my feelings       
16. If other people know what you are 
really like, they will think less of you       
17. When I get upset I usually show how I 
feel       
18. People will reject you if they know 
your weaknesses       
19. If a person asks for help it is a sign of 
weakness       
20. I don't feel comfortable showing my 
emotions       
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Appendix F - Fear of Compassion Scales (Gilbert, McEwan, Matos, & Rivas, 2011). 
 
Different people have different views of compassion and kindness. While some people believe that it is important 
to show compassion and kindness in all situations and contexts, others believe we should be more cautious and can 
worry about showing it too much to ourselves and to others. We are interested in your thoughts and beliefs in 
regard to kindness and compassion in three areas of your life:  
  
1. Expressing compassion for others  
2. Responding to compassion from others  
3. Expressing kindness and compassion towards yourself  
  
You will be shown a series of statements that we would like you to think carefully about and then circle the 
number that best describes how each statement fits you. Please use this scale to rate the extent that you agree with 
each statement about thoughts and beliefs about expressing compassion from others 
   
0 = Don't 
Agree at All 1 = 
2 = Somewhat 
Agree 3 = 
4 = Completely 
Agree 
1. People will take advantage of me if 
they see me as too compassionate        
2. Being compassionate towards 
people who have done bad things is 
letting them off the hook 
       
3. There are some people in life who 
don’t deserve compassion        
4. I fear that being too compassionate 
makes people an easy target        
5. People will take advantage of you if 
you are too forgiving and 
compassionate 
       
6. I worry that if I am compassionate, 
vulnerable people can be drawn to me 
and drain my emotional resources 
       
7. People need to help themselves 
rather than waiting for others to help 
them 
       
8. I fear that if I am compassionate, 
some people will become too 
dependent upon me 
       
9. Being too compassionate makes 
people soft and easy to take advantage 
of 
       
10. For some people, I think discipline 
and proper punishments are more 
helpful than being compassionate to 
them 
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Please use this scale to rate the extent that you agree with each statement about thoughts and beliefs about 
responding to compassion from others 
   
0 = Don't 
Agree at 
All 1 = 
2 = Somewhat 
Agree 3 = 
4 = Completely 
Agree 
1. Wanting others to be kind to oneself is a 
weakness        
2. I fear that when I need people to be kind 
and understanding they won’t be        
3. I’m fearful of becoming dependent on the 
care from others because they might not 
always be available or willing to give it 
       
4. I often wonder whether displays of 
warmth and kindness from others are 
genuine 
       
5. Feelings of kindness from others are 
somehow frightening        
6. When people are kind and compassionate 
towards me I feel anxious or embarrassed        
7. If people are friendly and kind I worry 
they will find out something bad about me 
that will change their mind 
       
        
8. I worry that people are only kind and 
compassionate if they want something from 
me 
       
9. When people are kind and compassionate 
towards me I feel empty and sad        
10. If people are kind I feel they are getting 
too close        
11. Even though other people are kind to 
me, I have rarely felt warmth from my 
relationships with others 
       
12. I try to keep my distance from others 
even if I know they are kind        
13. If I think someone is being kind and 
caring towards me, I ‘put up a barrier’        
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Please use this scale to rate the extent that you agree with each statement about thoughts and beliefs about 
expressing kindness and compassion towards yourself 
   
0 = Don't 
Agree at 
All 1 = 
2 = Somewhat 
Agree 3 = 
4 = Completely 
Agree 
1. I feel that I don’t deserve to be kind and 
forgiving to myself        
2. If I really think about being kind and 
gentle with myself it makes me sad        
3. Getting on in life is about being tough 
rather than compassionate        
4. I would rather not know what being ‘kind 
and compassionate to myself’ feels like        
5. When I try and feel kind and warm to 
myself I just feel kind of empty        
 
6. I fear that if I start to feel compassion and 
warmth for myself, I will feel overcome with 
a sense of loss/grief 
       
7. I fear that if I become kinder and less self-
critical to myself then my standards will drop        
8. I fear that if I am more self compassionate 
I will become a weak person        
9. I have never felt compassion for myself, 
so I would not know where to begin to 
develop these feelings 
       
10. I worry that if I start to develop 
compassion for myself I will become 
dependent on it 
       
11. I fear that if I become too compassionate 
to myself I will lose my self-criticism and 
my flaws will show 
       
12. I fear that if I develop compassion for 
myself, I will become someone I do not want 
to be 
       
13. I fear that if I become too compassionate 
to myself others will reject me        
14. I find it easier to be critical towards 
myself rather than compassionate        
15. I fear that if I am too compassionate 
towards myself, bad things will happen        
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Appendix G - Ethical Approval Application 
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Appendix H - Test for Normal Distributions 
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Appendix I – Multiple Regression Checks 
 
 
 
 
 
 
